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This dissertation examines representations of speech in narrative poetry in English 
between 1377 and 1422, a four-and-a-half decade span marked by almost constant 
political, religious, social and economic upheaval.  By analyzing the work that late 
medieval writers imagined the spoken word to perform – or, alternately, by examining 
how speech acts functioned performatively in medieval literary discourse – the author 
demonstrates how the spoken word functioned as a defining link between the Middle 
English text and the cultural tumult of the late medieval period.  More important, by 
focusing on speech as a distinct category within linguistic discourse, the study allows for 
a reappraisal of the complicated relationships between text and cultural environment that 
have been illuminated by scholarship on the politics of vernacularity and the development 
of the English language. 
 Chapter one uses The Manciple’s Tale to probe Chaucer’s engagement with the 
nominalist philosophy of William of Ockham, a philosophy which opposed the via 
antiqua and threatened to overturn the linguistic, epistemological, and ontological 
hierarchies that had been prevailed in various forms since the writings of Augustine of 
Hippo.  Chapter two analyzes representations of sacramental and priestly speech in the 
anonymous Saint Erkenwald.  By doing so, it redirects the critical conversation about the 
poem away from the role of baptism in redeeming the righteous heathen and toward the 
eucharistic theology that undergirds it, a critical that shift extends our understanding of 
the poem’s engagement with the emerging Wycliffite heresy and with typological notions 
of medieval Christian identity.  Chapter three focuses on the works of Thomas Hoccleve, 
fifteenth-century Privy Seal clerk and would-be court poet.  By examining the overtly 
performative speech acts in Hoccleve’s Marian lyrics, particularly “The Story of The 
Monk Who Clad the Virgin,” it establishes the existence of an idiosyncratic economy of 
speech within the poet’s canon, an economy that becomes paradigmatic for the mingled 
systems of monetary and interpersonal exchange that prevailed in the Lancastrian 
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“That whel wol cause another whel” 
 
 Just before it crashes to a premature and inconclusive end, the alliterative Wars of 
Alexander relates how its eponymous hero, having pressed his army well past the 
boundaries of the known world, reaches the shore of a vast ocean.  There, at the ragged 
edge of the earth itself, the fated conqueror hears the sound of his own language lapped 
back at him by cold, monster-infested waves: 
[Alexander] ... cairis on forthire 
To !e Occyan at !e erthes ende, & !are in an ilee he heres 
A grete glauir & a glaam of Grekin tongis. 
"an bad he kni!tis !aim vnclethe & to !at kithe swym, 
Bot all at come into !at cole, crabbis has !aim drenchid. 
     "an sewis furth !at souerayn, ay by !a salt strandis 
Toward !e settynge of !e son in seson of wintir.
1
 
The potent blend of alterity and familiarity in this passage – the terrible crabs that drown 
Alexander’s men and the accustomed speech of “Grekin tongis” – is enigmatic; the whole 
scene evokes nothing so much as the siren songs beckoning Ulysses on his journey home 
from Troy.  But Alexander’s odyssey is of a different sort than Ulysses’s, and the voices 
                                                
1
 [Alexander carries on farther to the ocean at the Earth’s end, and there, on an island, he hears a great 
chatter and a din of Greek tongues.  Then he bade his knights to unclothe themselves and to swim to that 
place, but crabs drowned all that went into the cold water.  Then the sovereign proceeds forth, always by 
the salt strand, toward the setting of the sun in the season of winter.] The Wars of Alexander, ed. Hoyt 
Duggan and Thorlac Turville-Petre, EETS s.s. 10 (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1989), 174 (ll. 5628-
5634), translation mine. 
2 
that call to the Macedonian warrior king from the island at the end of the world seem to 
mock rather than entice, to confront Alexander with the futility of escape from his 
ignoble bloodline, the inevitability of his death, the senselessness his often violent 
conquests, and the utter impossibility of his martial aspirations.
2
  Does Alexander send 
his men into the ocean to investigate the familiar speech from across the waves; or does 
he send them out, as he has done so many times before, to conquer what confronts him 
and subdue the words that echo from the edge of the earth?  Whatever the reason, the 
attempt is ultimately futile.  As his men drown horribly, Alexander can only turn the 
remains of his army toward the failing sun and toward a Macedonia he knows he will not 
live to see. 
 Alexander was not the only doomed king preoccupied with spoken language.  On 
another island near the edge of the known world, Richard II struggled to maintain control 
of the English crown in the face of an increasingly aggressive cabal of appellants.
3
  In the 
summer of 1397, he attempted to squelch those appellants once and for all by making 
them answer for the Merciless Parliament of 1388, a proceeding in which the appellants 
severely (if temporarily) circumscribed Richard’s royal authority.  Chief among those 
appellants was Richard’s uncle, Thomas of Woodstock, the duke of Gloucester.  Seized 
by Richard’s forces and held captive in the English territory of Calais, Gloucester was 
eventually coerced into admitting wrongdoing; just before his death he issued a full 
                                                
2
 Christine Chism observes that “in teasing at the barrier between self, other, and monster, [these lines] 
suggest the monstrousness of Alexander’s whole endeavor, the extremity of the desires that drive him.”  
See Chism, Alliterative Revivals (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 2002), 149.  
3
 While it is impossible to assert with certainty the composition date for Wars of Alexander, most critics 
have located it between the years 1361 and 1450, thus making it possible that the literary struggles of 
Alexander coincided with the dynastic struggles of Richard II.  For a brief, cogent analysis of the poem’s 
authorship and date, see Duggan and Turville-Petre’s introduction to Wars of Alexander, pp. xlii-xliii. 
3 
spoken confession, which was recorded and then read aloud to Parliament.
4
  Among the 
most serious articles in the confession was Gloucester’s admission that he engaged in 
treasonous speech: 
Also, in that I sclaundred my Loord, I knowleche that I dede evyll and 
wykkedly, in that I spake it unto hym in sclaunderouse wyse in audience 
of other folk .... Also, in that I was in place ther it was communed and 
spoken in manere of deposal of my liege Loord, trewly I knowlech wele, 
that we were assented therto for two dayes of three, And then we for to 
have done our homage and our oothes, and putt hym as heyly in his estate 
as ever he was.  But forsothe ther I knowlech, that I dede untrewly and 
unknyndely as to hym that is my lyege Loord, and hath bene so gode and 
kynde Loord to me.  Wherefor I beseche to hym naghtwythstondyng myn 
unkyndenesse, I beseche hym evermore of his mercy and of his grace, as 
lowly as any creature may beseche it unto his lyege Loord.
 5
 
Gloucester’s groveling was for naught; the duke died, apparently of natural causes, 
shortly after issuing his confession.  The admission that he “spake sclaunderouse wyse” 
and “in manere of deposal of [his] liege Loord,” however, proved damning even after his 
death – Gloucester was posthumously convicted and condemned by the crown.  Two 
other appellants met similar fates: the earl of Arundel was beheaded for treason; the earl 
of Warwick, also deemed guilty of treason, was exiled and stripped of his lands and title.  
                                                
4
 For a thorough account of Richard’s actions against the “Merciless Parliament” appellants, see Matthew 
Giancarlo, “Murder, Lies, and Storytelling: The Manipulation of Justice(s) in the Parliaments of 1397 and 
1399,” Speculum 77 (2002): 76-112. 
5
 From the Rotuli Parliamentorum, quoted and translated in Giancarlo, “Murder, Lies, and Storytelling,” 
81. 
4 
Like Alexander at the far end of the world, King Richard had reached the zenith of his 
power.  All that remained was for him to return. 
 Richard had waited nine years to exact retribution for the Merciless Parliament.  
By contrast, the remaining appellants’ retribution for Richard’s Revenge Parliament was 
stunningly swift.  In July of 1399, Henry Bolingbroke landed in Yorkshire from his exile 
in France, and by September he had succeeded in exacting from Richard a spoken 
“confession” of his own.  The King declared his “inability and insufficiency” to rule, and 
although he retained the “marks set upon his soul by sacred unction,” he gave his assent 
for Bolingbroke (now Duke of Lancaster) to succeed him on the throne.  Like 
Gloucester’s confession of 1397, Richard’s statement was read aloud to Parliament: 
according to the Parliamentary Rolls, “‘the king himself willingly, as it appeared, and 
with a happy face’ ... took the document and read it out loud himself ‘distinctly’ ... and in 
its entirety.”
 6
  And so Henry, duke of Lancaster, with Richard’s (coerced) spoken assent, 
became Henry IV.  And so Richard II – whose aspirations to semi-divine status had once 
led him to demand extravagant forms of address from his subjects and even to boast that 
the laws of the realm existed “in his own mouth” – was brought low as a prisoner in 
Pontefract Castle.  In a matter of months he would die there.
7
 
 I bring together these two examples – one historical and one literary – not 
necessarily to draw point for point comparisons among the Wars of Alexander, the 
deposition of Richard II, and the ascendancy of the Lancastrian dynasty.  Rather, I want 
                                                
6
 Giancarlo, “Murder, Lies, and Storytelling,” 93-94, 100. 
7
 David Wallace, Chaucerian Polity: Absolute Lineages and Associational Forms in England and Italy 
(Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 1997), 297.  For an analysis of the extravagant addresses upon 
which Richard insisted, see Nigel Saul, “Richard II and the Vocabulary of Kingship,” English Historical 
Review 110 (1995): 854-77. 
5 
to suggest the importance of the spoken word in both literature and the historical record, 
and to posit the spoken word as a point of intersection between the two.  With these 
examples, I also want to preview the general contours of this dissertation, a study that 
shows how representations of direct speech in late medieval narrative respond to and 
comment upon the political, religious, and economic upheavals that wracked England 
between the reigns of Richard II and Henry V.  More specifically, I explore how the 
speech acts described in literary texts, such as the unspecified Greek voices that call to 
Alexander, both comment on and are contingent upon important cultural and political 
events in the fourteenth and fifteenth centuries, events that include the deposition of 




 In order to do this, I apply the insights and vocabulary of modern speech-act 
theory – particularly the observations of J. L. Austin and John Searle – to the exigencies 
of the premodern text.  By focusing on speech as a distinct category within linguistic 
discourse, I demonstrate that the efficacy and function of speech stood at the center of 
rifts within the Ricardian and Lancastrian periods, that the spoken word itself existed as a 
deeply contested cultural and sociopolitical site in the fourteenth and fifteenth centuries.  
Questions of what speech could do and who was authorized to deploy it were closely 
linked to contemporary crises of sacramentalism, ontology, and dynastic authority.  By 
analyzing the work that late medieval writers imagined the spoken word to perform – or, 
alternately, by examining how speech acts functioned performatively in medieval literary 
                                                
8
 I will use the phrase “early Lancastrian” throughout this dissertation as shorthand for the reigns of Henry 
IV (r. 1399-1413) and Henry V (r. 1413-22), the first two Lancastrian kings. 
6 
discourse – I show the spoken word to be a defining critical link between the Middle 
English text and the tumult of the fourteenth- and fifteenth-century English nation. 
 
Throughout this dissertation, I will argue that speech was central to the social and cultural 
environment of the Ricardian and early Lancastrian periods; here I want to elucidate the 
specific contexts upon which I will focus and to explain why I bring them together. The 
first of these contexts is the linguistic and epistemological intervention of the fourteenth-
century Oxford philosopher William of Ockham.  Perhaps best known for his so-called 
“razor,” Ockham’s chief contribution to the philosophical milieu of his own time was his 
argument against the existence of universals, transcendent constructs that realist 
scholastic philosophy held were the “principal, stable and immutable forms or reasons” 
upon which all individual forms were predicated.
9
  Ockham posited that universals were 
not transcendent, divinely-ordained constructs but existed only as “thought-object[s] in 
the mind,” gleaned through observation and knowledge of individual forms.
 10
 This 
ontological shift – a de facto reversal of centuries of scholastic theory – had an enormous 
impact on late medieval understandings of speech and the functions that speech could 
perform.  In traditional scholastic thought the spoken word was inert and representational, 
wholly subordinated to the universal through a stable and specific hierarchy.  By 
obviating the universal, however, Ockham destabilized that hierarchy and opened the 
possibility for speech to function not only representationally but creatively.  To put it 
crudely, under Ockham’s nominalist philosophy, speech became immensely powerful, 
                                                
9
 Augustine, On Eighty-Three Different Questions in Paul Vincent Spade, A Survey of Medieval 
Philosophy, Version 2.0 (1985), 383, <http://www.pvspade.com/Logic/docs/Survey%202%20Interim.pdf>. 
10
 From Ockham’s Ordinatio, in William of Ockham, Ockham: Philosophical Writings, ed. and trans. 
Philotheus Boehner (London: Thomas Nelson and Sons, 1957), 41. 
7 
capable not only of communicating our understandings of reality but also of altering our 
perceptions of reality itself, even of creating individual realities by interfering with the 
“thought-objects” upon which knowledge of reality is predicated.  For Ockham and his 
followers, the world was contingent upon speech rather than speech being contingent 
upon the world. 
  Ockham’s nominalist philosophy affected fourteenth- and fifteenth-century 
understandings of the position of all speech within an overarching ontological system; in 
contrast, the fourteenth-century theologian John Wyclif was particularly interested in a 
specific kind of speech, that associated with the sacraments.  The dissident theologian’s 
arguments against sacramental speech roughly delineate the second cultural context with 
which this dissertation will engage.  Taking aim most vehemently at the sacrament of the 
Eucharist, Wyclif, who was as much a realist as Ockham was a nominalist, argued that 
the orthodox explanation of transubstantiation was a logical impossibility. Even after the 
sacramental words of consecration were uttered, he asserted, the body of Christ could not 
entirely replace the substance of bread and still leave behind bread’s sensual trappings, or 
accidents.  The accidents of bread, in other words, could not stand alone without their 
substance; as Wyclif writes, the “power !at prestis han stande! not in transsubstansinge 
of !e oste, ne in makyng of accidentis for to stonde bi hemsilf.”
11
  Wyclif proposed 
instead that priests could, by uttering the appropriate sacramental words, add Christ’s 
essence to the substance of bread, but under no circumstances did he allow for the 
wholesale substitution of former for the latter.  Thus, at the very heart of Wyclif’s attack 
on the Eucharist, we find a question about the efficacy of speech: can a priest’s spoken 
                                                
11
 Wyclif, “Of  Confession,” in Wyclif, The English Works of John Wyclif, 345. 
8 
utterance make the accidents of bread stand miraculously alone without their substance 
(the orthodox position) or can that utterance merely add the essence of Christ to the 
substance of bread (the position held by Wyclif)? 
Wyclif’s theological break from the orthodox medieval Church and the anti-
clerical stance that the dissident theologian often assumed helped to engender England’s 
first native heretical group, the Lollards.  Emerging in the mid 1370s and 80s and 
declining precipitously after the Oldcastle rebellion of 1414, Lollardy (or Wycliffism) 
was perceived as a very real threat to the social fabric of England in the Ricardian and 
Lancastrian periods.  In 1395 that threat prompted Roger Dymmok to present Richard II 
with an anti-Lollard book reiterating the full and exclusive presence of Christ in the 
consecrated host.  Dymmok also warned that failure to affirm “the sacramental sign of 
bread and wine currently maintained by the Church [would] destroy civil society” and 
lead to an anarchic “destruction of the community, whether this [community] is a city or 
a kingdom.”
12
  By the early 1400s, the usurping Lancastrian kings seized upon such anti-
Lollard sentiment.  The sacrament of the Eucharist itself – and particularly the belief that 
spoken priestly consecration enacted an orthodox transubstantiation – was held to be a 
“litmus test of orthodoxy”; denial of transubstantiation and of the priest’s efficacious 
speech was the very root and definition of heresy.
13
  In this political and religious 
climate, the fundamental question of what the spoken word could and could not do 
became the central issue of the central rite of the central organizing body in medieval 
England.  
                                                
12
 David Aers, Sanctifying Signs: Making Christian Tradition in Late Medieval England (Notre Dame, IN: 
University of Notre Dame Press, 2004), 9 
13
 Paul Strohm, England’s Empty Throne: Usurpation and the Language of Legitimation 1399-1422 (New 
Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1998), 47. 
9 
In the early years of Lancastrian kingship, the threat posed by Wycliffism collided 
with the exigencies of William of Ockham’s nominalism.  In his struggle to legitimize the 
uneasy crown he usurped from Richard II, Henry IV positioned himself as a champion of 
orthodoxy and scourge of the Lollards, effecting the 1401 passage of the statute known as 
De Haeretico Comburendo (which advocated the punishment of heretics by burning) and 
quelling heterodox writing with Archbishop Arundel’s Constitutions of 1407-09.  Paul 
Strohm documents that such resistance to Lollardy was important to the upstart 
Lancastrian dynasty for several reasons: by fashioning themselves upholders of the 
orthodox Church, Henry IV and his supporters hoped to gain broad public support for 
Henry’s claim to the Crown.  But Lancastrian resistance to Lollardy also had an 
important intrinsic rationale.  The very transformation of the host that Lollards denied 
also served as the theological and metaphorical underpinning for the project of 
Lancastrian kingship: just as the sacramental words of the Eucharist transformed bread 
into body, so too did the sacral coronation oath transform Henry, Duke of Lancaster into 
Henry IV, King of England.  Strohm writes: 
The Lancastrian commitment to ideas of transformation, so intense that it 
may be considered obsessional, is justified and defended by a strategy of 
doubling or division.  Good transformation – that is sacral transformation, 
elevation of inward properties without outward or apparent change – is 
reserved to the king ....  The Lancastrian program was reliant upon signs 
and more signs: more efficacious, more numerous, more motile and 
transferable.  Lollards (whose heightened respect for the spiritual 
10 




In this respect, the efficacy of the speech act that turns bread into body is of critical 
importance to the Lancastrian dynasty; the invisible but substantive change that 
sacramental speech effects is in crucial ways analogous to the coronation oath taken by 
Henry in 1399, an oath that had the power to “transform a claimant into a king” despite 
the absence of visible, physical change.
15
 
Anathema to Wyclif and the Lollards, the transformative potential of sacramental 
language was necessary to Henry IV and Henry V in the wake of Richard II’s deposition.  
So too, it seems, were the less miraculous transformations that Ockham’s nominalism 
suggested could be enacted by speech – the manipulation of those mental “thought-
objects” upon which human knowledge of reality is predicated.  The first two Lancastrian 
kings embarked on a project of what we would now call propaganda (or what George 
Orwell might call “newspeak”): they manipulated written chronicles and prophesy, legal 
writings, and even gossip in order to bolster their claim to the throne.  The Lancastrian 
attempt to secure power by controlling language – and particularly by controlling the 
explicitly spoken language of gossip – resonates strongly with the precepts of nominalist 
thought.  Indeed, by controlling the speech that helped create public understanding of the 
political realities of Lancastrian usurpation, the new dynasty clearly attempted to control 
the contours of reality itself, restructuring it in their own favor.
16
  This political 
                                                
14
 Strohm, England’s Empty Throne, 141. 
15
 Strohm, England’s Empty Throne, 139. 
16
 See Strohm, England’s Empty Throne, 2-3. 
11 
manipulation of language constitutes the third overarching social context with which this 
dissertation engages. 
Bringing together these cultural and political contexts, this dissertation 
demonstrates that questions about the efficacy of the spoken word were central to the 
Ricardian and early Lancastrian periods.  More important, however, it investigates how 
such seemingly disparate issues as Ockham’s theories on the signifying and creative 
functions of speech; Wyclif’s denial that priestly, sacramental speech could effect the 
miracle of transubstantiation; and Lancastrian manipulation of rumor, gossip, and other 
forms of linguistic expression are in fact related by a shared understanding that the 
spoken word can perform work, that speech contains the potential to affect directly, even 
to effect, its specific cultural environment.  Although such a notion is not wholly unique 
to the period I cover in this dissertation, the 45 years spanning the reigns of Richard II, 
Henry IV, and Henry V stand at a confluence of events that heighten the importance 
accorded to the spoken word.  These events include the increasing centrality of Corpus 
Christi to the medieval Church, the social displacements and hierarchical shifts (partly 
precipitated by the Black Death) that occurred in the mid- to late-fourteenth century, and 
the new social and political relevance accorded to the vernacular (an issue I will discuss 
in more detail below).
17
  Finally, the years covered by this dissertation are, as Anne 
Middleton has shown, years in which “poetry was to be a ‘common voice’ to serve the 
                                                
17
 For the growing prominence of Corpus Christi in the medieval Church, see Sarah Beckwith, Christ’s 
Body: Identity, Culture and Society in Late Medieval Writings (London: Routledge, 1993); Miri Rubin, 
Corpus Christi: The Eucharist in Late Medieval Culture (Cambridge: Cambridge Univ. Press, 1991).  The 
shifting hierarchies of the later fourteenth century are succinctly detailed by Paul Strohm in Social 
Chaucer, Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1989), especially chapter one, “Chaucer and the 




  Poetry itself, then, in its “public” capacity as social mediator, was 
necessarily understood not to be inert and reflective but functional, active, and alive.  In 
this respect, it is telling that Middleton’s discussion of public poetry frequently 
emphasizes the metaphorical poetic “voice” over written words: “public poetry 
generally,” Middleton argues, “speaks ‘as if’ to the entire community – as a whole.”
19
 
Individually, the chapters of this dissertation generally correspond to the three 
cultural contexts cited above.  Chapter one, “‘A wikked tonge is worse than a feend’: 
Nominalism, Speech, and Power in the Manciple’s Tale,” probes Chaucer’s engagement 
with the nominalist philosophy of William of Ockham.  I demonstrate that Chaucer’s 
preoccupation with Ockham’s nominalist ideas reaches its apogee in The Manciple’s 
Tale, a work that shows the poet considering both the epistemological ramifications of 
nominalism as well as the unsettling possibilities raised by the potential for language to 
alter reality or, in its most extreme form, to create it anew.  In chapter two, “‘And 
chaungit cheuely hor nomes’: Eucharist, Baptism, and Sacramental Utterance in Saint 
Erkenwald,” I analyze representations of sacramental and priestly speech in the 
anonymous Saint Erkenwald, a fourteenth-century alliterative poem that dramatizes the 
posthumous salvation of a righteous heathen by the poem’s titular saint.  This analysis 
redirects the critical conversation about the poem away from the role of baptism in 
redeeming the heathen and toward the eucharistic theology that undergirds it, a critical 
shift that extends our understanding of the poem’s engagement with Wycliffite heresy 
and brings the poem into conversation with issues of eucharistic theology and medieval 
Christian identity.  Chapter three, “‘Seye it eek with good deuocioun’: Economies of 
                                                
18
 Anne Middleton, “The Idea of Public Poetry in the Reign of Richard II,” Speculum 53 (1978): 95. 
19
 Middleton, “Idea of Public Poetry,” 98. 
13 
Speech and Redemption in the Works of Thomas Hoccleve,” builds on recent studies that 
consider Hoccleve’s often conflicting roles as Privy Seal bureaucrat and would-be court 
poet.
20
  By examining the speech acts in the critically overlooked Marian lyric, “The 
Story of The Monk Who Clad the Virgin by Singing Ave Maria,” I establish the existence 
of a specific economy of speech throughout Hoccleve’s Marian works, one in which 
supplicant and Virgin are locked in a system of mutual dependence predicated on the 
causative potential of the spoken word.  Furthermore, I show how this economy of speech 
becomes paradigmatic for the systems of economic and interpersonal exchange that 
Hoccleve develops in his better known works, including La Male Regle and the five-
poem cycle known as The Series.  By bringing together Hoccleve’s Marian lyrics and 
autobiographical works in this way, I illuminate the collision between traditional 
devotional culture and emergent fifteenth-century bureaucratic systems, a collision that 
fundamentally informed the poetic production we associate with the Lancastrian dynasty. 
 
When we consider the importance of speech to the philosophical, theological, and 
sociopolitical contexts that prevailed between Richard II’s ascension in 1377 and Henry 
V’s untimely death in 1422, we see an England deeply and actively invested in the 
potential of the spoken word to effect change.  But the specific linguistic issues identified 
above must themselves be put into the context of the increasing prominence of the 
English vernacular in the later Middle Ages.  Although England was (at least) a trilingual 
nation in the medieval period, “between 1300 and 1420,” as Nicholas Watson notes, “the 
position of English writing within this trilingual literary culture became much more 
                                                
20
 Ethan Knapp, The Bureaucratic Muse: Thomas Hoccleve and the Literature of Late Medieval England 
(University Park: Pennsylvania State University Press, 2001); Nicholas Perkins, Hoccleve’s Regiment of 
Princes: Counsel and Constraint (Cambridge, UK: D. S. Brewer, 2001). 
14 
important.”  English texts appeared “in far greater quantities than previously, gathering to 
themselves a new sense of their importance and undergoing a degree of standardization, 
as writers tried both to articulate their growing consciousness of the distinctiveness and 
coherence of English language and culture and to give the language a closer status to that 
of French or Latin.”
21
  This heightened consciousness – and increased production – of 
writing in English is a signal development in the literature of the fourteenth century, one 
rife with implications for England’s burgeoning “national [and] cultural identity,” as well 




 The development of the English vernacular in the fourteenth century is closely 
linked to medieval practices of translation; indeed, the vast majority of Middle English 
texts – as well as the majority of texts that this dissertation engages – have their germ in 
Latin originals or texts written in other European vernaculars such as French or Italian.  
Chaucer provides examples of both: his Manciple’s Tale is a close redaction of the story 
of Phoebus and the crow from Ovid’s Latin Metamorphoses; his Knight’s Tale is based 
upon Boccacio’s Italian Tessida; and his early dream visions have their root in French 
models such as The Romance of the Rose.
23
  Recent studies have shown translation into 
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the vernacular to be more than simply an effort to maintain consistent meaning between 
the “original” and the vernacular translation.  Rather, translation has been more 
accurately understood as an act of interpretation and criticism, “a site where cultural 
relations of dominance and subservience might be played out.”
24
  Rita Copeland in 
particular has demonstrated that vernacular translation serves to transfer not only specific 
texts into the mother tongue but also the cultural and social cachet those texts carried 
with them.  “Translation,” Copeland posits, “was also a primary vehicle for vernacular 
participation in, and ultimately appropriation of, the cultural privilege of Latin academic 
discourse.”
25
  Thus, texts like Chaucer’s Manciple’s Tale or the translations of the Gesta 
Romanorum in Hoccleve’s Series were not simply engaged in bringing Latin texts into 
the vernacular.  Rather, they were engaged in a wider effort to translate the prestige of 
Latin and Latinity into the English tongue.  Understood in these terms, translation 
becomes a deeply political project, and written translations themselves highly charged 
political texts. 
 The political dimensions of translation were nowhere more strongly felt than in 
the Englishing of that most central of written texts, the Bible.  Indeed, if we understand 
the project of translation as “the means by which cultural value and authority was [sic] 
transmitted from one period to another,” the translation of the single most important book 
in medieval Europe not only promised to accord an incommensurate prestige on the 
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vernacular itself, it also posed a genuine threat to the medieval Church, whose claim to 
authority rested largely on its exclusive access to and interpretation of the Latin 
scriptures.
26
  In the period that this dissertation covers, the issue of biblical translation is 
centered around the Wycliffite Bible, which appeared in at least two versions in the last 
decade of the fourteenth century.
27
 
The two-part response that these biblical translations engendered – the Oxford 
Translation Debates of 1401-07 and the promulgation of Archbishop Arundel’s 
Constitutions in 1409 – underscores the threat that they posed to the ecclesiastical 
establishment.  Of the barbed attacks on biblical translation that the Oxford debates 
generated, one particularly dramatic forecast of the consequences arising from an English 
Bible is worth repeating here at length: 
Translation into the mother tongue ... will bring about a world in which the 
laity prefers to teach than to learn, in which women (mulierculae) talk 
philosophy and dare to instruct men – in which a country bumpkin 
(rusticus) will presume to teach.  Translation will also deprive good priests 
of their prestige.  If everything is translated, learning, the liturgy, and all 
the sacraments will be abhorred; clerics and theology itself will be seen as 
useless by the laity; the clergy will wither; and an infinity of heresies will 
erupt.  Even the laity will not benefit, since their devotion is actually 
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The fears expressed in this admittedly alarmist response to Wycliffite biblical translation 
are, to a certain degree, fears over the corrupting influence of the vernacular itself, a 
“barbarous tongue ... grammatically and rhetorically inadequate as a vehicle for truth.”
29
  
But on balance, the concerns that Watson outlines are not so much about scriptural purity 
or dilution of theological truth as they are about upending the established ecclesiastical 
hierarchies – the relative positions of teacher and student assumed by the clergy and the 
laity, the “prestige” enjoyed by “good priests” over women and “country bumpkins,” the 
“usefulness” of clerics to lay people.  As David Lawton rightly observes, the contests 
over English biblical translation were less contests over theological issues than contests 
over “authority and who [had] access to it.”
30
 
 These recent studies on the vernacular have highlighted the tremendous cultural 
and political work performed by language in the later Middle Ages, particularly in the 
politically dynamic reigns of Richard II, Henry IV, and Henry V.  Although that 
scholarship has recognized that the vernacular “bore a close resemblance to the spoken 
word,” it has not engaged with the parallel work performed by speech in the later Middle 
Ages, preferring instead to focus on text and writing.
31
  On one hand, such a focus is 
logical: we do not have direct access to the medieval spoken word as we do to the written 
text; medieval vernacular speech acts (like all speech acts) disappeared as soon as they 
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were uttered.  On the other hand, the literature of the later Middle Ages presents us with 
texts that are explicitly and centrally focused on the spoken word – texts like Chaucer’s 
Canterbury Tales, which chronicles a fictional storytelling contest performed by a group 
of pilgrims, and the alliterative Saint Erkenwald, which details a confessional dialogue 
between a reanimated pre-Christian corpse and a seventh-century London bishop.  
Moreover, we know that many of these texts were written for oral presentation.  Joyce 
Coleman shows that Chaucer and his near contemporaries produced carefully nuanced, 
written verse for an audience that would often hear rather than see their words: “Aurality 
– i.e. the reading aloud of written literature to one or a group of listeners – was in fact the 
modality of choice for highly literate and sophisticated audiences ... among the nobility of 
England, Scotland, France, and Burgundy from (at least) the fourteenth through the late 
fifteenth century.”
32
  This “aurality” is evidenced in the text I used to open this 
introduction; The Wars of Alexander begins, “When folk ere festid & fed, fayn wald !ai 
here / Sum farand !inge eftir food to fayne !are hertis.”
33
  So while we may not be able to 
recapture medieval speech acts themselves, the texts that we call literature (from the 
Latin littera, meaning letter) may themselves be seen as records of speech, and the 
speech acts represented therein may be understood as verbal utterances in their own right.  
Though I will be focusing specifically upon the representations of speech within these 
literary texts, it is useful to recognize that those representations were articulated speech 
acts in their own right. 
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 Many of the works I examine in this dissertation have been previously analyzed in 
terms of their engagement with language and with writing.  The Manciple’s Tale, for 
example, has been approached “as an exploration of the nature of court poetry,” and the 
Manciple’s ventriloquizing crow has been described as a figure of the court poet 
himself.
34
  As a hagiography, Saint Erkenwald has frequently been understood as a 
translation of the Latin Trajan legend or, similarly, in the textual context of poems like 
the Anonymous Trental of Gregory, Lydgate’s Augustine at Compton, and the Vita Sancti 
Erkenwaldi.
35
  Even Hoccleve’s Marian Lyrics, when they have been analyzed at all, 
have most frequently been understood in the terms of their relationship to other written 
Marian poetry and, more recently, to the written petitions that dominated Hoccleve’s 
service as Clerk of the Privy Seal.
36
  This focus on writing is surely justified.  When we 
consider the “bryht golde lettres” that encrust the heathen’s sarcophagus in Saint 
Erkenwald, the relationship between the Monk’s prayer regimen and Hoccleve’s 
Formulary in “The Story of the Monk who Clad the Virgin,” or the Manciple’s repeated 
exhortations to “reed Salomon, ... reed David, ... reed Senekke,” we see details that 
underscore a self-conscious engagement with emerging paradigms of writing, translation 
and textuality.
37
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But analyzing these works only in terms of those textual and written paradigms 
provides an incomplete picture.  Along with the bright gold letters that we see in St. 
Erkenwald, we hear the baptismal words that Erkenwald speaks over the corpse.  
Hoccleve’s Monk is asked by the Virgin Mary to speak a series of prayers aloud “after hir 
doctryne and enformynge.”
38
  Chaucer’s Manciple reminds his fellow pilgrims ad 
nausiam that “God of his endelees goodnesse / Walled a tonge with teeth and lippes eke, / 
For man sholde hym avyse what he speeke” (IX 322-24).  These details demonstrate that 
while Chaucer, the Erkenwald poet, Hoccleve and others wrote with an eye fixed on an 
emerging written, literary, vernacular tradition, they also wrote with an ear attuned to the 
resonances of the spoken word.  They were acutely aware of the centrality of speech to 
the political, social, and religious conflicts of their day.  This study recognizes the 
“spoken-ness” of literature in the Ricardian and early Lancastrian periods, and in that 
recognition it presents a revised picture of the political and cultural work that poetry was 
able to perform.  By revealing the centrality of the spoken word for these medieval 
writers, this dissertation suggests new critical avenues for investigating the often public 
functions of poetry in the later Middle Ages. 
 
Performativity, Modern and Medieval 
 One theoretical construct important to my examination of speech in Middle 
English narrative is the “performative utterance.”  As proposed by Oxford philosopher J. 
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L. Austin in his series of lectures How to Do Things with Words, performative utterances 
are speech acts that “[a] do not ‘describe’ or ‘report’ or constate anything at all, [b] are 
not ‘true’ or false’...” and in which “[c] the uttering of the sentence is, or is a part of, the 
doing of an action.” By this definition, statements such as “I name this ship the Queen 
Elizabeth”
 
or “I bet you sixpence it will rain tomorrow” are performative utterances.
39
  
Austin distinguishes performatives from constatives, utterances that describe or report 
something and can ideally be declared true or false: “That ship is called the Queen 
Elizabeth” or “there are sixpence in my pocket” are constative utterances.  As Austin 
continues his lectures, he blurs the distinctions between performatives and constatives, 
eventually developing a general theory of speech acts organized around the locutionary, 
illocutionary, and perlocutionary aspects of all utterances, constative and performative 
alike.  The locutionary aspect refers to the “utterance of certain words in a certain 
construction, and the utterance of them with a certain ‘meaning’” – the vocal speech act 
itself.
40
  The illocutionary force roughly corresponds to the way in which a speaker 
“means” his utterance to be understood, while the perlocutionary force is the actual effect 
that an utterance has, one not necessarily connected to the utterance’s illocutionary intent.  
Thus, one locutionary act – let’s say a dirty joke – can have multiple perlocutionary 
aspects: it can make me laugh; it can make me angry; it can offend me; it can put me at 
ease.
41
  In the more precise vocabulary of Austin’s general theory of speech acts then, a 
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successful performative is one in which the perlocutionary force of an utterance is its 
illocutionary force, in which the effect generated by speech act is identical to its intent. 
 Austin’s work on performatives has been extended by John Searle, who focuses 
specifically on the philosopher’s notion that spoken words have the potential to do work.  
Searle distinguishes performatives from constatives by what he calls “the direction of fit” 
between the word and the world.
42
  In a constative or descriptive statement, the words 
uttered by the speaker fit the world; that is to say that the speaker’s words reflect his 
perception of the world around him.  Thus, if I see a couple that I know to be married, 
and I say, “You are married,” I have uttered a constative statement.  A performative 
utterance, on the other hand, is one in which the world fits the words uttered by a 
particular speaker, an utterance that does not simply describe the world but that actually 
alters it.  When, under the proper circumstances, a justice of the peace says to my fiancé 
and me, “You are married,” he changes the world to fit his words.
43
  This definition of 
performativity even extends to the supernatural: Searle specifically proposes that “when 
God says, ‘Let there be light!’… [He] makes the case by fiat that light exists,” thus 
uttering the very model of a performative utterance.
44
 As Saint Augustine of Hippo writes 
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in the City of God, “Dei quippe sublimior ante suum factum locutio ipsius sui facti est 
inmutabilis ratio” [For in fact the sublime speech of God in advance of his action is the 
immutable reason of the action itself].
45
  The Word of God does not merely describe; it 
creates. 
 There have been a number of productive disagreements with the theories 
propounded by Austin and Searle, none more influential than Derrida’s attack on the 
logical foundations of Austin’s performative category itself.  Specifically, Derrida takes 
issue with Austin’s exemption of literary and artistic speech – the words “said by an actor 
on the stage, or ... introduced in a poem, or spoken in soliloquy” – from his theory of 
performativity. Austin determines that artistic speech is “in a peculiar way hollow or 
void”; it can not be performative because it is “not used seriously, but in ways parasitic 
upon its normal use – ways which fall under the doctrine of the etiolations of language.”
46
  
In other words, Austin reasons that because it is predicated secondarily upon “normal” 
speech, the force of such derivative or “citational” speech is radically attenuated and 
cannot be performative.  Derrida, however, reasons that by excluding literary language as 
“anomaly, exception, non-serious, citation,” Austin effectively excludes the very thing 
that makes all utterances possible in the first place, the “general citationality – or rather 
general iterability – without which there would not even be a ‘successful’ 
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  In other words, because all speech acts function precisely by virtue of 
their adherence or deviation from conventional constructs – because speech acts are 
necessarily “repetitions of an established procedure or formula” – it is logically 
inconsistent for Austin to cordon off literary or dramatic speech acts from “serious” 
ones.
48
  Thus, Derrida determines that there is no difference between the “normal” 
performative and the “parasitic” performative: all performatives are similarly parasitic, 
all substantial speech acts are similarly hollow. 
 Unlike Derrida, who dismantles the fundamental logic of Austin’s theory, Pierre 
Bourdieu attacks the idea of performative speech in relatively straightforward terms, 
arguing that Austin and Searle simply misidentify the thing that makes speech 
efficacious.  According to Bourdieu, it is not the speech but the speaker that makes an 
utterance performative: 
By trying to understand the power of linguistic manifestations 
linguistically, by looking in language for the principle underlying the logic 
and effectiveness of language as an institution, one forgets that authority 
comes to language from outside....  In fact, the use of language, the 
manner as much as the substance of the discourse, depends on the social 
position of the speaker, which governs the access he can have to the 
institution, that is, to the official, orthodox, and legitimate speech.
49
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Thus, rather than existing within the speech act itself, the power that speech seems to 
contain – its ability to do work – should more accurately be understood as a reflection of 
the social status of the speaker.  Bourdieu insists that social circumstances are always 
inseparable from the effective deployment of performative speech.  The degree to which 
the speaker has access to the necessary social channels of authority determines the 
potential for that speaker to manifest the illocutionary – and perlocutionary – force of his 
speech. 
 The critical conversation surrounding performativity has been productive for 
some recent analyses of Middle English literature.  Bourdieu’s revision of Austin and 
Searle is particularly illuminating when we consider the fourteenth- and fifteenth-century 
English court itself, a locus in which courtiers employed various kinds of spoken 
discourse in an ongoing struggle for authority, patronage, and royal favor.  Lynn Staley 
has recently explored this issue, arguing that in the literary and documentary texts of the 
late fourteenth century we can see “an actual search for a language of power during the 
reign of Richard II.”
50
  Staley articulates a series of rhetorical strategies by which 
individuals within and around the royal court attempted to maintain (or enhance) their 
own positions of power: courtiers used a hierarchically coded “language of love” to 
describe not only romantic but also political relationships; rivals to Richard’s power, 
often from the House of Lancaster, struggled to find a language that would circumscribe 
the king’s royal prerogative while enhancing their own; Richard himself deployed a 
continentally inflected language of sacral kingship in order “to produce a royal image as 
magically endowed as that of the French kings,” and he sought an appropriate and 
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“meaningful ... language of princely address” to secure his monarchal authority.
51
  Paul 
Strohm embarks upon a similar project in his examination of the fifteenth-century 
Lancastrian Kings.  Like Staley, Strohm shows that the manipulation of language and the 
manipulation of power were, in the Lancastrian court, coterminous acts.
52
  The work of 
both Staley and Strohm, which clearly demonstrates the relationship between the creation 
of courtly power and the deployment of successful strategies of discourse in late 
medieval England, accords with Bourdieu’s response to Austin by showing the intimate 
link between the efficacious utterance and the powerful speaker. 
 Derrida’s discussion of iterability, as well as Austin’s exclusion of “citational” 
speech from “normal” speech, have also proven instructive for recent work on the Middle 
Ages.  In her examination of ecclesiastical regulation of medieval preaching practices, 
Claire Waters determines that the logical inconsistencies concerning artistic and citational 
speech that Derrida seized upon in Austin’s theories of performativity are analogous to 
Church concerns over the role of unlicensed preaching in the Middle Ages.  Waters 
reasons that authorized, licensed preaching in medieval England was itself based on 
citation, specifically on a “lineage of ... priests and preachers whose words derived from 
the words of Christ, who were supposed to follow and imitate him, and who were 
authorized both by that point of origin and by the ongoing tradition of priestly office in 
which they stood.”
53
  In other words, the power of the licensed preacher derived directly 
from the citational relationship of his words to the words of Christ (an inversion of 
Austin’s sense that the power of citational speech is etiolated by virtue of its “parasitic” 
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relationship to “normal” speech).  The presence of unlicensed lay preachers and self-
proclaimed prophets, however, threatened these official “chains of citation” precisely 
because such figures worked outside of the church hierarchy and “[claimed] a 
charismatic, personal authority ... that [was] much more difficult to regulate.”  Absent the 
citational authority claimed by licensed preachers, the preponderance of unregulated, lay 
preaching in the later Middle Ages threatened to create ecclesiastical contexts “without 
any center or absolute anchoring (ancrage).’” This Derrida-esque decentering of priestly 
authority was “anathema to medieval preaching theorists,” and its specter drove 
ecclesiastical efforts to regulate preaching.
54
 
 A Derridian insistence on iterability is also implicit in Susan Phillips’s 
Transforming Talk, particularly in the argument that medieval gossip was predicated not 
upon principles of “transgression” but upon “transformation.”  Phillips argues that far 
from being the exclusive (and exclusively transgressive) discursive domain of women in 
the Middle Ages, gossip in medieval England should be seen as a kind of speech that 
“influences and structures orthodox and literary practices,” speech that “is both the 
obstacle and the tool of priests and pastoral writers [and] ... a device that enables 
vernacular poets to reinterpret Latin textual culture.”
55
 
 My own analysis of the speech acts represented in Middle English narrative draws 
less from Derrida and Bourdieu than do the readings I discuss above.  Where I invoke 
modern speech act theory in this dissertation, I more frequently use the interpretive 
vocabulary of Searle and Austin than the interventions of their post-structuralist critics.  
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Despite the thorough dislocation of Austin’s theory that Derrida performs, the distinction 
that Austin and Searle draw between speech acts that shape their world and speech acts 
that reflect their world’s shape provides a useful interpretive framework for engaging 
with the literature of the Ricardian and early Lancastrian periods.  Moreover, if that 
framework can also support the questions about power and authority that Bourdieu finds 
implicit in the spoken word – and I propose that it can – so much the better.  Where I do 
find Derrida’s intervention extremely useful, however, is in justifying the heuristic link I 
draw between literary representations of speech and historical speech acts themselves.  
The objection might be raised that we do not – nor can ever – have access to medieval 
speech; thus, the speech we see represented on the page (and the work that authors 
imagined it to do) are somehow inauthentic.  In that argument, literary representations of 
speech are necessarily pale imitations of actual speech; they can not attest to the “real” 
functions that speech was understood to have in the Middle Ages since they are not the 
“real” spoken words of the Middle Ages.  Such an argument is, of course, a variation of 
Austin’s exclusion of the parasitic, citational and etiolated language of artistic expression 
from his theory of performativity.  What Derrida shows is that such citational speech is 
no more etiolated than any other speech.  It is structurally and functionally identical to the 
speech we hear spoken, to the speech that Chaucer would have heard spoken, to the 
speech that Hoccleve ventriloquizes in his Series, or even to the baptismal utterance that 
the Erkenwald poet writes into his poem.  Understanding speech in this capacity allows 
us to engage with textual representations of speech on the same level that we might 
engage with vocalized speech, even the vocalized speech recorded in the Rolls of 
Parliament over 600 years ago.  Thus, our engagement with literary representations of 
29 
Middle English speech can itself be seen as engagement with historical Middle English 
speech; the potential of one is the same as the potential of the other. 
 
The Wheel of Language: Representations of Speech in the House of Fame 
The “grete glauir & [the] glamm of Grekin tongis” that greets Alexander at the 
end of the world is reminiscent of another incomplete Middle English poem, a comic 
rather than an epic quest that likens the indistinct rumble of “speche and chidynges” (HF 
1028) to the “betynge of the see... ayen the roched holowe” (HF 1034-5).  Chaucer’s 
House of Fame is an unapologetically perplexing work, a dream vision that takes its 
reader (and its dreamer narrator, Geffrey) on a tour through glass temples and enormous 
wicker labyrinths comparable to the strangest architectural wonders described in the 
Wars of Alexander.  Referred to by one critic as “the most bookish of Chaucer’s books,” 
the House of Fame is deeply, often frustratingly, multivalent: it is simultaneously a 
rumination on the vagaries of fame and literary production, an inquiry into the nature of 
written and spoken auctorite, a genre-unraveling assault on the traditional medieval 
dream vision, and a focused assertion of the vernacular English text.
56
  The poem has 
                                                
56
 A. J. Minnis, Oxford Guides to Chaucer: The Shorter Poems (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1995), 183.  
Minnis’s text provides the most comprehensive and cogent introduction to the slippery critical discourse on 
the House of Fame. Among other important studies, Sheila Delany has argued that The House of Fame 
enacts the struggle for “a balanced intellectual position, one that could accommodate traditional belief and 
the skeptical attitude toward belief that was the inevitable result of... logical investigations.” The 
intellectual position on which the poem settles, Delany argues, is “skeptical fideism,” a pragmatic 
philosophy that acknowledges the intractable conflicts within “the body of traditional knowledge that 
[confronts] the educated fourteenth century reader” even as it posits the supreme authority of the Christian 
faith itself to transcend them.  Skeptical Fideism has, to a large degree, provided a structural blueprint for 
much criticism to follow; later writers have largely affirmed Delany’s argument that the poem deconstructs 
traditional textual authority but differed on what they put in its place.  Options are as diverse as “the 
individual vision or voice” (Miller), the voices of women (Kordecki), the reader (Terrell, Amtower), the 
tension between orality and literacy (Arnovick), and even the disparity between the overarching 
“mythology of the middle ages” and the individual written “fiction” (Gellrich).  See Sheila Delany, 
Chaucer’s House of Fame: The Poetics of Skeptical Fideism (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1972), 
3, 6; Jacqueline Miller, The Writing on the Wall: Authority and Authorship in Chaucer’s House of Fame,” 
30 
consistently stymied those who have tried to pin down its dominant philosophical and 
literary concerns; the auctores that Chaucer brings into conversation throughout the work 
are so numerous and so contradictory that they can not help but to undercut and subvert 
each other at every turn, guaranteeing a kind of poetic and philosophical mutually assured 
destruction.  No one gets out of the House of Fame unscathed. 
In addition to its many other facets, the House of Fame is also a primer on 
medieval theories of sound and speech, and it is in that capacity that I wish to discuss it 
here.  At the close of the poem’s second book, Geffrey is seized by a garrulous, telepathic 
eagle who whisks him into the ether and toward the titular House of Fame.  On the way, 
the eagle provides the terrified dreamer with a lesson in acoustics, explaining what sound 
is (“soun ys noght but eyr ybroken” [765]), what speech is (“spech is soun... / And every 
speche that ys spoken, / Lowd or pryvee, foul or fair, / In his substance ys but air” [762-
68]), and the analogous relationship between music and the spoken word (“whan a  pipe 
is blowen sharpe / The air ys twyst with violence ... / And ryght so breketh it when men 
speketh” [774-780]).   
The lesson reaches its climax when the eagle “proves” to Geffrey how “every 
speche, or noyse, or soun” (783) arrives at the House of Fame through a process of 
“multiplicacioun” (784): 
“I preve hyt thus – take hede now –  
Be experience; for yf that thow 
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Throwe on water now a stoon, 
Wel wost thou hyt wol make anoon 
A litel roundell as a sercle, 
Paraunter brod as a covercle; 
And ryght anoon thow shalt see wel 
That whel wol cause another whel, 
And that the thridde, and so forth, brother, 
Every sercle causynge other.” (787-796) 
Despite Chaucer’s decision to put these words in the mouth of an enormous talking bird, 
the description is not mere poetic fancy; in fact, it is a close redaction of Boethius’s 
description of the physics of sound in De Institutione Musica.  Even its central metaphor 
of the stone dropped into the pool is a recapitulation of Boethius: “The same thing 
happens in sounds that happens when a stone, thrown from above, falls into a puddle or 
into quiet water.  First it causes a wave in a very small circle; then it disperses clusters of 
waves into larger circles, and so on until the motion, exhausted by the spreading out of 
waves, dies away.”
57
  Thus, we can understand these concentric circles of “eyr ybroken” 
– these wheels of spoken language moving “from roundel to compas” (798) – to 
constitute for Chaucer’s readers the scientific underpinnings of medieval theories of 
acoustics.  They illustrate how speech works on a physical level. 
 There is a significant difference between the eagle’s description of speech, 
though, and the scientific account provided by Boethius.  The sixth-century philosopher 
describes a physics in which sound becomes increasingly weak as it travels outward from 
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its source, explaining that “[t]he latter, wider wave is always diffused by a weaker 
impulse.”
58
  Chaucer’s fourteenth-century raptor, however, describes a physics in which 
speech “up bereth ... through multiplicacioun” (818-20), amplifying in affect and force, 
expanding ever outward.  And when those concentric rings of twisting air reach the 
House of Fame, the eagle explains, they cease to be air at all but become the very 
physical incarnations of their very speakers: 
“Whan any speche ycomen ys 
Up to the paleys, anon-ryght 
Hyt wexeth lyk the same wight 
Which that the word in erthe spak, 
Be hyt clothed red or blak; 
And hath so verray hys lyknesse 
That speke the word, that thou wilt gesse 
That it the same body be, 
Man or woman, he or she.” (1074-1082) 
Contrary to Boethius, who describes the wheels of sound attenuating as they move away 
from their source, Chaucer describes sound that, at its furthest distance from its origin, 
manifests itself most robustly.  The spoken word that leaves a person’s mouth on the 
terrestrial plane is reconstituted in the form of its speaker in the House of Fame itself; 
those words, in turn, become active.  They “stonden” (1214) and “tellen tales” (1198); 
they “pleyen on an harpe” (1201) and make “lowde mynstralcies” (1217) and “doon her 
ententes / To make ... ymages” (1267-69).  In Austin’s terms, we might suggest that the 
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perlocutionary force of the speech acts described by Chaucer is to embody their own 
speakers.  Despite the poem’s clear secular context, we might also recall John 1:14: “Et 
Verbum caro factum est, et habitavit in nobis [And the Word was made flesh, and dwelt 
among us]” – a perlocutionary act sui generis.
59
  Whether philosophically or scripturally, 
Chaucer (through his narrative proxy Geffrey) clearly imagines a paradigm of speech in 
which the spoken word not only re-presents its world but re-creates it. 
 At the House of Fame’s Labyrinth of Rumor – a structure that Chaucer describes 
as a “Domus Dedaly ... ful of rounynges and of jangles” (1920, 1960) – the physics of 
sound and speech that the eagle describes are reenacted on the level of spoken narrative, 
the level of gossip and rumor and story.  Within the whirling maze, utterances that have 
taken the forms of their speakers tell their tales (tell themselves?) to other embodied 
utterances, and those utterances in turn change and enlarge and amplify those tales until, 
like the wheels of language, they reach the edge of their wicker cage: 
When oon had herd a thing, ywis, 
He com forth ryght to another wight,  
And gan him tellen anon-ryght 
The same that to him was told, 
Or hyt a forlong way was old,  
But gan somewhat for to eche 
To this tydynge in this speeche 
More than it ever was. 
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And evermo with more encres 
Than yt was erst. (2060-68, 2074-75) 
As with the “sound waves” described by the eagle, the process of rumor within the 
labyrinth is a process of constant “encres” and amplification, one where narrative voices  
perpetually reproduce themselves, beget their own duplicates, and even create new 
embodied  utterances – narratives of “fals and soth compounded” (2108).  The embodied 
speech acts here are exposed as not only reflections of their speakers but as active, 
creative, generative agents.  They are performative speech acts manifest, spoken words 
that, in the most literal possible sense, do work on their world. 
 What the eagle’s account of the motion of sound toward the House of Fame 
implies -- both in the capacity of the human voice to break and rend the air with violence 
as well as in the more fanciful notion that speech “wexeth lyk the same wight” who spoke 
it on earth – is that the spoken word is an active, capable, powerful agent.  As Chaucer’s 
description of the chattering sounds in the Domus Dedaly indicates, speech not only 
repeats and reflects the world, it amplifies the world, changes the world, and sometimes 
(as the half-truths slipping through the wicker cage and back into the sublunary sphere 
show) creates new worlds that didn’t exist before.  And while I do not mean to suggest 
that Chaucer intended for his fantastic dream vision to be taken literally, I do argue that 
we can understand the House of Fame as arising from a perception in the Middle Ages 
that the spoken word was uniquely powerful, that speech both represented creation and 
created in equal measure.  I propose, therefore, that we can see the concentric wheels of 
language that Chaucer’s eagle describes as an apt metaphor for the speech that this 
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dissertation locates in the poetry of the fourteenth and fifteenth centuries, speech whose 
power lies not only in its ability to travel and to communicate but also in its ability to 
“twyst” and to “break,” to engender and to create. 
 In many ways it is appropriate that Chaucer provide us with a guiding example for 
understanding Middle English conceptions of speech.  Certainly he is not alone in 
regarding speech as an efficacious and performative medium; as this study will show, 
both the Erkenwald poet and Thomas Hoccleve – as well other writers that I engage with 
more peripherally such as William Langland, John Gower, and the anonymous poet of 
the Wars of Alexander – similarly recognize the spoken word as a vehicle both for 
communication and for creation.  But as his body of work shows, Chaucer is intensely 
aware of the preeminence of speech both as a representative medium and as a creative, 
performative one.  The power of the spoken word is an issue that Chaucer deals with 
across his poetic oeuvre, from the self-generating speech of the House of Fame, to the 
consequences of oaths made and broken in Troilus and Criseyde, to the dialectical 
birdsong that pervades The Parliament of Fowls, and even to the curse in “Adam 
Scriveyn” that Chaucer utters to his own scribe: “thou most have the scalle” (3).   
But it is, of course, the Canterbury Tales that seals Chaucer’s reputation as a poet 
of speech, a poet who understands that people both make and are made by the words they 
speak.  Marshall Leicester writes that the Canterbury Tales “concentrate not on the way 
preexisting persons create language but on the way language creates people.  They detail 
how a fictional teller’s text im-personates him or her by creating a personality, that is, a 
textual subject that acts like, rather than is, a person.”
60
  Indeed, just as the expanding 
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wheels of language give form in the Labyrinth of Rumor to “shipmen and pilgrimes, ... 
pardoners, / Currours, and eke messagers” (HF 2122-28), so too does the speech of the 
Shipman, the Pardoner, the Canon’s Yeoman, and the Manciple, ventriloquized through 
the Canterbury Tales’s pilgrim narrator, ultimately give form to the Canterbury pilgrims 
and to the fictive world they inhabit.  In this respect, we can see the “congregacioun of 
folk” (HF 2034) within the House of Fame’s Domus Dedaly as poetic forerunners of the 
procession of “sondry folk” on the road to Canterbury.  The creative speech that the eagle 
describes in Chaucer’s early dream vision adumbrates the generative words of the poet’s 
last major work. 
Among the poets discussed in this dissertation, Chaucer is the poet of speech par 
excellence; in many ways his House of Fame and Canterbury Tales represent the alpha 
and omega of his engagement with the efficacy of the spoken word. Fitting, then, that in 
the first chapter of this dissertation we turn from Chaucer’s early dream vision to the final 
poetic tale of his final, unfinished work – from the talking eagle of the House of Fame to 





“A wikked tonge is worse than a feend”: 
Nominalism, Speech, and Power in The Manciple’s Tale 
 
Near the beginning of his tale, Chaucer’s Manciple draws a telling comparison between 
“Phebus, that was flour of bachilrie” (IX. 125) and “the kyng of Thebes, Amphioun, / 
That with his syngyng walled that citee” (IX.116-117) Ostensibly made to highlight the 
beauty of Phoebus’s “cleere voys” (IX 115), the Manciple’s comparison is important not 
only for what it includes but for what it neglects to mention – the role of Amphion’s lyre 
in the construction of the city walls.  The tradition that Amphion built the walls of Thebes 
by playing his lyre was readily available to Chaucer and his contemporaries, and it was 
one that the poet undoubtedly knew well.  In Boccaccio’s Teseida – Chaucer’s primary 
source for the Knight’s Tale and the Anelida –Amphion “call[s] upon the surrounding 
mountains to protect Thebes with the sweet song of [his] skillfully played lyre”; in 
Statius’s Thebaid, the Thebans tell “of stones that crept to the sound of a Tyrian lyre and 
Amphion animating hard rocks.”
1
  More to the point, Chaucer himself alludes to 
Amphion’s skill as a harpist in the Merchant’s Tale: his description of January and May’s 
lavish wedding feast includes an account of “instrumentz of swich soun / That Orpheus, 
ne of Thebes Amphioun, / Ne maden nevere swich a melodye” (IV 1715-17).  Michela 
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Grudin has rightly noted that the Manciple’s description of Amphion’s voice is among 
those passages in the Manciple’s Tale “that point us to the general area of speech, poetry, 
and song, but in light of Amphion’s conspicuously absent lyre, her argument doesn’t go 
far enough.
2
  The Manciple’s invocation of Amphion walling Thebes with his voice 
suggests the potential of the spoken word – and the spoken word alone – to perform 
work, to effect change within the physical world rather than simply to reflect that world 
in a representative fashion. 
In modern critical parlance, we might refer to Amphion’s song as a performative 
utterance – a speech act in which, as J. L. Austin writes, “the uttering of the sentence is, 
or is a part of, the doing of an action.”
3
  As a brief synopsis should demonstrate, such 
performative utterances are among the varieties of speech acts present in the Manciple’s 
Tale, a work that, like the House of Fame, is self-evidently invested in the functions of 
spoken language.  A wry recasting of Ovid’s story of Apollo and the Crow, the tale told 
by the Manciple centers on Phoebus, the clear-voiced god of poetry, and a snow-white 
crow that he has taught to “countrefete the speche of every man” (IX 134).  While his 
master is absent, the crow espies Phoebus’s wife and her “lemman” as “they wroghten al 
hir lust volage” (IX 239).  Upon Phoebus’s return the crow first cries “Cokkow! 
Cokkow! Cokkow!” and then, less punningly, lays bare the wife’s adultery using the 
human speech that Phoebus has taught him.  This situation does not end well for anyone.  
The enraged Phoebus kills his wife with an arrow, then, too late, repents of his violence.  
He breaks his bow in grief, destroys “his mynstralcie,” and – in an act of either wishful 
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thinking, utter denial, or rampant self-delusion – declares his wife to be “ful giltelees” 
(IX 277) of her adultery.  Finally, in a culminating act of destruction, Phoebus punishes 
the crow for his “fals tale” (IX 293): he plucks the crow’s white feathers, turns him black, 
and strips him of the ability to speak.   
Introduced by a prologue in which Chaucer’s drunken Cook loses his own ability 
to speak, punctuated by the Manciple’s sardonic observations on the relationship between 
the “word” and the “dede” (IX 208), and concluded by a paradoxically verbose call to 
silence, the Manciple’s Tale offers a de facto exploration of the potentia of spoken 
language, an interrogation into the work that a verbal utterance might perform.  And that 
work, the Manciple seems to tell us, is as dangerous as it is significant: the spoken word 
can build a city, expose a betrayal, turn a crow black, enrage a god, lead to murder.  As 
Christopher Cannon has argued, for Chaucer – and certainly for his proxy the Manciple – 




Tempting as it is simply to read the Manciple’s Tale through the lens of modern 
speech-act theory, we must recognize that J. L. Austin and his followers were hardly the 
first to consider the fraught relationship between words and things.  Chaucer’s own 
fourteenth century witnessed to a seismic shift in philosophical inquiry, precipitated 
largely by the teachings of the nominalist thinker William of Ockham, which complicated 
medieval understandings of that very relationship.  At the heart of this philosophical shift 
was Ockham’s argument that “a universal is not something real that exists in a subject ... 
                                                
4
 Christopher Cannon, “Chaucer and the Value of Language” (paper presented at the inaugural London 
Chaucer conference, School of Advanced Studies, University of London, UK, April 2002).  I am grateful to 
Christopher Cannon for generously providing me with a copy of his paper. 
40 
[but] has a being only as a thought-object in the mind.”
 5
  Such a pronouncement was 
directly at odds with dominant strains of medieval scholastic realism – exemplified by the 
writings of Augustine, Boethius and, later, Aquinas – which held that universals “exist 
outside the mind as the essences of individual things in which they inhere, at once distinct 
from the individual itself and from other universals.”
6
  Ockham’s rejection of universals 
and attendant emphasis on the ontological primacy of the individual had important 
consequences for late medieval thought.  Linguistically, such a philosophical shift 
demanded a reappraisal of the relationship between the signifier and the signified because 
the signified was no longer understood as being predicated upon a larger, transcendent 
universal.  Similarly, Ockham’s theories called for a revised understanding of the very 
nature of God’s power and of His relationship with mankind.  To that end, Ockham 
reasoned that because the will of God was not fettered by a system of absolute universals, 
God’s ordained power (potentia dei ordinata) was superseded by His more robust (and 
more erratic) absolute power (potentia dei absoluta). 
Chaucer’s own views on Ockham’s philosophy are, as the self-contradictory 
critical record shows, notoriously difficult to discern; it is impossible to say with certainty 
if (or to what degree) Chaucer himself had nominalist leanings.  We do know, however, 
that Ockham’s writings profoundly influenced many of the leading philosophical and 
intellectual figures of the fourteenth century, including Robert Holcot, John Wyclif, and 
Ralph Strode, very likely the same “philosophical Strode” (TC 5.1857) mentioned in 
Chaucer’s Troilus and Criseyde.  We can reasonably assume, therefore, that Chaucer 
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knew of the nominalist debate and that he engaged with it in his work.
7
  In this chapter, I 
contend that the Manciple’s Tale – a work often overlooked in discussions of Chaucer 
and nominalism – stands as the apogee of that engagement within the Canterbury Tales.  
More specifically, I will argue, first, that the aspects of performative speech we find in 
the Manciple’s Tale are central to Chaucer’s exploration of nominalist thought and, 
second, that the linguistic and ontological systems Chaucer develops in the tale are 
themselves logical extensions of the philosophy propounded by Ockham.  Finally, an 
analysis of Chaucer’s Boethian lyrics and Treatise on the Astrolabe offers a new 
perspective on the poet’s own position within the realist-nominalist debate by 
demonstrating his fraught position between two colliding and mutually exclusive 
linguistic and ontological systems. 
 
Ockham and Chaucer: the Philosophical and Critical Background 
Ockham’s nominalist intervention in medieval philosophy must be understood not 
only in terms of what it proposed but also in terms of what it overturned: specifically, the 
prevailing current of scholastic thought known as the via antiqua.  A synthesis of patristic 
writings, Neoplatonic thought, and Aristotelianism, the via antiqua both “recognized a 
harmony of faith and reason in theological issues” and “conformed to the tradition and 
beliefs of a Christian society.”
8
  Among its metaphysical underpinnings was a belief in 
the existence of universals, divine constructs described by Augustine as the exemplary 
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“forms” or “species” from which all individual forms were derived.  The existence of 
these universals (as well as their predicatory relationship to individuals) formed the core 
of what is known as scholastic realism: 
We can call the Ideas “forms” or “species.” ...  For Ideas are certain 
principal, stable and immutable forms or reasons of things. They are not 
themselves formed, and hence they are eternal and always stand in the 
same relations, and they are contained in the divine understanding. And 
although they neither arise nor perish, nevertheless everything that is able 
to arise and perish, and everything that does arise and perish, is said to be 
formed in accordance with them.
9
 
The Platonism implicit in such thinking is clear: Augustine posited the existence of a 
stratum of perfect and unattainable ideals, divine models that existed beyond the senses 
but upon which all known individual things were necessarily based.  To know something, 
Augustine reasoned, was to know the universal, not the individuals derived from it.  And 
since these universals were beyond the sensory apprehension of humans, that knowledge 
was ultimately gained through a process akin to divine illumination.  Indeed, Augustine 
proposed that knowledge was granted directly by the will of God, that with His power, 
the “inner and intelligible eye” was “drenched in a certain way and lit up by that 
intelligible light.”
10
  We know a thing because God reveals its universal essence to us, 
because He illuminates the universal that is always the basis of the individual. 
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The ontological system articulated by Augustine gave form to a similarly situated 
epistemology of language, one in which the signified and the sign assumed the same 
relative hierarchy as the universal and the individual: the sign was always predicated 
upon the signified.  Within this hierarchy, the function of speech was, quite simply, to 
signify – to state and to communicate the knowledge granted by God’s illumination.  
Moreover, Augustine argued that speech signified by convention; the spoken word was a 
sign that related to its signified not by some intrinsic relation but by external correlation.  
In De Doctrina Christiana, Augustine wrote that words existed exclusively in the service 
of such signification.  As a sign, a word “is a thing which of itself makes some other 
thing come to mind”; the subordinate relationship of sign to signified was a part of the 
“permanent and divinely instituted system of things.”
11
  In De Magistro, Augustine 
expanded this argument, proposing that “things signified are of greater importance than 
their signs” and that “the knowledge is superior to the sign simply because it is the end 
toward which the latter is the means.”
12
  Such passages show how the subordination of 
the individual to the universal made explicit by Augustine’s Platonist ontology was 
recapitulated in the subordination of the individual verbal sign to the universal signified. 
 A century after Augustine, Boethius’s translations of Aristotle precipitated the 
development of a similar theory of universals as well as a similar linguistic epistemology.  
Central to Boethius’s approach was the idea that “spoken sounds are symbols of 
affections in the soul, and written marks symbols of spoken sounds,” a formulation, 
originally propounded in Aristotle’s De Interpretatione, that posited the existence of 
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mental, spoken, and written signs.
13
  Boethius maintained that mental signs (also called 
conceptual signs) bore a natural and intrinsic relationship to the things they signified.  By 
contrast, spoken language consisted of a system of conventional signs, not natural ones.  
Speech was seen as signifying “only derivatively, by a conventional ... correlation with 
concepts”; it was, thus, a system of signifiers subordinated first to natural mental signs 
and then to the universals that they signified.
14
  Indeed, in his translation of Aristotle, 
Boethius explained that words “spoken in isolation are names and signify something.  For 
he who speaks [them] establishes an understanding and he who hears [them] rests.”
15
  
The capacity of the spoken word to function – to signify a mental concept – was therefore 
entirely dependent upon the shared linguistic conventions of speaker and hearer.  Finally, 
at the bottom of Boethius’s hierarchy of signifiers was the written word, itself predicated 
by convention upon speech.  Writing, then, held a tertiary position in Boethius’s 
linguistic hierarchy; it was a conventional sign of a conventional sign (spoken) of a 
natural sign (mental) of a universal. 
Boethius’s tripartite hierarchy accorded with the Augustinian notion that 
universals both existed and formed the ontological basis for human knowledge.  More 
important, it reinforced the hierarchical relationships between sign and signified implicit 
in Augustine’s discussion of speech and language.  But the frameworks proposed by 
Augustine and Boethius did not mesh perfectly.  Many philosophers influenced by 
Boethius’s translations of Aristotle, for example, rejected Augustine’s epistemology of 
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divine illumination, preferring instead to see “concept formation dependent upon sense 
experience, and knowledge of intelligible realities subsequent to knowledge of sensible 
realities.”
16
  Linguistically, too, the two traditions were subject to some disjuncture.  Was 
a spoken word a sign of the universal essence or was it the signifier for the individual 
derivation of the signified? Was language itself, as many Aristotelian thinkers proposed, 
important to the human ability to apprehend knowledge of universals or could such 
knowledge only be obtained by the illumination of God?  Did spoken signs hold a natural 
relationship to things signified or a conventional one (a position advocated by neither 
Boethius nor Augustine but articulated in Plato’s Cratylus)?
17
   
Later thinkers, none more significant than Thomas Aquinas, struggled to align the 
many “small misfits” that occurred between the Augustinian and Boethian frameworks.
 18
  
Aquinas’s Summa Theologica taught that “words relate to the meaning of things signified 
through the medium of the intellectual conception....  We can give a name to anything in 
as far as we can understand it.”
19
  Such an assertion supposed, with Augustine, that the 
individual signifying utterance existed in an ordered, subordinate relationship to the thing 
it signified.  It also suggested that language itself operated as “a rational, rule-governed 
system that ... [conveyed] the information necessary for organized knowledge,” a position 
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more in keeping with Boethius’s Aristotelian leanings.
20
  Aquinas also affirmed the 
existence of universals – a precept common to both schools of thought – reasoning that 
“the intelligible species is that which is understood secondarily; but that which is 
primarily understood is the object, of which the species is the likeness.”
21
  Here too, the 
knowledge of the derivative individual (the species) was subordinated to knowledge of 
the universal (the object).  
Because scholastic realism of the via antiqua was, broadly speaking, still the 
prevailing philosophical framework in the fourteenth century, comparatively few critics 
have argued specifically that Chaucer’s work evinces a realist philosophy.
22
  Indeed, the 
vast majority of Chaucer’s readers have silently, even unconsciously, accepted the poet as 
a realist without overtly defending that assumption.  Among those who have actively 
advocated for a realist Chaucer, Gerald Morgan has cast the widest net, arguing that the 
portraits in the General Prologue function as universal exemplars for the individual 
pilgrims in the Canterbury Tales.  He argues that a philosophical discussion of universals 
ultimately becomes “a sound basis for discriminating between the type and the 
individual” in the Canterbury Tales, a critical position that effectively reads Chaucer’s 
entire poem as, on one level, an extended realist allegory.
23
  David Williams sees 
evidence of a realist ontology specifically in the Friar’s Tale, reasoning that Chaucer’s 
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story of a summoner damned by his own failure to perceive the universal intent behind an 
individual curse presents “a world in which the signified escapes false signs and reasserts 
an ontology of realism.”
24
  But by far the most strident proponent of a realist Chaucer is 
Robert Myles, who states flatly that “Chaucer’s works reveal a foundational ... and 
linguistic realist”; within them, “signs, including ... language in particular, are, to some 
degree, a reliable means of knowing [an] extramental reality.”
25
 
 The absoluteness with which Myles’s declares Chaucer’s realism, the unwavering 
certainty that he ascribes to the poet’s philosophical position, need not tempt us to 
counter with a postmodern Chaucer (or as Myles puts it, a “schizophrenic” Chaucer).  But 
we should nonetheless acknowledge what the vast majority of critics since E. Talbot 
Donaldson have shown and what Myles seems to overlook: that by cloaking himself in 
personae and alternately donning the masks of satirist, translator, and courtly apologist, 
Chaucer makes it extremely difficult for his readers to separate the “real Chaucer” from 
the many Chaucers projected by his works.  To put such an argument into terms that 
resonate with this argument, we might say that readers have long struggled to distinguish 
the universal Chaucer upon which are predicated so many individual Chaucers.  Even 
without access to the “universal Chaucer” though, elements of scholastic realism can be 
found throughout the Canterbury Tales.  We might, for example, consider the Knight’s 
Tale to extol an essentially realist philosophy, one expressed eloquently in Theseus’s 
“Firste Movere” speech:  
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“Wel may men knowe, but it be a fool, 
That every part dirryveth from his hool, 
For nature hat nat taken his bigynnyng 
Of no partie or cantel of a thyng, 
But of a thyng that parfit is and stable.” (I 3005-09)
26
 
Here, Chaucer redacts a Boethian ontology in which individual parts “dirryveth from his 
hool,” and in which the whole in turn has “his bigynnyng” in a “thyng that parfit is and 
stable.”  Such a realist ontology receives a more Aristotelian treatment in the Melibee, a 
tale in which knowledge of the transcendent universals ordained by “God, of whom 
procedeth al vertu and alle goodnesse” (VII 1872) is attained not by sudden illumination 
bestowed by the “Firste Movere” but by means of a rigorous scholastic dialectic between 
Melibee and Prudence. 
Evidence of scholastic realism also surfaces in the linguistic hierarchy that 
Chaucer develops in the Canterbury Tales, a hierarchy thrown into particularly sharp 
relief by the fates of those who attempt to violate it.  Indeed, in several of the Tales, 
individual characters either fail to abide by or refuse to recognize the coherence between 
spoken sign, mental sign, and universal that defines scholastic realism – a failure for 
which many of them are punished.  Williams implies just such a punishment when he 
suggests that the corrupt summoner of the Friar’s Tale is damned to hell for his 
“erroneous and self-serving theory of signification,” a theory in which “universals are 
only names made up from knowledge of particulars” and in which “signs have no 
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necessary relation to their signified.”
27
  Williams’s reading of the damnation of the 
Friar’s summoner is equally applicable to the Pardoner’s “riotoures thre” (VI 661), who 
seek out the “privee theef men clepeth Deeth” (VI 675) in order to slay him.  Like the 
Friar’s misguided summoner, the Pardoner’s three “riotoures” fail to see that the death 
they seek is not an individual called Death but an immutable universal.  Their failure – or 
unwillingness – to apprehend the connection between a speech act (the word “death” 
uttered in the tavern) and the universal transcendent concept that it necessarily signifies 
ultimately leads the three men to murder one another, literally leads them to death.  
Finally, we might consider the fate of the Apius, the corrupt judge of the Physician’s Tale 
who attempts to subvert the linguistic hierarchy of scholastic realism by verbally 
declaring Virginia to be not Virginius’s daughter (which, of course, all the major figures 
in the tale know her to be) but Claudius’s servant.  By attempting to predicate the mental 
sign of Virginia’s identity upon his own speech act rather than vice versa, Apius threatens 
to upend the relationship between speech and mental sign, even to trouble the relationship 
between spoken language and the transcendent universal upon which it is constituted.  
Ultimately, this transgression leads to Virginia’s death, Claudius’s exile, and Apius’s 
own suicide; and it places the Physician’s Tale among the ranks of Chaucer’s bloodiest 
tales.  In fact, the only character to emerge unscathed from the Physician’s Tale is 
Virginius himself, a figure whose faith in an inflexible universal order is so profound that 
he beheads his own daughter rather than submit to Apius’s attack on the linguistic 
hierarchy of scholastic realism. 
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The nominalist philosopher William of Ockham allows us to further unpack 
Chaucer’s relationship to fourteenth-century theories of language; ultimately, his work 
will be central to our analysis of the Manciple’s Tale itself.  The position articulated by 
Ockham constituted a radical break from the realist philosophy of the via antiqua, but it 
shared with that philosophy an acknowledgement of the distinctions among mental, 
spoken, and written signs articulated by Boethius.  Like most of his contemporaries – 
realist and nominalist alike – Ockham proposed that speech maintained a secondary 
relationship to the mental sign and, moreover, that speech signified the mental sign only 
by conventional correspondence.  Ockham also accepted that mental signs – what 
Boethius would call “impressions of the soul” – signified the concepts upon which they 
were predicated naturally rather than conventionally: “[mental signs] reside in the 
intellect alone and are incapable of being uttered aloud, although the spoken words which 
are subordinated to them as signs are uttered aloud.”
28
  But Ockham diverged sharply 
from his contemporaries on the question of exactly what those mental signs were 
predicated upon.  Scholastic realists insisted that mental signs were natural signifiers of 
transcendent universals, divine signifieds upon which all individual things were based.  
By contrast, Ockham argued “that every universal is one particular thing and that it is not 
a universal except in its signification, in its signifying many things.”
 29
  In other words, 
the mental sign did not signify a divine, inviolate signified; rather, the mental sign 
signified yet another kind of individual sign, an “object of thought” that only seemed to 
be a universal. 
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By this logic, Ockham effectively conflated the universal and the individual; the 
former, he reasoned, was another iteration of the latter, a sign rather than a thing 
signified.  More important, this logic also led Ockham to the conclusion that universals 
existed in name only and had no reality outside of the mind, a position that struck at the 
heart of the realist ontology: 
No universal is a substance regardless of how it is considered.  On the 
contrary, every universal is an intention of the mind which, on the most 
probable account, is identical with the act of understanding.  Thus, it is 
said that the act of understanding by which I grasp [the concept] “men” is 
a natural sign of men in the same way that weeping is a natural sign of 
grief.  It is a natural sign such that it can stand for men in the same way 
that a spoken word can stand for things in spoken propositions.
30
 
In effect, Ockham demoted the universal from a transcendent signified to an individual 
cognitive construct, one which was itself predicated on human experience and 
observation.  As such, the concept that realists called a “universal” was, in fact, 
coterminous with the mental sign.  It was “an intention of the mind” based upon 
signifieds outside of itself; it was not, as the realists held, “capable of functioning 
[exclusively] as a predicate.”  Indeed, as Ockham finally concluded, “no [individual] 
substance is ever predicated of anything [universal]”; the universals that realists 
understood to be eternal predicates of all things simply did not – could not – exist.
31
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Although a full survey of the implications of Ockham’s nominalism is outside the 
scope of this chapter, two issues arising from the philosopher’s rejection of universals 
warrant further discussion for our analysis of Chaucer and, more specifically, of his 
Manciple’s Tale.  The first is the effect of that rejection on medieval understandings of 
the relationship between epistemology and speech.  As we have already observed, 
Ockham concurred with his realist contemporaries that speech signified mental signs by 
conventional correspondence in much that same way that written words in turn signified 
spoken utterances: – “spoken words are used to signify the very things that are signified 
by concepts of the mind.”
32
  But whereas scholastic realism held that mental signs were 
in turn predicated upon transcendent universals, Ockham argued that those universals 
were themselves yet another “intention of the mind,” coterminous with rather than 
generative of mental signs.  For Ockham, the human knowledge derived from mental 
signs – and by extension the spoken expression of those mental signs – was as variable as 
the individual things that those mental signs portended to signify.  To know a thing was 
not tantamount to understanding the transcendent universal behind it but merely to 
understanding that individual thing as it was represented by a particular mental sign.  To 
speak of something, therefore, did not mean to signify a mental sign anchored inexorably 
to a perfect and immutable signified but to signify a mental sign predicated solely upon 
other signs, including other spoken utterances.  Thus, Ockham’s nominalist philosophy of 
language detached both knowledge and speech from a stable, overarching cohort of 
universals and radically redefined them as subject wholly to the internal mental processes 
of the individual thinker. 
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Such a shift goes well beyond the assertion, made by many who discuss 
Chaucer’s relationship to nominalism, that Ockham’s linguistic philosophy simply 
overturned the argument that language bore a natural, rather than a conventional, 
relationship to the things that it signified, a position known as cratylic realism.
33
  In fact, 
the vast majority of scholastic realists, including Aquinas and Duns Scotus, rejected 
cratylic realism, as, of course, did Ockham.  Ockham’s intervention was not an assertion 
that speech signified mental signs by convention but rather that mental signs themselves 
were disconnected from a transcendent universal signified, a position which meant that 
knowledge was finally “not the result of generation, but of abstraction, which [was] only 
a kind of mental picturing.”
34
  Predicated upon the inherent vagaries of individual 
“intentions of the mind,” the mental sign was contingent only upon the individual 
creating it, a flimsy predicate indeed when we compare it to the immutable universals of 
realism.  Speech was similarly destabilized.  As one critic has pointed out, for Chaucer 
“Words could no longer be assumed to fit the shape of reality because of their origin in a 
real world of ideas beyond the mind.  Language [was] no longer a shadow pattern of the 
real, but [had] become a skewed grid that may not fit the scheme of reality.”
35
  Within the 
strictures of Ockham’s epistemological model, then, what a person thought he knew of 
reality, he did know of reality.  More radically, we might also suggest that because 
mental signs were predicated not upon universals but only upon other signs, including 
signs of speech, spoken words could fundamentally change that knowledge of reality and 
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even could, for the individual thinker, alter reality itself.  In other words, at the extreme 
limit of Ockham’s nominalism, we see the ontological potential for performative speech. 
The same rejection of the universal that necessitated a shift in thinking about 
language and epistemology also had significant ramifications for nominalist 
understandings of God, a point underscored most emphatically by Ockham’s emphasis on 
God’s absolute and unmediated power – potentia dei absoluta.  Following the theological 
distinction popularized by (though not original with) Albert the Great and reinforced by 
John Duns Scotus, Ockham held that God’s power, though essentially singular in nature, 
was of two species – potentia ordinata and potentia absoluta.
36
  Potentia ordinata, God’s 
ordered power, referred to the power that God has to act without directly contradicting 
his own precepts, or, as Ockham put it, to act “according to the laws that are ordered and 
instituted by God.”
37
  Potentia absoluta, on the other hand, referred to the absolute power 
of God to act outside and even in contradiction of His own laws.  In Ockham’s nominalist 
ontology, God Himself became the only real measure of such ideals as truth, right, and 
good – ineffable concepts that scholastic realists held to be derived from transcendent 
universals.  By extension, physical laws, too, were predicated solely upon the will and 
power of God.  Without universals to govern the laws “ordered and instituted by God,” 
His potentia ordinata effectively collapsed into His potentia absoluta: there was simply 
no space between the expression of God’s will within His laws and the expression of 
God’s will without them.  In this way, Ockham’s ontology finally “[rendered] all 
creatures and things utterly contingent upon their creator not only for their existence but 
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also for the circumstances that [governed] their existence.”
38
  By unbinding the individual 
from the universal, Ockham was forced instead to bind it to the unfettered and absolute 
power of God. 
Ockham’s insistence on God’s absolute power has become a locus of Chaucerian 
criticism.  In one of the first significant studies of Chaucer and nominalism, Robert 
Stepsis writes that Walter in Chaucer’s Clerk’s Tale should be understood not as “a 
human being, but as God, a God whose only recognizable trait is the absolute, unbounded 
freedom of His will.”  Griselda, in turn, should be read as “an emblem of the patient 
human soul in its ideal response to the adversities visited on it by God.”
39
  Thus, the 
disturbingly sadistic Clerk’s Tale becomes an Ockhamist allegory demonstrating the 
inviolable and unconditional nature of potentia dei absoluta – “the freedom of the divine 
will and the absoluteness of God’s power.”
40
  More recently, Roger Moore has linked 
nominalist concerns to Chaucer’s Man of Law’s Tale for similar reasons, noting that the 
tale “displays little evidence that God’s will is just, merciful, or rational; it merely 
postulates that such a will exists, and remains silent as to its inherent character.”
41
  
Although Ockham’s concept of potentia dei absoluta must be taken into account when 
considering Chaucer’s approach to nominalism, I maintain that potentia dei absoluta is 
for Chaucer secondary to Ockham’s rejection of the universal and to the linguistic and 
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epistemological differences that stem directly from it.  To be certain, Moore’s argument 
does mention the nominalist epistemology in which “human reason can gain true 
knowledge only of particular, individualized objects,” but both Moore and Stepsis finally 
place God’s potentia absoluta at the very center of their analysis of nominalism, 
marginalizing the most fundamental aspects of Ockham’s intervention in the process.
42
  
In other words, by largely ignoring questions of language and epistemology and focusing 
only on God’s power, Stepsis and Moore approach nominalism at its periphery, seldom 
engaging with the fundamental issues at its heart. 
 A separate and more fruitful line of critical inquiry, however, has developed 
around those very epistemological and linguistic aspects of the nominalist intervention, 
aspects that assert themselves strongly in what Russell Peck calls Chaucer’s “literary 
world ... filled with glossers and verbal manipulators who trick others and themselves 
with semantic disjunctions.”  Peck writes that in Chaucer’s work, “nominalistic thought 
makes one aware of the limitations of human perception and the likelihood of one’s being 
prisoner to his own ideas.”
43
  This observation resonates with the core proposition of 
Ockham’s philosophy: those things that are held to be transcendent universals are, in fact, 
“mentally fashioned and abstracted from singular things previously known.”
 44
  P. B. 
Taylor also links Chaucer to nominalism; however, unlike Peck, who flatly declares 
Chaucer to be a nominalist thinker, Taylor portrays Chaucer as a frustrated realist who 
sees the tenets of his philosophical beliefs threatened by nominalist ideals.  Taylor 
suggests that while Chaucer “aspires toward a linguistic realism in which intent informs 
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deeds through the ministry of words,” that realist aspiration is repeatedly undercut both 
by “the practice of the real world” and by the tales of his own pilgrims, which frequently 
“[mock] the idea that words should reflect intent.”
45
  Along these lines, Holly Boucher 
has suggested that Chaucer writes in full consciousness that “concepts and the words 
which expressed them had become relative” and that “the firm bonds between signifier 
and signified ... had unraveled.”  In the face of such nominalist notions, Boucher 




 Boucher’s discussion of “words” and worlds” provides a felicitous conjunction 
with the work of John Searle, particularly the distinction he draws between the 
performative utterance and a constative utterance based on the direction of fit between 
the word and the world.
47
  It is my contention that the connection between Ockham’s 
nominalism, which posits the “power of words to create autonomous worlds,” and the 
performative speech act, in which words create the world they describe is not a 
suggestive anachronism; rather, it is fundamental to our understanding of the full 
implications of nominalism and its resonances in Chaucer’s poetic output.  Indeed, 
performativity is implicit in the very linguistic and epistemological structures upon which 
nominalism insists.  By predicating knowledge upon unverifiable and individual acts of 
“mental language” rather than upon a set of stable and transcendent universals, Ockham 
lays the groundwork for an ontology in which to think something is to know it, in which 
to know something is not necessarily to know it, and in which to speak of something can 
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make it real.  Within this radically disjointed ontology, the individual speech act becomes 
exceedingly powerful.  Persuasive speech becomes performative speech; to have one’s 
mind changed by another’s words is to have those words alter the very fabric of reality.  
In the proper circumstances, then, spoken words have the potential to create discrete 
individual realities for separate characters – realities that we as readers may deem false, 
but that are nonetheless valid by the standards of Ockham’s nominalist paradigm. 
The Canterbury Tales provides no shortage of situations in which characters use 
spoken words to make individual realities out of otherwise objective falsehoods.  In the 
Miller’s Tale, for example, Nicholas’s description of “a reyn, and that so wilde and wood 
/ That half so greet was nevere Noes flood” (I. 3517-18) makes the coming of the second 
flood a reality for the carpenter John, and eventually, the single word “water” is enough 
to bring that same reality (quite literally) crashing down around John’s head.  More 
darkly, a priest in the Canon’s Yeoman’s Tale is convinced that base metals can be 
transformed into gold by the speech of an unscrupulous canon, a belief so real to him that 
he spends the exorbitant sum of forty pounds for the fraudulent secret.  The Canterbury 
Tales offers countless other examples in which words more generally perform work: 
Chauntecleer is first trapped by the fox’s flattering words and then extricates himself by 
putting words into the fox’s mouth; a friar is bound by verbal contract to divide a fart 
evenly twelve ways; a loathly lady provides a rapist knight with the words that will both 
save him from death and bind him to her; Dorigen traps herself into a liaison with 
Aurelius through her rashly pledged troth.  Indeed, as a series of stories told by individual 
tale-tellers, the entire Canterbury project takes on the mantle of performative speech.  
The “reality” of the tales, after all, is solely a linguistic one; the words written on the 
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page – the words spoken by the pilgrims, as it were – causally precede the reality that 
they create.  Who is Dorigen, for example, but the creation of a particular Franklin, and 
who is that Franklin but the (re)creation of the pilgrim narrator, himself the creation of 
Chaucer?  The repeated layering of author and authored, the very hallmark of the 
Canterbury Tales itself, becomes both an exercise in performativity and an exploration of 
the principles of nominalist thought, an experiment in using words to create and recreate 
the divergent, individual worlds of the tales’ speakers. 
 
Nominalism and the Manciple: “The Word Moot Nede Accorde with the Dede” 
The Russian playwright Anton Chekhov famously remarked, “If there is a gun 
hanging on the wall in the first act, it must fire in the last.”   Temporal distance from the 
Canterbury Tales notwithstanding, Chekhov’s aphorism is illustrative for the structure of 
the Manciple’s Tale and provides a useful framework for analyzing Chaucer’s 
investigation of both the spoken word and the questions raised by Ockham’s nominalism.  
I contend that the Manciple’s allusion to Amphion’s voice is one of a number of passages 
that, as Chekhov might say, hang the gun of language upon Phoebus’s wall.  It is an 
allusion that implies the potential (even the inevitability) of speech to function 
performatively, but it does not actually demonstrate or enact that particular function.  
Another passage that suggests a potential function of speech (and a function vastly 
different from that implied by Amphion’s song) is the Manciple’s digression on the 
futility of restraining those things “that nature / Hath natureelly set in a creature” (IX 
161-2): 
Taak any bryd, and put it in a cage, 
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And do al thyn entente and thy corage 
To fostre it tendrely with mete and drynke 
Of alle deyntees that thou kanst bithynke, 
And keep it al so clenly as thou may, 
Although his cage of gold be never so gay, 
Yet hath this brid, by twenty thousand foold 
Levere in a forest that is rude and coold 
Goon ete wormes and swich wrecchednesse. 
For evere this brid wol doon his bisynesse 
To escape out of his cage, yif he may. 
His libertee this brid desireth ay.  (IX 163-174) 
The Manciple amplifies his source text for this aside, Jean de Meun’s scholastic Romance 
of the Rose, to insist that “nature” is paramount in determining the caged bird’s actions, a 
point that becomes critical to what seems to be an affirmation of the ontological 
underpinnings of scholastic realism.  In the Manciple’s discussion of nature, we can see a 
tacit acknowledgement that the bird is predicated upon a transcendent universal – an 
immutable ur-bird that serves a model for the individual and that determines its “lust[s]” 
(IX 181), and its “appetit[s]” (IX 182). Derived from and predicated upon a stable 
universal, the nature of the bird is something over which we have no control; it cannot be 
altered by “mete and drynke” (IX 165) or by a “cage of gold” (IX 168). 
The Manciple does not explicitly discuss language in this passage, let alone 
speech in particular.  Nonetheless, the realist ontology that he presents is important to the 
range of possibilities that he develops for the spoken word in his tale.  This connection 
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becomes clear when we consider the affinities between the hypothetical “bryd” of the 
Manciple’s digression and the other bird in the tale, Phoebus’s crow.  In his digression, 
the Manciple describes a bird “put... in a cage” (IX 163) and expounds upon the futility 
of trying “to fostre it” (IX 165) with meat, drink, and other human luxuries.  Such 
“deyntees” (IX 166), the Manciple promises, will never stop the bird from longing for its 
freedom, nor will they curb its “appetit” for “wormes and swich wrecchednesse” (IX 
171).  Like the Manciple’s “bryd,” Phoebus’s crow – whose propensity for eating worms 
and wretchedness might be extrapolated from the crow’s identification as a “worm-foul” 
in Chaucer’s Parliament of Fowls – hangs always in a cage.
 48
  Moreover, the crow 
ultimately obtains the freedom that the Manciple’s “bryd” so desires when Phoebus slings 
him “out at dore” (IX 306).
49
  Rather than being “fostred” with “mete and drynke” 
however, Phoebus’s crow is fostered with speech: 
Now hadde this Phebus in his hous a crowe 
Which in a cage he fostred many a day, 
and taughte it speken, as men teche a jay. 
The linguistic and structural parallels that the Manciple draws between his “bryd” and 
Phoebus’s crow imply analogous parallels between the “mete and drynke” with which the 
“bryd” is fostered and the “speche” (IX 306) with which Phoebus fosters his crow.  Thus, 
when the Manciple emphasizes the subordination of the meat and drink to the things 
nature has put in the bird (“Lo, heere hath lust his dominacioun” [IX 181]), he implies the 
concomitant subordination of speech.  Like the cage of gold and the dainties offered the 
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bird, the spoken language in which the crow is nurtured is finally ineffective in the face 
of the lusts and appetites predicated upon the universal; it becomes a part of the faulty 
arsenal by which one might attempt to “destreyne a thyng which that nature/ Hath 
naturelly set in a creature” (IX 161-62).  In this metaphorical construction, speech is, at 
best, a secondary representation of a universal signified.  At worst, it is a means of 
mendacity and deception, a false signifier that attempts (but fails) to obscure that which is 
predicated upon nature. 
 Inert and ineffective, the brand of speech that the Manciple’s discussion of the 
bird implies is a far cry from Amphion’s performative, city-building utterances.  Rather, 
as speech that cannot effect change in the world – speech that, to borrow Searle’s 
vocabulary, cannot fit the world to the word – it is constative in function.  In terms more 
historically appropriate to the late Middle Ages, the Manciple invokes a model of speech 
that accords with the linguistic hierarchy of scholastic realism, a model in which the 
spoken utterance cannot change those affections within the bird because they are 
themselves predicated upon a stable, guiding universal – upon nature.  And though it 
might stretch this analogy too far to suggest that those things “which that nature / Hath 
natureelly set in a creature” function here as de facto mental signs, there is an important 
parallel between the two: both are predicated entirely upon transcendent, universal 
constructs.  Those things put into the bird by “nature” assume a hierarchical position that 
is analogous to that of the mental sign.  Like Boethius’s “affections in the soul,” they are 
derived from “nature” through a process of natural correspondence. 
If the Manciple implies the inviolable realist hierarchy of universal over mental 
sign over spoken word in his digression on the bird, he invokes it explicitly in his second 
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long aside, his now infamous analysis of the “lady” and the “lemman.”  The Manciple 
tellingly prefaces that analysis with a dictum from Plato’s Timeaus, probably redacted 
second hand from Jean de Meun’s Romance of the Rose: 
The word moot nede accorde with the dede. 
If men shal telle proprely a thyng, 
The word moot cosyn be to the werkyng.
50
   
The relationship between word and deed articulated in this brief passage aligns neatly 
with the mainly ontological distinctions developed in Manciple’s discussion of the bird.  
More important, the passage allows the Manciple to shift the ontological distinctions 
developed in the bird digression firmly and overtly into the realm of the linguistic.  The 
word is contingent here; the word must accord with, must be cousin to, the deed just as 
the bird must accord with nature.  The “werkyng” is signified; the word is sign. 
 From this Boethian-Platonist beginning, the Manciple articulates his most explicit 
case for a realist linguistic hierarchy.  Specifically, this is a hierarchy in which the spoken 
word signifies the mental sign and the mental sign in turn signifies the overarching 
universal: 
Ther nys no difference, trewely, 
Bitwixe a wyf that is of heigh degree, 
If of hir body dishonest she bee, 
And a povre wenche, other than this – 
If it so be they werke bothe amys – 
But that the gentile, in estaat above,  
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She shall be cleped his lady, as in love; 
And for that oother is a povre womman, 
She shal be cleped his wenche or his lemman. (IX 212-20) 
It is most fruitful to unpack the realist hierarchy that the Manciple depicts by starting at 
its top, at the universal.  The Manciple insists that there is no difference between the two 
adulterous women in question except for their difference in status.  The two social 
stations that the Manciple invokes here, I propose, function as universals, as overarching 
constructs that scholastic realists regarded as inviolate truths.  For the purposes of clarity, 
we can follow the Manciple in referring to those universals as “gentile” and “povre,” but 
even as we do that, we must recognize that our naming of these constructs is a matter of 
rhetorical convenience; as universals, they have no existence in language.  From the 
universals “gentile” and “povre” two distinct mental signs are derived.  These “thought 
objects” or “affections in the soul” signify “gentile” and “povre” naturally rather than by 
convention, and like their universal signifieds, they have no existence in the linguistic 
sphere.  Finally the mental signs act as predicates for the spoken signs that the Manciple’s 
hypothetical wommen are “cleped” (from “clepen” meaning “to speak; call, shout”).
51
  
Those spoken signs of  “lemman” and “lady”  signify their respective mental signs only 
through conventional correspondence; the words themselves, while based on mental 
signs, are derived by a kind of cultural or social consensus.  What is most important, 
however, is that even if they signify by convention, the spoken signs are predicated 
firmly upon mental signs that are in turn predicated upon stable universals: because one 
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woman is “povre” she is called a “lemman”; because the second woman is “gentile” she 
is called a “lady.” 
 But how stable are those universals?  Certainly, the Manciple constructs this 
careful hierarchy of signs and signifieds upon what appears to firm realist ground, but his 
initial assertion that “Ther nys no difference” between the two women resonates with 
unusual force throughout his digression, undercutting the very scholastic realism it 
portends to support.
52
  Indeed, the proposition that the two adulterous women are 
essentially identical is dangerous to the realist ontology the Manciple develops precisely 
because it suggests that “gentle” and “povre” – the universals from which the spoken 
signs “lady” and “lemman” ultimately derive – may not really be universals at all, that 
they are not “at once distinct from the individual itself and from other universals.”
53
  In 
fact, the stated sameness of the two women displaces what initially appear to be 
universals, rendering them not inviolable signifieds but another set of mental signs, 
themselves predicated upon other signifieds.  The key to understanding this slippage lies 
in the relationship between the mental sign and the universal, specifically in the question 
of whether the mental sign signifies a universal signified (the realist approach) or whether 
it signifies other individual signs that, in the aggregate, seem to be a universal (the 
nominalist approach).  What the Manciple reveals, even as he argues from an ostensibly 
realist ontology, is that the mental signs informing our speech are not as firmly grounded 
in the universal as scholastic realism insists.  Rather, the universal itself may be subject to 
interference from other signs; it may not be a universal at all.  Ultimately, the Manciple 
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raises the possibility that, as Donald Howard has remarked, “the only real difference 
[between the two women] is a difference of language” – a nominalist philosophy.
54
 
Practically, the Manciple’s description of the “lady” and the “lemman” presents 
us with something we might anachronistically refer to as a linguistic feedback loop: the 
difference in status between the two unfaithful women ensures that the noble woman is 
called a lady while the poor woman is called a lemman; however, the speech acts “lady” 
and “lemman” themselves reify and make palpable such a status difference, even when 
the two women are essentially identical in their action.  The Manciple’s own actions 
underscore the notion that speech functions in this circular capacity, that it 
simultaneously signifies and generates the distinctions upon which mental signs are 
based.  It is, after all, his own utterance of the word “lemman” to which the Manciple 
reacts so strongly – “Certes this is a knavyssh speche!” (IX 205) – not the act of adultery 
itself, which he discusses at length without apology (IX 187-195).  In this “feedback 
loop,” we can see the Manciple proposing a brand of speech that is neither wholly 
performative in nature nor wholly constative, a brand of speech that exists between the 
two on a continuum of verbal efficacy.  Moreover, the power that the Manciple shows the 
spoken sign to have upon the mental sign allows us to identify the beginnings of an 
encroaching Ockhamist thread within the Manciple’s Tale. 
 
The three passages examined above – the allusion to Amphion walling Thebes with his 
voice; the Manciple’s discussion of the things “which that nature / Hath natureelly set in 
a creature”; and the comparatively complex discussion of the “lady” and the “lemman” – 
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suggest a range of possibilities for speech, from the inert to the radically performative 
and to intermediate points in between.  Taken together, they represent what Chekhov 
might call the gun on the Manciple’s wall, the range of functions accorded to the spoken 
utterance in the Manciple’s Tale.  And true to Chekhov’s words, that gun will fire by act 
five.   
While Chekhov’s dramaturgical truism offers a heuristic for understanding the 
Manciple’s Tale, the idea behind the Russian playwright’s metaphor, that the second part 
of a literary work brings the first part to fruition, is not unique to him; scholars of 
medieval literature have used similar metaphors to describe the narrative structure of 
poetry in the Middle Ages.  A. C. Spearing, for example, argues that many medieval 
poems are “comparable to ... a pictorial diptych” in that they consist of two equally sized 
“leaves” which “when put together... incite the reader to participate in the creation of a 
meaning that is larger than either possesses in isolation.”
55
  Spearing cites Chaucer’s 
Book of the Duchess and the alliterative poems Patience and Awntyrs off Arthure as such 
diptych poems; other critics have expanded that list to include Saint Erkenwald, Pearl, 
and Chaucer’s General Prologue.
56
  Chaucer’s Manciple’s Tale also exemplifies this 
diptych structure: the first leaf develops the potential of speech and the second leaf shows 
its deployment.  Even more than the image of the diptych, however, Chekhov’s metaphor 
articulates the movements of invocation and completion, of potential and kinetic energy, 
that undergird the tale’s larger structure. 
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Just after the midpoint of the Manciple’s Tale, Phoebus’s crow sings, “Cokkow! 
Cokkow! Cokkow!” (IX 243), an outburst that is important for two reasons.  First, it 
begins to reveal the philosophical underpinnings of the Manciple’s linguistic philosophy; 
second, it starts to fulfill the potential that the first portion of the tale accords to speech – 
to fire the gun.
57
  Their obvious punning aside, however, the three words alone might be 
understood as nonsensical birdsong, as vox rather than dictio, sound rather than sense.
58
  
When Phoebus presses the crow on the meaning of his speech (“What, bryd?” quod 
Phebus. “What song syngestow?” [IX 244]), the crow eliminates any ambiguity, 
reporting “by sadde tokenes and by wordes bolde, / How that [Phoebus’s] wyf had doon 
hire lecherye” (IX 258-59).  Initially, the crow’s utterance appears to be a constative one, 
a statement that is subordinated to a stable truth (the wife’s infidelity) and that accurately 
reflects the mental signs predicated upon that truth (the crow’s knowledge of the wife’s 
infidelity).  In fact, the Manciple endorses just such an interpretation by describing how 
the crow had stood mute witness to the very act of infidelity: “the white crowe, that 
heeng ay in the cage, / Biheeld hire werke, and seyde never a word” (IX 240-241).  In 
this respect, the crow’s damning utterances evoke a realist linguistic ontology, one in 
which the spoken word is fully subordinated both to the mental sign and to the universal 
that backs it up.  In relation to Phoebus, however, the statement functions differently.  
Rather than following the linguistic hierarchy described by the realists, where spoken 
language signifies a mental sign that itself always signifies an inviolable universal, the 
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crow uses his speech to alter the terms of Phoebus’s mental signs, to alter the things 
Phoebus knows to be true.  This ontological reversal violates the strict epistemological 
and linguistic hierarchy upon which scholastic realism insists.  Instead of being 
predicated upon a stable universal, Phoebus’s mental signs are shown to be contingent 
upon the crow’s speech: the mental sign that causes Phoebus to kill his wife is 
engendered by the crow’s utterance, “on thy bed thy wyf I saugh hym swyve” (IX 256).  
In this way, the Manciple’s Tale evokes a nominalist linguistic paradigm, one in which 
the mental sign is not connected to a transcendent universal but is derivative of other, 
more flexible signifieds. 
 After the enraged Phoebus murders his wife, the Manciple develops the 
nominalist current implied by the crow’s damning report still further.  The words that 
Phoebus speaks to the crow – an unvarnished assertion of his own wife’s fidelity – 
functionally invert the crow’s earlier report of Phoebus’s cuckolding: 
“Traitour,” quod [Phoebus], “with tonge of scorpioun,  
Thou hast me broght to my confusioun;  
Allas, that I was wroght! why nere I deed?  
O deere wyf! o gemme of lustiheed!  
That were to me so sad and eek so trewe,  
Now listow deed, with face pale of hewe,  
Ful gilteless, that dorste I swere, ywys!” (IX 271-277) 
Scholars have disagreed sharply on what exactly Phoebus is up to in this passage, though 
critical responses tend to fall into two camps: some critics argue that Phoebus really does 
think that the crow is lying; others argue that he willfully disagrees with the crow and 
70 
forces himself to believe his own rhetoric.
59
  This critical debate points out how 
Phoebus’s reaction, or rather the motivation for Phoebus’s reaction, is necessarily mired 
in a subjectivity that has no clear universal predicate.  Thus, in ontological and linguistic 
terms, Phoebus’s spoken defense of his wife offers a metatextual moment in which the 
poem enacts for the reader the very nominalism that it develops within its own narrative.  
Put another way, Phoebus’s words – his oddly unjustifiable assertion that his wife is not, 
in fact, an adulteress – are all we as readers have to go on.
60
 
By his own report, then, Phoebus finally does believe in both his wife’s fidelity 
and the crow’s mendacity; he knows his “deere wyf” to be “sad,” “trewe,” and “gilteless” 
(IX 274-275); he knows the crow to be a scorpion-tongued “traitour” (IX 271).  Peter 
Herman writes that Phoebus denies the crow’s words “in order to deny the truth and 
make reality subject to his will.”
61
  I suggest that Phoebus not only attempts to make 
material reality subject to his will, he creates a coexisting linguistic reality by the sheer 
force of his utterances.  In other words, Phoebus’s speech creates Phoebus’s world.  Here, 
as with the crow’s initial report of Phoebus’s cuckolding, speech stems from mental signs 
that have no connection to an overarching universal, a paradigm that mirrors the 
linguistic epistemology of Ockham’s nominalism.  Indeed, the only predicate for mental 
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signs themselves is a host of other, less absolute signifieds including (as we also saw in 
the crow’s initial report of Phoebus’s cuckolding), speech itself.  Without a stable 
universal to anchor the “affections in [his] soul,” Phoebus can generate a reality with his 
own spoken utterances in which, if only for himself, his wife is chaste, is true, is guiltless. 
The objection might be raised that the reality Phoebus creates is invalid, that the 
god’s assertions of his wife’s fidelity are little more than the disingenuous speech of a 
murderer trying to recuperate his wife’s lapsed virtue and mend his shattered reputation.  
Such is the contention of Britton Harwood, who claims that the tale told by the Manciple 
reveals his disdain for “those who can be distracted from empirical reality by language, 
which creates a bogus reality of its own.”
62
  Although it may be true that Phoebus’s 
reality is outwardly constructed of speech and that the reader, like the crow, sees a 
broader “empirical reality,” such an empirical reality is itself constructed by the 
Manciple’s own authority as a speaker in Chaucer’s pilgrimage. In the literary world of 
the Canterbury Tales, a world in which nine and twenty “sondry folk” (I 25) tell stories 
to one another on horseback, the reality to which readers have access is always mediated 
by the fictional speech of the pilgrims.  In this respect the “bogus reality” created by 
Phoebus’s speech may comment not upon the potential of speech simply to deceive but 
rather upon the power of poetic language to create worlds within the poetic text.  The 
efficacy of Phoebus’s speech stands as an indication that Chaucer – a poet whose great 
unfinished work ventriloquizes the spoken voices of 24 pilgrims – was acutely aware of 
the potential for speech to create realities, to signify and to be signified, to engender the 
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kinds of mental signs – “thought objects” – that nominalists argued were falsely 
perceived to be “universals.” 
In most of the Canterbury Tales, the reader and Chaucer are complicit in their 
understanding of this potential; indeed, Chaucer allows the reader to share in his authorial 
omniscience repeatedly through his work.  Like Chaucer, we know that a second flood is 
not coming to sweep John away in the Miller’s Tale even if the deceived carpenter does 
not; like Chaucer we know that Aurelius has not removed the “grisly rokkes blake” that 
obsess Dorigen (V 859), that May has not engaged in a “strugle with a man upon a tree” 
to restore January’s sight (IV 2374), that the deceived priest of the Canon’s Yeoman’s 
Tale will never possess the formula for multiplying base metals into gold.  What 
separates the Manciple’s Tale from the other tales of the Canterbury pilgrimage – what 
separates Phoebus’s “bogus reality” from John’s and Dorigen’s and January’s and the 
priest’s – is that Phoebus’s speech acts expose for the reader the very engine that drives 
Chaucer’s own poetic project.  We see in Pheoebus’s speech the creation of the world by 
the utterance of the word. 
Never is this more clear than when Phoebus turns to his crow and says, “I wol 
thee quite anon thy false tale” (IX 293).  Though early in the tale Phoebus was presented 
alternately as a courtly fop and a deceived husband, at this moment he makes good on his 
threat with startling and unsparing efficacy.  He becomes not the cuckold but the quitter 
of tales, not the courtly fop but the god of poets and poetry.  Phoebus uses his speech not 
to create an individual linguistic reality but to change the very nature of his world.  
Cuckold, bon vivant, and author – Phoebus speaks, and by speaking renders his talking 
crow mute, his white crow black: 
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Thou songe whilom lyk a nyghtyngale;  
Now shaltow, false theef, thy song forgon,  
And eek thy white fetheres everichon,  
Ne nevere in al thy life ne shaltou speke.  
Thus shal men on a traytour been awreke;  
Thou and thyn ofspryng evere shul be blake,  
Ne nevere sweete noyse shul ye make,  
But evere crie agayn tempest and rayn,  
In tokenynge that thurgh thee my wyf is slayn. (IX 294-302) 
There is a fundamental distinction between the speech that Phoebus unleashes here to 
punish the crow and the utterances he has used earlier to recuperate his wife.  In the 
latter, Phoebus’s speech creates an individual reality distinct from the seemingly 
objective, truthful reality of the reader and the crow.  In the former, Phoebus’s spoken 
words transform the crow to fit their own image; they create a reality that exists not only 
for Phoebus but for the crow and his offspring, for the reader, and even for the world 
outside the text, where black crows fly about cawing discordantly.  Phoebus says that the 
crow and all his offspring will be black, and the crow and all his offspring are black; 
Phoebus says that the crow will lose his beautiful voice, and the crow does lose his 
beautiful voice; Phoebus tells the crow that his cry will stand as a harbinger of tempest 
and storm, and so it does.
63
  By turning the crow black and destroying its ability to speak, 
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Phoebus reverses the causal relationship between the spoken sign and the mental sign; 
Phoebus forces the “dede” – the crow becoming black – to accord with his words rather 
than fitting his words to the dede (IX 208).  In other words, Phoebus puts the lie to what 
scholastic realists would call the immutable universal crow because he shows that 
“universal” to be predicated upon his own speech.  Here, at last, speech functions in a 
fully performative capacity.  Like Amphion, who uses his voice not to describe but to 
construct the walls of Thebes, Phoebus speaks not to describe the crow but to create it.  
Here, too, is Ockham’s nominalist ontology extrapolated to its fullest extent, an ontology 
in which the spoken sign and the mental sign exist apart from an unseen host of 
transcendent universals, in which speech holds the potential not only to represent reality 
but to create reality in its own image. 
 Phoebus’s crow-transforming utterance also underscores another important 
nominalist idea, the primacy of God’s potentia absoluta over His potentia ordinata.  
Despite the Manciple’s earth-bound presentation of Phoebus, he is first and foremost a 
god.  Although I do not wish to suggest that Chaucer intends Phoebus to be a simple 
stand-in for the Christian God, Phoebus’s creation and subsequent transformation of a 
speaking crow are, if nothing else, demonstrative of a God-like power.  Moreover, that 
power, the Manciple seems to indicate, is absolute, even to the point that Phoebus can 
alter the crow’s natural state from white to black.  Realist thinkers like Aquinas and John 
Duns Scotus rejected the potential for God to contravene His own laws, to go against the 
universal constructs of His creation.  Duns Scotus writes in his Ordinatio that “God can 
do whatever does not involve a contradiction,” maintaining that God can not flout His 
established universal laws and that “absolute power does not absolutely exceed ... ordered 
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power, since it would be ordered according to another law.”
64
  Ockham, however, saw no 
problems in God’s apparent self contradictions.  The potentia absoluta of God 
superseded all such paradoxes; His will was all, and it was boundless: 
Just as God creates every creature merely from His volition, so He can do 
with creatures whatever pleases Him merely from his volition.  Hence, if 
someone should love God and perform all the works approved by God, 
still God could annihilate him without any offense.  Likewise, after such 
works God could give the creature – not eternal life – but eternal 




This is the very potentia that the Manciple’s story of Phoebus and the crow enacts: just as 
easily as Phoebus creates the crow by his own will, so too does he destroy the crow and 
subject him to eternal punishment, slinging him “out at dore ... unto the devel” (IX 306-
07).  As in the nominalist interpretation of the Christian God, Phoebus becomes “the final 
source and guarantor of truth, just as He is the final source and guarantor of laws 
governing physical bodies.”
66
  His power, as the crow painfully learns, is bounded not by 
a set of ordained and transcendent universals but by the limitless capacity of his own 
absolute will. 
 Phoebus’s punitive series of overtly performative speech acts – evidence both of 
the tale’s commitment to a nominalist perspective on speech and of Phoebus’s own 
potentia absoluta – finally propels the Manciple into his lengthy harangue on the virtues 
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of silence.  Over the course of 44 lines, the Manciple obsessively repeats maxims that his 
mother taught him, each an admonishment to “restreyne and kepe wel thy tonge” (IX 
333), each a small contribution to the Manciple’s absurdly garrulous speech against 
speech.  The paradox created by the Manciple’s prolixity is difficult to reconcile, and 
critics have responded with a variety of interpretations.  Perhaps this compulsive and 
aggressive repetition demonstrates the Manciple’s growing anxiety that, as Harry Bailly 
implies, the Cook will reveal how the Manciple has “sette ... aller cappe” (I 586) of the 
lawyers in his house; perhaps it even speaks to an unseen knot of psychological issues 
that the Manciple has with his mother.
67
  I contend, however, that in light of Phoebus’s 
final, transformative speech act,  the Manciple’s warning demonstrates a nominalistic 
understanding of the terrible potential of the “rakel tonge.”  In repeatedly admonishing 
his fellow pilgrims to “kepe wel thy tongue and thenk upon the crowe” (IX 362), the 
Manciple not only asks them to consider the consequences of the crow’s speech but of 
Phoebus’s speech as well.  For while it is the crow’s “jangling” that angers Phoebus and 
brings about the crow’s punishment, it is Phoebus’s own speech act that brings the crow 
to his woeful (and current) state, a speech act that both threatens vengeance and enacts it 
in the same breath.  In other words, in the Manciple’s nominalist ontology the spoken 
word is dangerous not only because it can bring to light an undesirable truth; it is 
dangerous because it can create truth in its own right.  And, as the voiceless, coal-black 
crow demonstrates, the truth created by the word is not always a desirable one. 
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 The Manciple’s final speech fully bears out this assertion; indeed, most of the 
aphorisms that the Manciple cribs from his mother discuss not what speech is but what 
speech does. The speech act – metonymically described as the tongue – is an active agent 
within the Manciple’s nominalist ontology, something that “forkutteth and forkerveth” 
(IX 340), something that causes “muchel harm” (IX 337) and prevents “muchel reste” 
(IX 350), something that “serveth” and “gooth” and “kutteth freendshipe al a-two” (IX 
339, 355, 342).  The tongue becomes active speech literalized, the spoken word made 
flesh.  In fact, only when he describes the “wikked tongue” as being “worse than a feend” 
(IX 320) does the Manciple describe speech for what it is rather for than what it does.  It 
should come as no surprise, then, that in the midst of his diatribe the Manciple presents us 
with an image that clearly evokes his earlier allusion to Amphion building the walls of 
Thebes.  By stating that “God of his endelees goodnesse / Walled a tongue with teeth and 
lippes eke” (IX 322-23), the Manciple reinforces the ability of speech to perform work in 
the absence of universals, whether that work be constructive or, as the Manciple’s crow 
so aptly demonstrates, destructive. 
 
Nominalism and Geoffrey Chaucer: “The Righte Way to Rome” 
The Canterbury Tales’s engagement with nominalism – an engagement that 
reaches its apogee in the Manciple’s Tale – prompts this question: “What is Chaucer’s 
own perspective on Ockham’s nominalist philosophy?”  The Manciple himself, I have 
argued, both subscribes to a nominalist philosophy and understands the dangers implicit 
in it; Chaucer expresses a frustratingly ambivalent attitude toward the Manciple, 
however, and by extension, toward his nominalist views.  On the one hand, Chaucer 
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implies an affinity between himself and the Manciple several times in the Canterbury 
Tales, including in the General Prologue, where Chaucer juxtaposes his own narrative 
persona with the Manciple on a single line: “Ther was also a Reve, and a Millere / A 
Somnour, and a Pardoner also, / A Maunciple, and myself – ther were namo”(I 542-44).  
Furthermore, because the Manciple’s Tale interrogates so many of the issues explicitly 
raised by the Canterbury Tales as a whole – the relationship between “word” and “dede,” 
the practice of “quitting,” the balance between “sentence” and “solaas” – the Manciple 
emerges as a kind of poetic doppelganger for Chaucer, a figure within the fiction of the 
pilgrimage who engages with the same thematic issues the poet himself considers.  
Grudin has gone so far as to argue that the Manciple’s Tale “explains and reinforces ... 
the poetic principles of the Canterbury Tales” and encapsulates “the foundation upon 
which Chaucer’s poetics are built.”
68
  In that respect, the flexibility and power that the 
Manciple accords to speech would necessarily appeal to a poet who “relies on equivocal 
language” in order to investigate the relationship between word and world.
69
   
On the other hand, Chaucer the author frequently disparages the Manciple despite 
connecting him so overtly to his own narrative alter ego.  The poet includes the Manciple 
(along with the Reeve, the Miller, the Pardoner, the Summoner, and himself) in the 
gallery of churls at the end of the General Prologue, and he draws the reader’s attention 
to the Manciple’s penchant for bilking the lawyers at his inn of court by noting that “he 
sette hir aller cappe” (I 586).  Chaucer also paints a highly unflattering portrait of the 
Manciple in the prologue to his tale, a piece of roadside drama in which the Manciple 
first insults the ale-sodden Cook to his face, then disingenuously denounces him to the 
                                                
68
 Grudin, Chaucer and the Politics of Discourse, 151.   
69
 Peck, “Chaucer and the Nominalist Questions,” 760. 
79 
other pilgrims, then finally – after Harry Bailly implies that the Cook might exact 
retribution by exposing the Manciple’s dishonest “rekenynges” (IX 74) – self-servingly 
plies him with wine until he can no longer speak.  Even if we can imagine Chaucer using 
this most duplicitous pilgrim to propose a philosophical outlook he actively proposes, the 
choice of the Manciple as a philosophical mouthpiece raises as many questions about 
Chaucer’s attitude toward questions of nominalism as it resolves. 
Chaucer’s attitude toward nominalism gets no clearer when we move beyond the 
Manciple’s Tale and consider the final tale of the Canterbury pilgrimage, the treatise on 
confession offered by the Parson.  The links between the Parson’s Tale and the 
Manciple’s Tale have long been recognized; Chaucer explicitly encourages comparison 
by having both the Manciple and the Parson claim not to be “textueel” men (IX 235, X 
57) and by placing the two tales back to back.  Scholars who have read the tales in 
tandem, however, have almost universally read them as antitypes.  Mark Allen makes a 
representative argument in this vein: 
[The Manciple’s Tale] is markedly unpenitential, even antipenitential: the 
central transformation of the tale – the change of the crow from white to 
black – ironically reverses the penitential change that the Parson describes 
at the end of his tale....  As the Manciple encourages the Cook’s fall, so his 
tale encourages a similar fall for everyone who accepts his advice before 
the Parson’s exhortation to penance.  We need the Parson’s speech to lead 
us to penance, and, as becomes increasingly clear, we need the penitential 
transformation that speech effects.
70
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Allen reasons that the Parson’s Tale, the last word of the Canterbury pilgrimage proper, 
effectively undoes the Manciple’s Tale; thus, we might understand it to show Chaucer 
repudiating the nominalist excesses of the Manciple himself.  On one level, that argument 
makes sense: the Parson’s insistence upon penitential speech – his dictum that “Al moot 
be seyd, and no thing excused ne hyd ne forwrapped” (X.319) – offers a corrective to the 
Manciple’s stifling call to silence.  Moreover, The Parson’s vision of speech as a blessing 
from God which brings spiritual salvation counters the Manciple’s view of speech as 
predominantly dangerous.  Most important for our attempt to discern Chaucer’s relative 
ontological bent, the Parson’s Tale maintains a distinctly realist viewpoint, both 
philosophically and linguistically.  Informed by patristic writers such as Augustine and 
Ambrose, it evinces supreme confidence both in the “parfit knowynge of God” (X 1079) 
and in the ordained power of God to grant that “knowynge,” with His grace, to the 
penitent soul.  Even Harry Bailly’s swipe at the Parson’s would-be Lollard sympathies in 
the epilogue to the Man of Law’s Tale – “O Jankin be ye there? / I smelle a Lollere in the 
wynd” (II 1173-74) – may suggest the Parson’s realist outlook.  Despite his flagrant 




But Chaucer does not allow the Parson’s Tale to serve as so straightforward an 
antidote to the nominalist Manciple’s Tale (an alternative that would have made it far 
easier to assert the poet’s realist bona fides). Despite their markedly different approaches, 
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the tales told by the Manciple and the Parson demonstrate a fundamental similarity in 
their understanding that language can do work, that speech has the potential to function 
performatively.  Ultimately, both tales are about transformation and the ability of 
language to effect it, whether that transformation be triumphant, as in the Parson’s Tale, 
or tragic, as in the Manciple’s Tale.  Even in the heat of his invective against speech, the 
Manciple pauses to exempt speech in the service of God, noting “thy tonge sholdestow 
restreyne / At alle tymes, but whan thou doost thy peyne / To speke of God, in honor and 
preyere” (IX 329-331).  In much the same way, the Parson, though clearly an advocate of 
transformative sacramental speech, warns the pilgrims against “janglynge, that may not 
been withoute synne” (X 649) and against “idle words, that is withouten profit of hym 
that speketh tho wordes” (X 647); this is, tellingly, the same “janglyng” (IX 350) against 
which the Manciple intones in his final speech.  The difference between the Parson and 
the Manciple, then, is a difference not in kind but in emphasis.  Each recognizes that 
speech has the ability to do work, but while the Manciple most frequently stresses the 
destructive potential of speech over the constructive, the Parson stresses the potential for 
salvation over the equally present potential for damnation.  Far from being antitypes then, 
the tales told by the Manciple and the Parson are, in fact, mirrors of one another – one 
dark, one bright, both demonstrative of the power of speech and the necessity of silence.  
The distinctions that many critics draw between the two tales become, in this regard, 
untenable.  Despite the rival ontological and linguistic systems that each tale seems 
initially to represent – the Manciple’s Ockhamist nominalism and the Parson’s scholastic 
realism – the two tales are ultimately revealed to be two species of the same genus. 
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Those same ontological and linguistic cross currents complicate even Chaucer’s 
“Retraction,” a work whose rubric – “Heere taketh the makere of this book his leve” 
(rubric before X 1081) – promises some respite from the incessant layering of narrators 
and sub-narrators that vexes interpretation of the Canterbury Tales.  We might at first be 
tempted to ascribe a realist outlook to the “Retraction.”  Indeed, Chaucer’s assertion, “al 
that is writen is writen for oure doctrine” (X 1083) strongly suggests the subordination of 
conventional linguistic expression to transcendent universal truth upon which the realists 
insisted.  From the works that Chaucer chooses not to retract, most pertinently his 
translation of Boethius’s Consolation of Philosophy, we might additionally construe that 
he maintains a realist viewpoint.  But in many respects, the very act of retracting itself is 
at odds with realist understandings of the signifying function of language: it presupposes 
that Chaucer can use words to alter his canon, that he can “revoke” (from the Latin re 
vocare, meaning “call back”) works already in existence.  More cynically, we might read 
Chaucer’s list of retracted works as paradoxically speaking those works into existence, 
serving as a retrograde table of contents and reinforcing rather than diminishing their 
existence.  For the modern reader, the case of Chaucer’s lost “book of the Leoun” enacts 
such nominalistic performativity on an extra-textual level: the reference in the 
“Retraction” is all the evidence we have of that work; its reality for us is created solely by 
the linguistic signifiers used to express it.  In other words, by “revoking” the Book of the 
Lion for himself, Chaucer effectively “re-vokes” it for his readers as well. 
In addition to these internal contradictions, we cannot with confidence extract the 
“Retraction” from the Canterbury frame itself.  The “makere of this book” specified by 
the rubric may (as is usually supposed) refer to Chaucer, the historical author of the 
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Canterbury Tales; it may, however, just as easily refer to the pilgrim / reporter that serves 
as Chaucer’s narrative alter ego.
72
  In other words, Chaucer does not unequivocally 
relinquish the narrative valences of the Canterbury Tales in his retraction.  Therefore, we 
should not be surprised that Chaucer seems to follow the advice of the Parson and the 
Manciple in equal measure in the “Retraction,” simultaneously offering the quasi-
penitent language of the “Retraction” itself and retroactively withholding the dangerous 
language of “many a song and many a leccherous lay” (X 1087). 
Our inability to extrapolate Chaucer’s philosophical viewpoint from the Parson’s 
Tale or the “Retraction” makes an a fortiori argument for our inability to do so from any 
other tale or from the Canterbury collection as a whole; the intricate authorial and 
narrative layering in the work is too complex to give us a clear window into Chaucer’s 
own point of view.  This observation is frequently made, of course, but it is also precisely 
the point of the Canterbury Tales: the nominalist language of the Manciple’s Tale 
suggests that Chaucer is acutely aware of the nominalist underpinnings of his 
performative tale-telling project.  If we move away from the highly self-conscious frame 
of the Canterbury Tales and consider Chaucer’s lyric poetry, however, we can piece 
together a different philosophical outlook, one more consistently realist than Chaucer’s 
final, unfinished work might suggest.   
I do not mean to suggest that we should read Chaucer’s lyrics as unvarnished 
authorial statements; these lyrics were written within a specific courtly setting and must 
be seen in the wider context of Ricardian structures of power and patronage.  
Nonetheless, the courtly lyrics can be said to represent Chaucer’s public voice and are, 
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therefore, significant to our understanding of the poet’s views on nominalism. With its 
biblical refrain “And trouthe the shal delivere, it is no drede” (7), the short poem “Truth” 
strongly evinces the epistemology of scholastic realism: 
That thee is sent, receyve in buxumnesse; 
The wrastling for this world axeth a fal. 
Her is non hoom, her nis but wildernesse: 
Forth, pilgrim, forth!  Forth, beste, out of thy stal!   
Know thy contree, look up, thank God of al; 
Hold the heye wey and lat thy gost thee lede, 
And trouthe thee shal delivere, it is no drede. (15-21) 
We may initially want to read this passage, and especially its first three lines, as little 
more than the sage (if conventional) advice offered the courtier by the poet: “accept your 
good fortune humbly, for it will not follow you to your celestial home when this life is 
through.”  Yet, further consideration of the poem’s language – particularly the phrases 
“receyve in buxumnesse” and “thank God of al” – reveal a deeply hierarchical paradigm, 
one in which the courtier obediently receives that which is given to him by god.  Such a 
paradigm recalls the realist epistemology of revelation that Augustine develops in De 
Magistro, in which humans receive, also in “buxumnesse,” the illumination granted by 
God.  Augustine writes, “Our real Teacher is he who is so listened to ... namely Christ, 
that is, the unchangeable power and eternal wisdom of God.  To this wisdom every 
rational soul gives heed, but to each is given only so much as he is able to receive.”
73
 It is 
logical, then, that after the admonition “Know thy contree” – a phrase which can mean 
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both “know your terrestrial country” and “know that heaven is your true home” – 
Chaucer asks the addressee to look up and thank God.  It is God, from whom that 
knowledge comes, God who will grant the universal truth that “thee shall delievere.”
74
  
Small wonder that this poem is situated in one manuscript next to the General Prologue’s 
portrait of the Parson, a pilgrim whose faith in an orderly, hierarchical cosmos leads him 




 Chaucer’s other so-called “Boethian Lyrics” imply a similar investment in the 
linguistic and ontological precepts of scholastic realism.
76
  In “Gentilesse,” Chaucer 
particularly asserts the objective universality of such concepts as “vertu” (4), “vice” (11) 
and “vertuous noblesse” (17), while in “Fortune” he echoes the Parson’s lament about 
“ordre or ordinaunce turned up-so-doun” by bewailing “this wretched worldes 
transmutacioun ... withouten ordre or wys discrecioun”(1-3).  Most telling of all, 
however, is “Lak of Stedfastnesse,” which marries the other lyrics’ concerns with 
hierarchy and disorder to questions of speech and language: 
Somtyme the world was so stedfast and stable 
That mannes word was obligacioun, 
And now it is so fals and deceivable 
That word and deed, as in conclusioun, 
Ben nothing lyk, for turned up-so-doun 
                                                
74
 The MED defines “contree” both as “any geographic area or physiographic province” (n., 1) and as “the 
realm (of the air, the stars, heaven)” (n., 5).  See also Note 19 for “Truth,” in The Riverside Chaucer, 1085. 
75
 See Leila Z. Gross’s brief discussion of “Truth,” in “The Short Poems” (introduction), The Riverside 
Chaucer, 635. 
76
 For the grouping of “Truth,” “Fortune,” “Gentilesse,” and “Lak of Stedfastnesse” as “Boethian Lyrics” 
see Gross, “The Short Poems,” in The Riverside Chaucer, 634-35 (introduction to “The Former Age”). 
86 
Is al this world for mede and wilfulnesse, 
That al is lost for lak of stedfastnesse. (1-7) 
Although here Chaucer repeats his plaint that the once stable world has turned “up-so-
doun,” he gives that inversion a specific shape in the dislocation of word from deed, of 
sign from signified.  As we have already seen in the Manciple’s Tale, such a dislocation 
is implicit within Ockham’s nominalist ontology: without universals upon which to 
predicate the mental sign, there can be no guarantee that even the most scrupulous and 
accurate verbal utterance correlates with a stable, transcendent reality.  Subjective reality 
becomes the only reality.  In such a world, “Vertu hath ... no dominacioun” (16) because 
“vertu” is merely a contingent signifier rather than an overarching universal sign.  
Similarly, “resoun is holden fable” because neither “resoun” nor “fable” is predicated 
upon a larger “trouthe” (15).  As Liam Purdon writes, “the obvious result of the mutable 
and debased state of language and thought, according to Chaucer, is that vice reigns, 
while virtue and pity and mercy ... are either relegated to a state of insignificance or 
exiled.”
77
   
 Although “Lak of Stedfastnesse” clearly deplores the encroachment of 
nominalism on an increasingly disordered cosmos, the corrective it supplies for an “up-
so-doun” nominalist world is, in fact, startlingly reminiscent of Ockham’s own 
philosophy: 
O prince, desyre to be honourable, 
Cherish thy folk and hat extorcioun. 
Suffre nothing that may be reprevable 
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To thyn estat don in thy regioun. 
Shew forth thy sword of castigacioun, 
Dred God, do law, love trouthe and worthinesse, 
And wed thy folk agein to stedfastnesse. 
Directed to King Richard II, this envoy brings an overt political dimension to the lyric, 
making terrestrial the “up-so-doun” cosmic hierarchy described by the first three stanzas 
and investing the king rather than God with the power to right it.  In urging the king to 
“shew forth [the] sword of castigacioun,” Chaucer essentially argues for the royal 
equivalent of God’s potentia absoluta: Richard is to “suffre nothing” that works against 
his regal authority, and he should not spare punishment in his attempts to wed his 
subjects back to the stable earthly hierarchy.  Despite Chaucer’s insistence that Richard 
“Dred God, do law [and] love trouthe and worthinesse,” the effect of advice contained in 
the envoy is, as Paul Strohm flatly states, “to strengthen the king’s hand; to urge him to 
stiffen up and be a king.”
78
  Where Ockham turned to the potentia absoluta of God to 
remedy the cosmic disorder threatened by the abandonment of stable universals, Chaucer 
turns to the potentia absoluta of the king to remedy the earthly disorder that prevailed at 
the close of the fourteenth century. 
 The envoy to King Richard that concludes “Lak of Steadfastnesse” is particularly 
suggestive for our reading of the Manciple’s Tale.  As a number of critics have pointed 
out, the bow-wielding Phoebus bears more than a passing resemblance to Richard II, a 
monarch whose increasingly tyrannical reign in the late 1390s was emblemized by his 
retinue of Cheshire archers and whose aspirations to semi-divine status are revealed in 
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such visual works as the Westminster Abbey Coronation Portrait and the extraordinary 
Wilton Diptych.
79
  Equally important, particularly in light of the power Chaucer accords 
to Phoebus’s speech, is the power that Richard himself seemed to invest in the spoken 
word; among the articles of deposition drafted against the king in 1399 was the 
accusation that Richard proclaimed “the laws were in his own mouth ... and that he alone 
could change or establish the laws of his realm.”
80
  Recent scholarship has detailed a 
changing “vocabulary of kingship” toward the end of Richard’s reign, in which the king 
demanded new and elaborate forms of royal address in order to encourage “a lofty, 
almost God-like, image of himself... as a distant, majestic and all-powerful figure.”
81
  
Richard also manipulated the legal and parliamentary proceedings surrounding the 
“Revenge Parliament” of 1397, including the damning spoken confession made by the 
Duke of Gloucester just before his death.  In these actions, it is possible to see Richard 
attempting – like Chaucer’s Phoebus – to alter the world by altering the language used to 
describe it.
82
  And while it is surely absurd to imagine Richard simply taking Chaucer’s 
envoy to heart and assuming the mantle of royal potentia absoluta on its behest, it is not 
absurd to imagine Chaucer understanding Richard’s tyranny as the only possible response 
to what he might see as England’s descent into a nominalist dystopia.  Nor is it absurd (or 
even difficult) to imagine Chaucer composing his Manciple’s Tale mindful of both that 
descent and the increasing royal tyranny he may have associated with it. 
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In the absence of the narrative and meta-narrative complexities of the Canterbury 
Tales, the Boethian lyrics demonstrate that despite the affinities between Chaucer and the 
Manciple, the world described in the Manciple’s Tale – in which realist ontological and 
linguistic hierarchies are upended and the spoken word can function performatively 
without constraint or universal predicate – is not only a world that Chaucer decries and 
fears; it is a world that he sees manifest in the political and social landscape around him. 
Thus if Chaucer is a nominalist, as Peck and others have suggested, he is only the most 
reluctant of nominalists, simultaneously aware and fearful of the possibilities arising from 
an “up-so-doun” philosophy.  P. B. Taylor more probably asserts that Chaucer “aspires 
toward a linguistic realism in which intent informs deeds through the ministry of words” 
but that “ this aspiration is an ideal sullied by the practice of the real world.”
83
  Inasmuch 
as Chaucer believes that speech and the mental signs that precede it are – and should be – 
subordinated to universal truths, he is a realist.  And yet, as a poet and a creator of fiction, 
Chaucer is also acutely aware of, and invested in, the potentia that nominalists like 
Ockham ascribed to spoken and written signs.  The very world that Chaucer inhabited, 
which frequently throbbed with the Sturm und Drang of social discord, must have invited 
comparison to the upended hierarchies and arbitrary expressions of power manifest in 
nominalism. 
Despite all of this – or perhaps because of it – Chaucer offers an optimistic 
expression of scholastic realism in one of his most unlikely literary endeavors.  
Ostensibly written for his ten-year-old son “Lowys,” who had shown “by certeyne 
evydences [an] abilite to lerne sciences touching nombres” (Astrolabe 1-3), Chaucer’s 
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Treatise on the Astrolabe purports to provide in English (apparently Lowys’s knowledge 
of Latin was “yit but smal”) the “reules and ... trewe conclusions” (26-29) of the 
astronomical instrument.  It also provides in its introduction a remarkable articulation of 
the linguistic principles of scholastic realism: 
This tretis, divided in 5 parties, wol I shewe the under full light reules and 
naked wordes in Englissh, for Latyn canst thou yit but small, my litel sone.  
But natheles suffise to the these trewe conclusions in Englissh as wel as 
sufficith to these noble clerkes Grekes these same conclusions in Grek; 
and to Arabiens in Arabik, and to Jewes in Ebrew, and to Latyn folk in 
Latyn; whiche Latyn folk had hem first out of othere dyverse langages, 
and writen hem in her owne tunge, that is to seyn, in Latyn.  And God 
woot that in alle these langages and in many moo han these conclusions 
ben suffisantly lerned and taught, and yit by diverse reules; right as 
diverse pathes leden diverse folk the righte way to Rome .... And Lowys, 
yf so be that I shewe the in my lighte Englissh as trewe conclusions 
touching this mater, and not oonly as trewe but as many and as subtile 
conclusiouns, as ben shewid in Latyn in eny commune tretys of the 
Astrelabie, konne me the more thank. (25-55) 
Chaucer’s argument that English “sufficith” for “Lyte Lowys” just as Greek suffices for 
Greeks and Latin suffices for “Latyn folk” is most immediately relevant as “part of 
Chaucer’s characteristic interest in the translator’s role.”
84
  However, that same argument 
also implies – indeed is predicated upon – the universality of what Chaucer refers to as 
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“trewe conclusions,” concepts that exist outside the conventional signifiers of spoken 
language and from which those signifiers derive their truth value.  Moreover, such “trewe 
conclusions” are the same not only in different languages (“Arabik,” “Ebrew,” “Grek”) 
but for different peoples (“Arabiens,” “Jewes,” “Grekes”); they cannot, therefore, exist 
“only as... thought object[s] in the mind” but must necessarily be part of a set of 
overarching truths, of universal constants upon which first mental signs and then spoken 
signs are predicated.
85
  Thus, Chaucer’s dictum, “diverse pathes leden diverse folk the 
righte way to Rome” (39-40) encapsulates his realist beliefs: the diversity of speech and 
writing drawn from a diversity of individuals is nonetheless predicated upon a single 
“righte way,” a universal that always comes from and leads to the same place.
86
  It is 
fitting, then, that Chaucer echoes one of the more realist sentiments of the “Retraction” 
when, in the Treatise on the Astrolabe, he describes translating the astrological work “in 
myn Englissh oonly for thy doctrine” (63-4). 
But even beyond Chaucer’s introductory ruminations on translation, language, 
and universals, The Treatise on the Astrolabe articulates a realist ontology.  Indeed, the 
very choice of the astrolabe as a textual subject evokes the realist ontological hierarchy, 
expressed here as part of the “pervasive and ubiquitous medieval principle of the celestial 
dominance over terrestrial matter.”
87
  The very purpose of medieval astronomy (and of 
the more suspect interpretive art of astrology) was to glean “trewe conclusions” from the 
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observable phenomena of the heavens, to understand the universal truths that the motions 
of the stars and planets signified.  When Chaucer introduces the Astrolabe to his son, he 
specifies its ability to illuminate truths beyond those known by human beings: “truste wel 
that alle the conclusions that han be founde in so noble an instrument as is an Astrelabie 
ben unknowe parfitly to eny mortal man in this regioun, as I suppose” (15-19).  John 
Gower’s confessor, Genius, makes a similar case for the transcendent truth of the heavens 
when he instructs Amans on the arts of astronomy in Confessio Amantis: 
     "Benethe upon this erthe hiere 
Of alle thinges the matiere, 
As tellen ous thei that ben lerned, 
Of thing above it stant governed, 
That is to sein of the planetes.”
88
 
Although the practices and interpretation of astronomy do not always accord with the 
teachings of the Church (a point also made by Gower in the Confessio), the science 
nonetheless depends upon the core beliefs of realist thought.  The science itself is 
“hierarchically ordered to the supreme purpose of knowing God,” an Aristotelian attempt 
to know the universal through sense experience.
89
  This, finally, is the ontology that 
Chaucer wants to pass onto his son Lowys; an ontology that may inform Chaucer’s own 
thinking about the world he inhabits. 
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 Of course the world we desire to give our sons and daughters and the world that 
we fear they will inherit are two different things.  When we think about the tumult that 
Chaucer witnessed in his sixty years – from the plague outbreak of his childhood, to his 
time in the Hundred Years war, to the mob passing by his Aldgate house in 1381, to his 
service in the Good Parliament, to the deposition and murder of King Richard during the 
final months of his life – we must also recognize that the orderly universe the poet 
describes to his young, mathematically inclined son was never the universe he knew.  I 
wrote at the outset of this chapter that it is impossible to be certain of Chaucer’s position 
on nominalism.  Nonetheless, I have made the argument that Chaucer was a realist, albeit 
one who recognized an active tension between realism and the exigencies of an 
increasingly “up-so-doun” world.  This is the tension that he enmeshes into his Boethian 
lyrics and that simmers menacingly beneath the surface of his Manciple’s Tale.  In some 
respects, it may seem naïve to suggest that this tension finds its primary expression in 
Chaucer’s literary representations of speech.  But as the Manciple’s Tale shows us, the 
power that the poet accords to the spoken word is often monumental.  Perhaps what we 
finally witness in Chaucer’s poetry is a cry against the discord and entropy of the 
fourteenth century, a poetic call for the restoration of order amidst social and cultural 
chaos.  And perhaps the Manciple’s Tale itself – in its depiction of a topsy-turvy, 
unhinged world – is nothing less than a speculum mundi, a mirror reflecting both 





“And chaungit cheuely hor nomes”:  
Eucharist, Baptism, and Sacramental Utterance in Saint Erkenwald 
 
 It is with good reason that critics have focused so persistently on the sacrament of 
baptism in their readings of Saint Erkenwald: even in the frequently outlandish universe 
of medieval alliterative verse, the poem’s climactic spectacle of a miraculously preserved 
and reanimated corpse crumbling to dust at the moment of its christening is a remarkable 
one.  Generally recognized to be an English recasting of the legend of Saint Gregory and 
the Emperor Trajan, Saint Erkenwald focuses on the discovery, during the construction of 
Saint Paul’s Cathedral, of a magnificent sarcophagus containing the inexplicably 
preserved corpse. Unable to read the engravings on the sarcophagus or to determine the 
identity or even the vintage of the body, London’s increasingly agitated citizens summon 
their bishop, Erkenwald, from clerical duties in Essex so that he might solve the mystery 
and quell the growing civic unrest it has created. Erkenwald addresses the corpse, 
commanding it in the name of God to reveal its secrets; and like some Celtic 
Frankenstein’s monster, it blinks its eyes and begins to tell its story.  The corpse, it turns 
out, was a judge who lived 500 years before Christ.  Strict, honest, and unswervingly fair, 
the judge was buried as a king for his flawless adherence to law; but as a heathen, his 




  Deeply moved by the mournful tale, Erkenwald cannot help but weep, and he 
wishes aloud that God could grant the virtuous pagan life once more, just long enough to 
be baptized.  If only such a thing were possible, the bishop exclaims, he would speak 
these words: “I folwe !e in !e Fader nome and His fre Childes, / And of !e gracious Holy 
Goste” (318-19).  Despite the oddly conditional mode of his baptismal prayer (an issue to 
which I will return), the words have their effect; as Erkenwald utters them, one of his 
tears falls on the judge’s face to complete the sacrament.  The new Christian soul flies to 
heaven; the body falls to ash.  Bells ring in London.  Order is restored. 
 Gordon Whatley identifies two, overarching critical responses to the poem.  The 
first, that the heathen judge achieves salvation by virtue of his good works and worthy 
life, is a position that closely echoes Langland’s treatment of the Trajan story in Piers 
Plowman.
2
  Implicit in such a response is the argument that “the poet’s main concern is to 
affirm the efficacy of individual merit and good works in the achievement of salvation,” 
that the actions of the heathen judge alone are sufficient to engender the mercy of God.
3
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Whatley himself offers a different analysis, suggesting that the poem demonstrates how 
salvation requires not only the sacrament of baptism, but also the authority of the Church 
to administer it.  Since his influential essay, critics have tended to follow Whatley’s 
assertion even as they have worked to refine it.  Whereas Frank Grady finds that Saint 
Erkenwald occupies a kind of middle-ground between Langland’s heterodox treatment of 
the Trajan story and a strict orthodox one, both Christine Chism and William Kamowski 
see the poem as profoundly orthodox and, more specifically, profoundly anti-Wycliffite.  
More recently, Jennifer Sisk has argued that even as it “overtly expresses traditional 
views,” Saint Erkenwald finally “occupies an idiosyncratic position that uneasily 




 Few critics have examined the nature of sacramental speech in Saint Erkenwald, 
which is surprising when we consider the poem’s investment in – even obsession with – 
the speech-centered sacrament of baptism.
5
  The first part of this chapter proposes to 
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remedy that lack of critical attention by looking at baptism not simply as the means of 
salvation for the pagan judge but as a sacrament whose reliance upon the spoken word 
raises fundamental issues about the efficacy of sacramental language and about the 
priest’s role in administering it.  Although this chapter gives baptism its due in the poem, 
it ultimately seeks to look beyond baptism and to focus on another orthodox rite, one 
similarly invested in the transformative power of the priest’s words: the sacrament of the 
Eucharist.  As a number of recent studies have demonstrated, the Eucharist attained 
immense cultural importance in fourteenth- and fifteenth-century England, even as it 
came under increasing scrutiny, most vociferously by heterodox Wycliffite Christians.
6
  
By denying the orthodox view of transubstantiation, Wyclif and his followers mounted an 
attack on the Church that, taken to its extreme, seemed poised to “destroy Christianity 
and unravel the very fabric of human community.”
7
  I argue that Saint Erkenwald, while 
never explicitly referring to the Eucharist or the doctrine of transubstantiation, 
nevertheless demonstrates its allegiance to orthodox eucharistic theology in its account of 
the judge’s conversion.  In some respects, this argument comports with earlier criticism 
showing how the orthodoxy of the poem is constructed through its explicitly baptismal 
aspects; however, I depart from that criticism in two fundamental ways.  First, I argue 
that the key indicator of orthodoxy in the poem is not the judge’s baptism per se but the 
efficacy of Erkenwald’s words both in the performance of the baptism and in the 
miraculous reanimation of the heathen corpse.  Second, I demonstrate that Saint 
Erkenwald focuses on the efficacy of language in order to bind the salvation of the 
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heathen judge to the defining sacrament of the Eucharist, a connection that allows the 
poem to offer a far more comprehensive response to Wycliffite heresies, as well as a 




 The second part of this chapter takes a broader view than the first: it considers 
Saint Erkenwald’s anti-Wycliffite stance in the context of the Church’s relationship with 
its non-Christian forbears.  I argue that the poem develops its immediate polemic against 
Lollardy within a semantic and linguistic register that evokes a number of fundamental 
theological issues: namely, the nature of orthodox eschatology, the foundational Christian 
precepts of Old Law and New Law, and the typological model by which medieval 
Christianity defined itself against paganism and Judaism.  By again focusing on the 
efficacy – and sometimes the stubborn inertness – of the spoken word within these 
theological contexts, this chapter not only establishes Saint Erkenwald’s views on 
Lollardy but also uncovers the poem’s cultural anxieties over the origins of English 
Christianity and its susceptibility to heterodox and heretical threats. 
 
The Words of the Priest, the Body of Christ 
 The conditional mode of Bishop Erkenwald’s baptismal prayer remains one of 
Saint Erkenwald’s most critically vexing details.  Moved to tears by the corpse’s story, 
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the bishop laments the pagan judge’s pitiable condition aloud and wishes he had the 
power to perform a baptism: 
“Our Lord lene,” quo! !at lede [Erkenwald], “!at !ou lyfe hades, 
By Goddes leue, as longe as I my!t lacche water 
And cast vpon !i faire cors and carpe !es wordes, 
‘I folwe !e in !e Fader nome and His fre Childes, 
And of !e gracious Holy Goste’ and not one grue lenger;  
"en !of !ou droppyd doun ded hit daungerde me lasse.” 
Wyt !at worde !at he warpyd !e wete of eghen 
And teres trillyd adoun and on !e toumbe lighten, 
And one felle on his face and !e freke syked. (315-323)
9
 
Since Whatley, most critics of Saint Erkenwald have read this passage as an affirmation 
of the unconditional necessity of orthodox baptism for salvation.  However accurate, such 
an assessment does little to account for the fact that the baptism itself is an accident: the 
baptismal tear is shed without what we might call baptismal intent.  Even more 
remarkably, the baptismal prayer is uttered only as a demonstration of what Erkenwald 
would say if he thought it would do any good.  Annemarie Thijms suggests that the 
“accidental” nature of the baptism and Erkenwald’s conditional prayer allow Saint 
Erkenwald to skirt a problem that has often troubled the Trajan legend, namely the sticky 
issue of an ecclesiast asking God to change His mind and grant salvation to a damned 
                                                
9
 “‘Our lord grant,’ said Erkenwald, ‘that you had life, by God’s leave, long enough that I might use water 
and cast it upon your fair corpse and speak these words: “I follow thee in the name of the father and his 
generous Child and of the gracious Holy Ghost,” and not one word more.  Then though you dropped down 
into death, it would trouble me less.’ With those words his eyes became wet and tears trilled down and 




  I propose that the conditional bracketing of the baptismal words – “I my!t 
lacche water / And cast vpon !i faire cors and carpe !es wordes” – also serves a 
metadiscursive function: it draws attention to the words of the spoken baptismal prayer as 
words, divorced from their specific sacramental context.  Even so, the words are 
apparently efficacious; Erkenwald’s baptismal prayer does perform its appointed work, 
whether it is uttered conditionally, subjunctively, or with genuine intent to baptize.  In 
this respect, the poem shows the sacramental utterance itself to be important, not 
necessarily the intent with which it is uttered.  When the newly christened judge feels his 
soul enter heaven, he places the responsibility for his salvation squarely on “!e wordes 
!at !ou [Erkenwald] werpe and !e water !at !ou sheddes” (329): the words – as well as 
the water – of baptism.  Indeed, it is only “Wyt !at worde” (321) that the baptismal tear is 
effective.  As Peter Cramer argues in his recent study of baptism in the Middle Ages, 
“The power of language, and especially of liturgical language, to ‘make’ those who speak 
it, to invigorate the natural motion of the soul, is more than a philosopher’s idea.  It is one 
of the fundamental reasons why sacrament works, throughout the Middle Ages and no 
doubt beyond them too.”
11
 
 Cramer’s discussion of liturgical speech as language which “makes” those who 
speak it is reminiscent of the work of Austin and Searle, whose identification of the 
performative utterance provides a useful framework for looking at sacramental speech.  
Almost by definition, the prescribed words of baptism fall into the category of the 
performative: uttered in the proper social circumstances, the words, “I folowe the, or elles 
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I crystene !e, in the nome of / the fader & !e sone and the holy gost,” effect the 
fundamental change of christening the individual being baptized.
12
  Moreover, the Word 
of God itself, from which, according to Aquinas, the baptismal prayer derives its efficacy, 
demonstrates speech at its most explicitly performative.  After all, “the sublime speech of 




 W. A. Quinn further demonstrates Saint Erkenwald’s emphasis on the power of 
sacramental language by highlighting the poem’s emphasis on specificity in sacramental 
language.  Turning to John Mirk’s well-known fifteenth-century instructions for parish 
priests to support his assertions, Quinn argues that the ambiguous phrase “and not one 
grue lenger” (319) following Erkenwald’s recitation of the baptismal formula should be 
understood as “with no more words,” an affirmation of the precise, Trinitarian, baptismal 
formula endorsed by the Church.
14
  Specifically, Quinn highlights Mirk’s insistence that 
priests recite the exact words of baptism and that they “[do] no more”.
15
  Such concern 
for the precise form of sacramental speech in baptism is also expressed in more doctrinal 
sources.  Aquinas argues that “Baptism receives its consecration from its form….  
Consequently the cause of baptism needs to be expressed in the baptismal form.”  He 
further ties the sacramental utterance to the Word of God itself: “The words which are 
uttered in the sacramental forms, are said not merely for the purpose of signification, but 
also for the purpose of efficiency, inasmuch as they derive efficiency from that Word, by 
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Whom all things were made.”
16
  Tellingly, Aquinas is far less stringent when it comes to 
the physical procedures of baptism and even to the persons authorized to perform the 
sacrament.
17
  The work of baptism, he seems to recognize, is performed less by water 
than by a specific and powerful sacramental formula, a formula that might be diluted, 
corrupted, or even invalidated by the addition to or alteration of its language. 
 One critic has demonstrated that Saint Erkenwald’s insistence on orthodox 
baptism and its strong affirmation of the baptismal utterance show the poem to be a 
rebuttal of Lollard arguments to the contrary, noting that its treatment of the sacrament is 
“antithetical to some of the most notorious and pointed Wycliffite challenges to the 
Church’s efficacy in salvation.”
18
  Lollards in general denied the absolute necessity of 
baptism and also of the baptismal formula itself, two significant breaks from orthodox 
theology.  Some Lollards argued that children of Christians were christened in utero 
through the faith of their parents and that a formal baptism would have been redundant.
19
  
Wyclif himself writes in De Ecclesia that the act of baptism does not necessarily destroy 
the taint of original sin; and in  “Speculum de Antichristo,” he issues an attack on 
ecclesiastics who focus on baptizing the masses rather than preaching to them, suggesting 
that since “god sent [the Apostle Paul] for to preche !e gospel & not to cristene men,” 
ordinary priests should follow suit.
20
  In all of these instances, both the necessity and the 
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efficacy of the priest’s baptismal prayer – in J. L. Austin’s terms, the prayer’s 
performativity – are called into question.  If God’s grace alone is enough to christen the 
soul, the words of the baptismal prayer become, at best, an outward sign of christening 
and, at worst, an impediment to the true nature of the sacrament and a distracting 
sideshow to what Lollards considered the real work of the Church. 
 But if Saint Erkenwald is to be a poetic bulwark against the encroaching threat of 
Lollardy, it must do more than simply reinforce the need for orthodox baptism.  Certainly 
an affirmation of baptism could have been understood as an anti-Wycliffite gesture.  Yet 
the most sustained and coherent Wycliffite attack on the institutional Church was directed 
at the sacrament of the Eucharist, not at baptism.
21
  Because the eucharistic sacrament 
invested the clergy with so much authority, Wycliffite “re-evaluation of the doctrine of 
transubstantiation [was] ... an attack on the central mediating role of the priesthood, an 
attack on its rights to be the exclusive handlers of Christ’s Body.”
22
  In other words, the 
Lollard assault on the Eucharist was also an assault on the Church in general, on its 
exclusive ability to mediate between the celestial and the mundane, and, perhaps most 
crucially, on its sole authority to effect salvation in the laity.  The comprehensive nature 
of such an attack was not lost on Wyclif’s virulently anti-clerical followers.  Nor was it 
lost on the orthodox Church itself: by the end of the fourteenth century, the Eucharist had 
become not only the spiritual focus of the Mass but also, as Paul Strohm points out, a 
“litmus test of orthodoxy” and the point on which “the Lollards’ heresy was effectively 
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  To mount a true defense against the Wycliffite threat, Saint Erkenwald 
needed not only to assert the requirement of orthodox baptism but also to affirm the 
orthodox view of the Eucharist. 
In an essay on Chaucer’s poetic response to the Lollard controversies, Fiona 
Somerset shows how, in the “atmosphere of heightened concern over the division and 
multiplication of Christ’s body and over lay interpretation of the doctrine of the 
Eucharist,” The Summoner’s Tale is able to comment on the fourteenth-century 
eucharistic debate without ever mentioning it by name.
24
  Contemporary with the 
Summoner’s Tale, Saint Erkenwald is also positioned to indulge in similar, if far more 
polemical, double meanings.  The poem, I suggest, uses its discussion of baptism to 
engage in a tacit, though no less important, argument for the sacrament of the Eucharist.  
In point of fact, the connection that the poem generates between the two sacraments has 
scriptural precedent.  The Gospel of John turns to the Crucifixion itself to show the 
common origin of the water of baptism and the salvific blood of Christ: “sed unus 
militum lancea latus eius aperuit, et continuo exivit sanguis, et aqua [But one of the 
soldiers with a spear opened his side, and immediately there came out blood and 
water].”
25
  A number of alliterative works often associated with Saint Erkenwald also 
interrogate this common origin.  In Langland’s Piers Plowman, for example, the mortar 
of mercy in Piers’s barn, Unity, is made of  Christ’s “baptisme and blood !at he bledde 
on rode”; and in Pearl, the Pearl Maiden tells the Dreamer, “Ryche blod ran on rode so 
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roghe, / And wynne water; !en, at !at plyt, / "e grace of God wex gret innoughe.”
26
  By 
pointing out the mutual source of baptism and the Eucharist, such passages suggest the 
intimate connection between sacramental water and sacramental blood and body. 
But there is another, even more pivotal reason that Saint Erkenwald is able to 
enact a thematic shift from baptism to the Eucharist: both sacraments are thoroughly 
marked by the presence – even the necessity – of sacramental language.  Just as orthodox 
baptism requires the attending priest to utter a precise sacramental form, so too does the 
sacrament of the Eucharist require the priest to intone specific, biblical words – hoc est 
corpus meum – in order to transubstantiate bread into the body of Christ.  As is the case 
with the words of baptism, the form of the sacramental words used to change bread to 
body is important to the work that those words do. Once again, John Mirk’s instructions 
provide a clear example of the precision demanded of those priests who uttered the 
eucharistic formula, in terms of the words themselves and even in terms of vocal 
inflection: 
Sey !e wordes of !at seruyse 
Deuowtely wyth gode a-vyse; 
Cotte !ow not !e wordes tayle, 
But sey hem oute wy!owte fayle; 
Sey hem so wy! mow!e & thoght,  
"at o!er !ynge !ow !enke noght 
But al !yn herte and !yn entent  
Be fully on that sacrament.
27
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The precision with which the priest must recite the eucharistic formula is itself a 
testament to the inherent power of the sacramental words and a tacit acknowledgement 
that they contain the potential to effect substantive change in the world around them.  
Such an emphasis also demonstrates a reverence for the specific nature of the change 
taking place, a change in which the subject of the host is entirely replaced by the very 
body of Christ even as the accidents of the host – the physical signs that bread is bread – 
remain.  Informed as they are by the Word of God, the words of the priest are not to be 
uttered carelessly.  As the Erkenwald-poet himself might suggest, the words of 
consecration should be uttered, “and not one grue lenger” (319). 
 Recent historical and theological scholarship has confirmed the fundamental 
importance of the words of consecration to the Eucharist.  David Aers emphasizes the 
roles of both priest and priestly language when he describes the doctrine of 
transubstantiation: “At the words of consecration, spoken by a duly ordained priest, the 
body of Jesus ... became present under what had become the appearance of bread and 
wine lacking their proper substance.”
28
  Similarly, Eamon Duffy calls the Eucharist a rite 
in which “only a priest might utter the words which transformed bread and wine into the 
flesh and blood of God incarnate,” and Miri Rubin, in her exhaustive study of the 
sacrament, describes how “Christ’s body was sacramentally made present though the 
words of a priest.”
 29
  Rubin also enumerates many treatises, such as Mirk’s instructions, 
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that were written to assist clergy in performing the sacrament correctly.  The existence of 
such treatises strongly suggests the danger perceived in misspeaking the sacramental 
words.  Arguing on grounds both theological and linguistic, Catherine Pickstock, ties 
sacrament to utterance even more closely: “Not only is language that which administers 
the sacrament to us, but conversely, the Eucharist underlies all language, since in carrying 
the absence that characterizes every sign to an extreme (no body appears in the bread), it 
also delivers a final disclosure, or presence (the bread is the Body), which alone makes it 
possible now to trust every sign.”
30
  Finally, in a formulation that brings together the 
Word of God, the words of the priest, and the incarnate body itself, Herbert McCabe 
argues that “the Eucharist is the creative language of God, his eternal word made flesh.”
31
  
The sacrament of the Eucharist was central to the late medieval Church, and at the center 
of that sacrament were the words of consecration themselves. 
 Thus, we should not be surprised that as Wyclif and his followers leveled a 
general critique at what Rubin calls the “sacerdotal-sacramental efficacy” of the 
eucharistic sacrament, they also questioned more specifically the ability of the priest’s 
words to effect transubstantiation.
32
  Wycliffite positions on the Eucharist have been 
particularly well documented, but we should recognize that Wyclif himself held a far 
more nuanced position on the matter than is generally recognized.  In brief, he argued 
that after the priest’s sacramental utterance, the bread remained unchanged in both 
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subject and accident but that the spiritual essence of the body of Christ was added to it.
33
  
Such an argument stood in stark opposition to Church teachings, which stated that the 
sacramental words hoc est corpus meum did not affect the accidents – the outward, 
sensual appearances – of bread; rather, they caused the Body of Christ to replace the 
subject of bread altogether, leaving the bread’s accidents intact.  One critical difference 
between the Church’s view and Wyclif’s, then, lay in the exact work that the sacramental 
utterance performed: whereas the Church maintained that the priest’s words caused the 
miracle of transubstantiation, Wyclif, who considered it logically impossible for an 
accident to exist without its subject, argued that those same words merely effected a 
process of spiritual addition.  In the face of this immensely important difference, Wyclif’s 
arguments against orthodox transubstantiation nonetheless grant considerable power to 
the words of consecration.  Indeed, in Wyclif’s view the sacramental words spoken by the 
priest do perform an action; it is simply not the action the Church claimed that they 
perform.  Wyclif writes: “crist ha! !yue power I-nowe to his prestis to teche his churche; 
& enioyned hem siche office !at !yue! hem not occasioun to synne. & !us power !at 
prestis han stande! not in transsubstansinge of !e oste, ne in makyng of accidentis for to 
stonde bi hemsilf.”
34
  Rather than denying the power of the priest’s words, Wyclif dilutes 
their efficacy both in kind (because they perform an act of addition rather than one of 
substitution) and in degree (because they ultimately lack the ability to make accidents 
stand alone without their subject).  The question suggested by Wyclif’s formulation of the 
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Eucharist, then, is not, “Are the words uttered by the priest effective?” but rather, “What 
specific effect do those sacramental words have?” 
 In his assault on the Eucharist, Wyclif calls into question the ability of the priest’s 
words to make accidents stand alone without their subjects; similarly, in his attacks on 
orthodox baptism, the dissident theologian obviates the necessity of the baptismal prayer 
in the act of christening.  As I have argued above, the ability of language to enact 
transubstantiation and christening is a key point of contact between the two sacraments.  
Eucharist and baptism share yet another relationship – one particularly germane to Saint 
Erkenwald – that enables the latter to operate as an especially effective metaphor for the 
former: both are a means of conversion.  Discussing how religious conversion in the 
Middle Ages was grounded in the metaphor of Christ’s death and rebirth, Peter Cramer 
argues that “to be converted by baptism, or by the periodic ‘conversion’ of the Eucharist, 
[was] to take part in this metaphor, to pass with this metaphor from physical to spiritual 
being.”
35
  Moreover, the very term “conversion,” as Cramer seems to recognize, suggests 
both spiritual conversion (heathen to Christian) and substantial conversion (bread to 
body).  This association of religious conversion with transubstantiation also finds support 
in religious texts roughly contemporary with Saint Erkenwald.  A fifteenth-century 
English translation of the De Imitatione Christi, for example, describes the act of 
conversion in Pauline terms that suggest nothing so much as the process of 
transubstantiation: “A man conuertyng him holy to god, is exute [stripped, divested] & 
taken fro !e body & chaunged into a newe man.”
36
  Here, conversion is not only 
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analogous to transubstantiation, it is mimetic of transubstantiation: the convert is 
metaphorically taken from his own body – we might say his subject is removed from his 
accidents – and “chaunged” into a new, Christian man.  McCabe argues that “sacraments 
are sacramental by their relationship to the Eucharist” and
 
that the Eucharist becomes a 
kind of arch-sacrament through which other sacraments gain their efficacy.
37
  Such arch-
sacramentality is evident in De Imitatione Christi.  It is not without reason that the 
baptismal conversion described in that work assumes a distinctly eucharistic shape: the 
transformative model of the Eucharist underlies the very act of conversion itself. 
 Crucially, Saint Erkenwald begins with an act of conversion sui generis, the 
Christianization of England and its Saxon inhabitants by Saint Augustine of Canterbury: 
"en wos this reame renaide mony ronke !eres 
Til Saynt Austyn into Sandewiche was sende fro !e pope; 
"en prechyd he here !e pure faythe and plantyd !e trouthe 
And conuertyd alle !e communnates to Cristendame newe. 
He turnyd temples !at tyme !at temyd to !e deuelle 
And clansyd hom in Cristes nome and kyrkes hom callid; 
He hurlyd owt hor ydols and hade hym in sayntes 
And chaungit cheuely hor nomes and chargit hom better: 
"at ere was of Appolyn is now of Saynt Petre, 
Mahoun to Saynt Margrete o!ir to Maudelayne; 
"e synagoge of !e Sonne was sett to oure Lady, 
Jubiter and Jono to Jhesus o!er to James. 
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So he hom dedifiet and dyght alle to dere halowes 
"at ere wos sett of Sathanas in Saxones tyme. (11-24)
38
 
The sheer swiftness of Augustine’s barnstorming conversion of England, suggested by 
the frenetic pace of the passage itself, practically begs us to ask how genuine and 
effective such a conversion could have been, a question that the poem’s modern readers 
have been all too keen to ask.  Christine Chism, for example, states that “the past is 
transformed by a cosmetic reversal more gestural and linguistic than essential; the 
temples are ‘turned’ but not fundamentally altered, ‘clansyd’ but not reconstructed.”
39
  
The poem’s description of Augustine’s conversion, however, hews closely to the account 
given in Bede’s eighth-century Historia Ecclesiastica, a text that treats the same event 
without the skepticism and anxious uncertainty that Chism locates in the alliterative 
poem.  Most provocative is Bede’s report of a message from Pope Gregory to Augustine 
and his fellow ecclesiastics in which the pope advises that the pagan temples be left 
standing.: 
Uidelicet, quia fana idolorum destrui in eadem gente minime debeant; sed 
ipsa, quae in eis sunt, idola destruantur; aqua benedicta fiat, in eisdem 
fanis aspergatur; altaria construantur, reliquiae ponantur.  Quia, si fana 
eadem bene constructa sunt, necesse est, ut a cultu daemonum in obsequio 
ueri Dei debeant commutari [The temples of the idols in that nation 
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[England] ought not be destroyed; but let the idols that are in them be 
destroyed; let holy water be made and sprinkled in the said temples, let 
altars be erected, and relics placed.  For if those temples are well built, it is 
requisite that they be converted from the worship of devils to the service 
of the true God].
40
   
Later in the same message, Gregory argues that preserving the external form of the pagan 
temples will make the conversion of the Saxons more rather than less effective:  
Ut dum gens ipsa eadem fana sua non uidet destrui, de corde errorem 
deponat, et Deum uerum cognoscens ac adorans, ad loca, quae consueuit, 
familiarius concurrat.  [The nation, seeing that their temples are not 
destroyed, may remove error from their hearts, and knowing and adoring 
the true God, may the more familiarly resort to the places to which they 
have been accustomed].
41
   
Such advice is followed to the letter by Saint Erkenwald’s Augustine, who quickly 
renames temples churches, cleanses them in Christ’s name, and replaces their idols with 
saints.  The linguistic changes that Augustine makes, though swift and largely invisible, 
nonetheless simultaneously signify and allow for the deeper spiritual changes taking 
place within. 
 Although Saint Erkenwald never mentions transubstantiation directly, the 
mechanism behind the conversions effected by Augustine finds a clear parallel in the 
mechanism of the orthodox Eucharist, a sacrament in which the subject of the body of 
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Christ entirely replaces the subject of bread even as the accidents of bread, those physical 
signs that tell our eyes and mouths that bread is bread, remain.  As Monika Otter notes, 
“On the one hand [Augustine’s conversion] asserts a radical change from paganism to 
Christianity; on the other hand, it asserts material continuity from one state to the 
other.”
42
  Otter’s analysis, which takes into consideration both the spiritual rupture and 
the physical stability of Augustine’s conversions, underscores these parallels.  Like the 
priest performing the ritual of transubstantiation, the work that Augustine performs is 
mainly the work of sacramental speech.  That the pagan temples are, externally, still 
pagan temples after Augustine has dubbed them churches is precisely the point; we can 
consider the consecrated pagan edifices to be temples in accident only, buildings that 
contain the subject of churches within.  The poem reinforces this subject/accident binary 
when it relates how Augustine “hurlyd owt hor ydols and hade hym in sayntes” (17).  
Here, the saint within the temple becomes the holy subject within the profane accident, 
the body within the bread, the physical sign of the otherwise invisible change that the 
speech act has engendered. 
 The mechanism of change described in both Bede’s Historia and in the alliterative 
Saint Erkenwald clearly echoes the act of transubstantiation; while explicitly invoking 
baptismal conversion, the poem also evokes the language used to describe the Eucharist 
in the fourteenth and early fifteenth centuries.  When Saint Erkenwald relates how 
Augustine “turnyd temples !at tyme !at temyd to !e deuelle/ And clansyd hom in Cristes 
nome and kyrkes hom callid” (15-16, emphasis mine), the poem employs a word 
frequently connected to orthodox descriptions of transubstantiation in Middle English 
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treatises: turnyd.  Moreover, by including that word in a hyperalliterative line – aaa/ax 
rather than the usual aa/ax – the poet actively uses the form of the poem to call this key 
term to our attention.
43
  As early as 1303, Robert Mannyng of Brunne’s Handlyng Synne 
refers to the Eucharist as a sacrament in which the words of consecration cause “!e 
lykënes of bred and wyne, / Yn flesshe and blode to turne hit ynne.”
44
  Later, a mid-
fifteenth-century translation of Speculum Humanae Salvationis glosses the word 
“transsubstanciate” as “turned fro o kinde of substaunce to anothere.”
 45
 Both of these 
instances suggest that “turned” was a common synonym for the more technical 
ecclesiastical term, but they are not alone in doing so.  In his explicitly anti-Lollard Reule 
of Crysten Religioun, dated 1443, Reginald Pecock describes the sacrament of the 
Eucharist as “!e taking of breed and wijn... and !e blessing and halewing and turnyng of 
hem into cristis verry body and blood.”
46
  Similarly, in the early to mid-fourteenth-
century translation of Guillaume de Deguileville’s Le Pèlerinage de la Vie Humaine, the 
allegorical figure of Reason “turned... bred into quik flesh” and “wyn... into red blood”; a 
free translation of Grosseteste’s Chateau d’Amour from the same period explains that 
“Thurgh the vertue of cristes wordes of the sacrament / That the prest reherces at his 
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messe with gode entent, / Brede in to cristes flesc#, & wyne in to his blode, / Sudanly is 
turned.”
47
  Most compellingly, an anti-Wycliffite sermon, probably delivered to a lay 
audience in London near the end of the fourteenth-century, extols “!e vertew of !e 




 The Erkenwald-poet also employs sacramental language in the phrase that 
emphasizes the primacy of Augustine’s speech act in the conversion of the pagan 
temples: “And chaungit cheuely hor nomes” (18).  A sermon on the Lord’s Prayer dating 
to either the late fourteenth-century or early fifteenth-century relates how “ate !e bord, / 
!are changede bred to god alone, / !orw prestes wordes on !e auter stone,” while a 
manuscript of Peraldus’s Summa of Vice from the same period remarks, “!ou! it seme 
wonderful and a!eynes kynde !at brede turne into flesche and wynne into blode..., !at 
blessynge is above kynde, and of more my!t, and chaunge! !inge out of o kynde into 
ano!er.”
49
  Even as Saint Erkenwald narrates Augustine’s mass conversions of the sixth 
and seventh-centuries, the poem’s linguistic register echoes contemporary language 
concerning the Eucharist.
50
  In “turnyng” the temples and “chaunging” the idols that 
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dwell within them, Augustine performs much more than a simple “linguistic sleight of 
hand”; his conversion of those temples – indeed, his conversion of the entire island – 
adumbrates the very sacrament that would, by the first years of the fifteenth-century, 
become the central and defining feature of the liturgy in England.
51
 
 Against this semantic and intertextual backdrop, the issue raised by the opening 
lines of Saint Erkenwald involves not simply the validity of Augustine’s harried 
conversion of England but the very nature of the priest’s words in the sacrament of the 
Eucharist.  More specifically, the poem seeks in its opening salvo to answer the two 
questions most crucial to the debate over the Eucharist, namely, (1) are the sacramental 
words effective, and (2), if so, do they do what the Church says they do: create the 
subject of Christ’s body within the accidents – and only the accidents – of bread?  As I 
have already suggested, the eucharistic terminology in the passage should allay doubt 
about the efficacy of Augustine’s mass conversion; to emphasize its point further, 
however, the poem moves from Augustine of Canterbury to his ecclesiastical successor 
and heir apparent, Bishop Erkenwald.
52
  This important line of descent asks us to 
understand Erkenwald as a kind of Anglo-Saxon Augustine, a figure whose confrontation 
and ultimate conversion of an individual pagan is foreshadowed by Augustine’s mass 
conversions centuries earlier.  In fact, such a lineal relationship finds ample support 
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Eucharist in the poem. 
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outside the poem.  The twelfth-century Vita Sancti Erkenwaldi – which, along with 
Bede’s Historia, provides much of our knowledge of the historical Bishop Erkenwald – 
opens with the conversion of England and the spread of Christianity throughout the 
nation: 
Like a radiant beam of sunlight was this Augustine, and the first to teach 
the true way of life in the see of the church of Canterbury.  From Kent he 
in turn dispatched Mellitus, his comrade in the sacred struggle, to the 
country of the East Saxons, whose capital city, London, was situated on 
the river Thames.  There King Ethelbert built a church in honor of Paul, 
the preacher to the Gentiles, and there the aforesaid Mellitus performed 
the office of bishop.  And thus it came to pass that a certain small boy 
named Erkenwald, young in years but mature in mind, would hasten to 
hear the teaching of Bishop Mellitus.
53
 
Like the alliterative poem, in which Erkenwald is described as the bishop “of !is 
Augustynes art” (33), the Vita Sancti Erkenwaldi posits a direct line of descent from 
Augustine to Erkenwald.  Indeed, while most editors of Saint Erkenwald gloss the phrase 
“!is Augustynes art” as  “this Augustine’s district,” the phrase has the additional sense of 
“this Augustine’s art,” the techniques and principles of Augustine’s position, the tools of 
his salvific trade.
54
  Thus, Erkenwald’s confrontation and interrogation of the pagan 
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corpse, lying so perfectly preserved in his splendid sarcophagus that he appears to have 
“sodanly slippide opon slepe” (92), becomes a more intimate reiteration of the work 
already performed by his spiritual predecessor.  We are invited to judge the validity of 
Augustine’s earlier conversions by observing, in almost microscopic detail, the success of 
Erkenwald’s later one. 
 The poem quickly establishes the efficacy of Bishop Erkenwald’s speech.  Upon 
returning to London from Essex, Erkenwald hears High Mass and prays for divine 
guidance in untangling the mystery presented by the corpse.  Then he surrounds himself 
with the symbols of ecclesiastical authority, approaching the open sarcophagus with 
“mony ma!ti men and macers before hym” (143), “riche reuestid” (139) in his priestly 
finery.  Only with the full weight of his clerical authority quite literally upon his 
shoulders does Erkenwald finally address the preserved pagan judge: 
Then he turnes to !e toumbe and talkes to !e corce, 
Lyftande vp his eghe-lyddes he loused suche wordes:  
“Now lykhame !at !er lies, layne !ou no lenger;  
Sythen Jhesus has iuggit to-day His ioy to be schewyde, 
Be !ou bone to His bode, I bydde in His behalue.” (177-181) 
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Though the passage notes that Erkenwald physically opens the corpse’s eyelids, the 
emphasis in these lines is most explicitly on the force of his language, on the words 
“loused” on behalf of Christ Himself, the Word of God made flesh.  The corpse confirms 
as much when he says, “!i bode is me dere. / I may not bot boghe to !i bone for bothe 
myn eghen” (193-4).  It is Bishop Erkenwald’s words that have enabled the pagan judge 
to speak, his words that are, in the parlance of modern linguistics, “ontologically and 
causally prior” to the action.
55
  And while the utterance that reanimated the corpse is not 
connected to a specific sacrament per se, it is closely analogous to sacramental speech in 
that it is “bydde [bidden] in His behalue,” (181) filled with the authority of God’s Word 
itself.  Erkenwald’s command to the pagan operates in much the same manner as the 
sacramental formulae we have already observed.  Like the utterances “I folowe the, or 
elles I crystene !e, in the nome of / the fader & !e sone and the holy gost” and “hoc est 
corpus meum,” it effects change in the world into which it is uttered. 
 Following the reanimation of the corpse, the poem recounts Erkenwald’s 
interrogation of the judge and the judge’s own self-revelation.  Although I focus in this 
chapter only on the sacraments of baptism and the Eucharist, it is worth pausing to 
consider other sacramental aspects of this scene, specifically its confessional 
connotations.  Like baptism and the Eucharist, auricular confession is a sacrament 
marked by the presence of necessary speech, both on the part of the sinner (who verbally 
enumerates sins) and, more especially, on the part of the confessor (who grants verbal 
absolution).  Donning his liturgical, clerical vestments, Erkenwald attends to the judge’s 
story much as he might attend to the confession of a penitent; when the bishop at last 
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does press the judge to speak about the state of his soul, we learn that the judge, righteous 
as he might have been on earth, is nonetheless guilty of that Original Sin of “Adam oure 
alder !at ete of !at appulle / "at mony a ply!tles pepul has poysned for euer” (295-6).  No 
matter that the noble judge, born many years before Christ, was never in the position to 
achieve Christian grace in his lifetime; like all sinners, he could not receive God’s mercy 
without “shrift of mou! / to make to prest [his] synnis cou! / opinli ham to knaw.”
56
  
Such is the hard-line that Saint Erkenwald takes: in order for the judge to attain salvation, 
the spoken words of confession must precede the cleansing of his soul.  As a response to 
Wycliffite arguments privileging the internal state of contrition over the externally 
directed practice of oral confession, the poem’s unwavering insistence on confession is 
yet another affirmation of orthodoxy. 
 The judge’s de facto confession brings us back to the climactic scene itself: 
Erkenwald’s conditionally sacramental, accidentally orthodox, tearfully baptismal 
utterance.  The efficacy of Erkenwald’s sacramental speech, established by the 
reanimation of the corpse and, to a lesser degree, Erkenwald’s role as confessor, is 
reconfirmed at the moment of christening.  But to the challenges raised by Wyclif and the 
Lollards concerning the Eucharist, the orthodox baptism and the efficacious words of 
baptism themselves can only provide a partial response.  As we have seen, Wyclif 
concedes that the sacramental words uttered by the priest during his performance of the 
Eucharist create the body of Christ within the host; he argues that they create “veri goddis 
bodi in forme of breed.”
57
  What Wyclif denies is that the accidents of bread can exist in 
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that same host if their subject has been wholly replaced by Corpus Christi.  With this in 
mind, I want to suggest that the poem’s final gesture toward orthodoxy – its thematic and 
linguistic masterstroke – is that the baptismal process through which the pagan judge 
passes becomes a metaphor for the sacrament of the Eucharist itself, a formulation that 
allows the poem to strike at the heart of the Wycliffite attack on orthodox doctrine.   
 The groundwork for this metaphor is laid with the event that precipitates the bulk 
of the narrative, the discovery of the sarcophagus in the foundation of Saint Paul’s.  
Initially, the poem lavishes a great deal of attention upon the tomb’s materiality, upon its 
“thykke ston thryuandly hewen” (47), its “gargeles... of gray marbre” (48), and the 
inscrutable “bry!t golde lettres” (51) with which it is encrusted.  When the lid is lifted, 
however, attention shifts to the body within, and the tomb is largely forgotten.  
Erkenwald is summoned, and, speaking in his capacity as bishop, he invests the ancient 
pagan with a kind of half-life, a state between the morbidity of the preserved corpse and 
the animated vivacity of Erkenwald himself.
58
  But in the end, it is only in the moment of 
the baptism – when Erkenwald laments to God the pagan’s lifelessness, speaks the 
baptismal formula, and baptizes the pagan’s face with his tears – that the judge lives, that 
he joins the bodies politic and ecclesiastic that Erkenwald oversees.  It is at this moment 
too, “as sone as !e soul was sesyd in blisse” (345), that the body disintegrates.  Just as in 
the process of transubstantiation, one subject has replaced the other: the subject of bread 
is annihilated and replaced with the life-giving body of Christ; the corpse of the heathen 
is annihilated and replaced with the newly christened and eternally living soul.  It is 
significant, therefore, that the pagan should describe the experience of salvation in terms 
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reminiscent of the Eucharist and even of the Last Supper itself: once “Hungrie in-wyt 
helle-hole” (307) and unable to join in the communion of heaven, the newly christened 
judge now reports, “Ry!t now to soper my soule is sette at !e table” (338).  What remains 
unchanged through all of this is the physical artifact of the tomb, the sarcophagus that 
contained the body of the judge and in which his miraculous transformation took place.  
Covered with inscrutable messages and golden, “roynyshe” (52) letters, the sarcophagus 
becomes a hollow signifier, the physical vessel that remains after the corpse within has 
been fundamentally and subjectively altered.  Here, remaining behind after the 
transformation and, indeed, the physical obliteration of its contents, is the accident 
without its subject, the logical impossibility that Wyclif and his followers sought so 
fervently to deny. 
 If the moment of the judge’s conversion – the moment of the judge’s 
transubstantiation – is to be read as both an answer to Lollard arguments and an 
affirmation of the Eucharist itself, the closing four lines of Saint Erkenwald stand as a 
testament to the communal power of that sacrament: 
"en wos louynge oure Lorde wyt loves vp-halden, 
Meche mournynge and myrthe was mellyd to-geder; 
"ai passyd forthe in processioun and alle !e pepulle folowid 
And alle !e belles in !e burghe beryd at ones. (349-352) 
Recent scholarship on the Eucharist has discussed the critical social work that it 
performed.  Sarah Beckwith proposes that as “the medium though which social conflict is 
often worked out in social rite, ritual and drama,” the sacrament of Eucharist “provides a 
language through which the relationship of self to society is articulated on a 
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individualized basis.” More darkly, David Aers documents the alarmist view held in late 
medieval England that “any interrogation of the Church’s current [orthodox] 
understanding of sacramental signs dissolves the union of the faithful in the mystical 
body of Christ, the Church, and consequently the order of the earthly city.”
59
  As both of 
these examples suggest, the Eucharist must ultimately be understood not simply as a 
sacrament that effects the salvation of the person or even of the congregation but “as an 
essential action within the Church which constantly reproduces the Church” and that, in 
turn, allows for the existence of an orderly, civil society.
60
  In the conversion of the pagan 
judge, we witness the transformative potential of the sacrament for the individual, but in 
the conversion of the London citizenry from a “grete prece” (141) of agitated, nearly 
riotous citizens to the orderly “processioun” moving away from the site of the miracle, 
we see that potential writ large: body from bread; Christian from pagan; Church from 
rabble; society from mob.
61
  Finally, in the very presence of the miraculous, Saint 
Erkenwald reveals to us the concordant civic body so menaced by the encroachment of 
Wycliffism.  In so doing, the poem also allows us to glimpse, under the tolling bells of 
London, the potential of eucharistic community and the promise of sacramental 
orthodoxy fulfilled. 
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Right and Truth, Law and Mercy 
By focusing on efficacious language in the orthodox sacraments, I have argued 
that the alliterative Saint Erkenwald is a thoroughly anti-Wycliffite work, a poem with an 
aggressive, even polemical, orthodox agenda.  In this capacity the empty sarcophagus and 
the redeemed judge become the metaphorical embodiment of accidentia sine subjecto 
and operate as a direct refutation of the Wycliffites’ most pernicious argument.  But the 
sarcophagus and the preserved pagan judge are also, quite literally, a sarcophagus and a 
preserved pagan judge; they are two trespassers from the pre-Christian past, suddenly and 
insistently brought into contact with a decidedly Christian present.  Pulled from the earth 
into the living stream of history, these relics raise questions that transcend the poem’s 
immediate stance contra Lollardy and ask us to consider the fraught relationship between 




 It is no coincidence that the poem’s culminating anti-Wycliffite images – the 
empty sarcophagus and the transubstantiated judge – so conspicuously recall the 
historical foundations of English Christianity.  Indeed, the connections between Lollardy, 
pre-Christian heathenism, and the spoken word suggested by those images are crucially 
important to Saint Erkenwald’s wider poetic project.  In the second half of this chapter I 
will investigate those connections further, identifying a strategy within Saint Erkenwald 
whereby the poet attempts to assimilate the threatening and novel Wycliffite heresies into 
the more familiar, typological schema by which medieval Christianity defined itself.  
                                                
62
 Chism (Alliterative Revivals, p. 41) argues that “the poem spotlights the tremendous desire and fear 
directed toward the revenant from the pagan past and the historical risk that any genuinely new work must 
transact.”  My own argument, predicated as it is on representations of speech and language, is significantly 
different than hers, though it owes a great debt to the ground she has already broken. 
125 
More specifically, I will show how the Erkenwald-poet explores these broad cultural and 
theological issues by considering the efficacy and function of speech.  This mode of 
exploration is immediately evident in the figure of the pagan judge himself, an individual 
whose unerring verdicts of guilt and innocence (“I remewit neuer fro !e ri!t by reson myn 
awen / For to dresse a wrange dome, no day of my lyue.” [235-236]) and whose spoken 
self-presentation (“Fyrst to say the !e sothe quo my selfe were...” [197]) provide pre-
Christian counterpoints to Bishop Erkenwald’s explicitly Christian, sacramental speech 
acts.  The entire poem, I argue, operates within a linguistic register that highlights 
fundamental connections and disjunctions between the heathen judge and the seventh-
century bishop, evoking at the same time theologically loaded concepts of law and truth 
that not only undergird the medieval debate over righteous heathens but inform medieval 
Christianity’s relationship to its closest relative, Judaism. 
 
Richard Firth Green’s recent discussion of the word truth in late medieval England 
provides a point of departure for this analysis.  Green argues that “in late fourteenth-
century England trowthe was, in Raymond Williams’s sense of the term, a keyword”: 
more specifically, he establishes that by the fourteenth century truth, “had acquired a 
considerable range of meanings, that some of these meanings were felt to be new and 
difficult, and that the overlaps between them were complex and potentially ambiguous.”  
Indeed, Green suggests that by the Ricardian period, truth had become “the archetypal 
keyword in English,” a profoundly multivalent term that found currency in four separate 
semantic fields – legal, ethical, theological, and intellectual – and whose meaning was 
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both complicated and enhanced by these fields’ mutual interpenetration.
63
  Discussing the 
word truth in Piers Plowman in these very terms, Frank Grady points to the sentence “Ne 
wolde neuere trewe god bote trewe treuthe were alloued” as evidence that Langland is 
“aware, and ready to exploit ... the word’s overlapping senses and the permeability of the 
boundaries between them.”
64
  We might also consider Book of the Duchess’s “trewly for 
to speke of trouthe” (999) and Confessio Amantis’s “Som man, whan he most trewe 
appiereth, / Thanne is he forthest fro the trowthe” as moments in fourteenth-century 
literature when the semantic possibilities of truth are similarly developed.
65
  In Saint 
Erkenwald, however, the word trouthe appears only three times and its cognate trew 
once.  More to the point, the Erkenwald-poet seems to deny the semantic density of truth 
that Grady describes in Langland’s work and that we find in other late-medieval poetry.  
Indeed, in light of works like Piers Plowman and Confessio Amantis that so 
enthusiastically demonstrate the multiplicity that Green and Grady claim for the word, 
the most notable feature of truth in Saint Erkenwald is its semantic stability and 
directness: truth in Saint Erkenwald always signifies theological truth – the truth of the 
Word of God. 
 The word truth first occurs in Saint Erkenwald when the Erkenwald-poet 
describes how Saint Augustine “prechyd ... !e pure faythe and plantyd the trouthe / And 
conuertyd alle !e communnates to Cristendame newe” (13-14).  Here, the word clearly 
operates in the theological sense: the “trouthe” that Augustine plants is the truth of 
                                                
63
 Richard Firth Green, A Crisis of Truth (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 1999), 3-9.   
64
 Frank Grady, Representing Righteous Heathens in Later Medieval England (New York: Palgrave, 2005), 
31; William Langland, Piers Plowman: The C Version, eds. George Russell and George Kane (London: 
Athlone Press, 1997), 487 (C.14.212). 
65
 Gower, Confessio Amantis, 1:132 (1.1198-1199). 
127 
Christianity, the truth of the gospels.  The word next appears when the as yet unbaptized 
heathen judge explains to Erkenwald how his body was preserved:  
“Nay bisshop,” quo! !at body, “enbawmyd wos I neuer 
Ne no monnes counselle my clothe has kepyd vnwemmyd 
Bot !e riche kynge of reson !at ri!t euer alowes 
And loues al !e lawes lely !at longen to trouthe.” (265-268)
66
 
Here, trouthe is more ambiguously associated with ideas of right and law.  Insofar as it is 
still linked with God’s Word and His capacity for Christian mercy, however, trouthe in 
this passage is still grounded in the theological semantic field, still associated with the 
trouthe planted by Augustine.  The theological sense of the word is further developed 
when the judge, now saved by Erkenwald’s baptismal tears, tells the bishop that his spirit 
has entered “into !e cenacle solemply !er soupen alle trew” (336).  Particularly when we 
consider the baptismal and eucharistic scene that we have just witnessed – as well as the 
de facto Corpus Christi procession that follows it –  those “trew” to which the judge 
refers are clearly the christened faithful, the true followers of Christ.
67
  In fact, only when 
Bishop Erkenwald asks the corpse to speak and to “councele [conceal] no trouthe” (184) 
about his identity and his past does the word function primarily in an ethical rather than a 
strictly theological sense; but even in this instance, where trouthe seems to pertain to 
human veracity rather than to divine truth (e.g. “tell the truth!”), the word carries 
theological overtones.  For only in the context of his larger, Christian invocation does the 
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Bishop ask the corpse to be truthful: – “Be !ou bone to His bode, I bydde in His behalue. 
/ As He was bende on a beme quen He His blode schedde, ... ” (181-182).
68
 
 By arguing that truth carries a relatively limited range of meaning in Saint 
Erkenwald, I contend that the semantic consistency of the word is in keeping with the 
unflagging orthodoxy of the work itself and with its profound investment in salvation.  
The “trouthe” planted by St. Augustine allows for the process of conversion we see in the 
poem’s opening lines; the unconcealed “trouthe” of the judge’s confession  and God’s 
own love of “trouthe” lay the foundations for the redemption of the virtuous pagan.  
Ultimately, the poem asserts that the “trew” are the only souls for whom the great feast of 
heaven is available (340).  In John 14:6, Christ tells Thomas, “ego sum via et veritas et 
vita nemo venit ad Patrem nisi per me” [I am the way, and the truth, and the life. No man 
cometh to the Father, but by me].  It is this biblical truth, this divine and transcendent 
truth, that forms the core of Saint Erkenwald’s rigid eschatology.  And it is to this truth 
that the poem demands the judge submit.  Whereas Piers Plowman, Book of the Duchess, 
and Confessio Amantis locate in the concept of truth questions that demand to be 
answered; Saint Erkenwald understands truth as the divine answer to all questions. 
 But crucially, Saint Erkenwald does still pose a question.  It is the same question 
that lies at the heart of the righteous heathen problem itself, one articulated by the judge 
himself: 
“Ma!ty maker of men, thi myghtes are grete – 
How my!t !i mercy to me amounte any tyme? 
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Nas I a paynym vnpreste !at neuer thi plite knewe, 
Ne !e mesure of !i mercy ne !i mecul vertue, 
Bot ay a freke faitheles !at faylid !i laghes 
"at euer !ou Lord wos louyd in? – Allas !e harde stoundes!” (283-288)
69
 
Initially, the complaint that the judge registers to God is explicitly – and wrenchingly – 
personal: How might Your mercy be made sufficient for me?  His indignation at being 
left in the “helle-hole” (291) of limbo despite his evident righteousness is couched in 
terms that emphasize both God’s absolute authority to grant mercy and his own inability, 
as a virtuous, pre-Christian pagan, to receive it.  But the judge soon moves beyond these 
strictly personal questions and widens his rhetorical focus from “I” to “we.”
70
  Noting 
that he was damned because “Adam oure alder ... ete of !at appulle / "at mony a ply!tles 
pepul has poysned for euer” (294-295), the heathen asks, 
Quat wan we wyt oure wele-dede !at wroghtyn ay ri!t, 
Quen we are dampnyd dulfully into !e depe lake 
And exilid fro !at soper so, !at solempne fest 
"er richely hit arne refetyd !at after right hungride? (301-304)
71
 
Speaking now for all those unsaved souls who lived before “Crist suffride on crosse and 
Cristendome stablyde” (2), the judge proffers his central question: why wasn’t the “wele-
dede !at wroghtyn ay ri!t” sufficient to engender the mercy of God?  Because, as Grady 
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notes, the judge “suggests the possibility of a whole cohort left behind at the Harrowing,” 
he questions the nature of salvation and the inherent justice of God’s authority.
72
 
Ri!t [right] is an important term here, both in the passage quoted above and in 
Saint Erkenwald as a whole.  In fact, the word right or one of its cognates is used no 
fewer than thirteen times over the course of the poem, twelve times by the judge and once 
by Bishop Erkenwald.
73
  These frequent appearances become even more startling when 
we consider that all of them fall within only 100 lines – approximately one third of the 
poem.  And if such a concentration alone does not make right a keyword in the sense 
suggested by Green and Williams, that concentration nonetheless renders right “a strong, 
difficult and persuasive word” that that the Erkenwald-poet wishes to interrogate.  
Moreover, within the poem itself, the word right acquires “a considerable range of 
meanings” that are “complex and potentially ambiguous.”
74
  Just as the Erkenwald-poet 
consciously underdevelops the semantic potential of truth in order to emphasize the 
poem’s absolutist theology, he similarly overdevelops the word right and to the same 
ends.  Right rather than truth is Saint Erkenwald’s keyword.  By probing the foundations 
of the word right, the poem articulates the questions that its absolutist understanding of 
truth answers. 
 The nine primary meanings that the MED delineates for the right can be linked 
heuristically to the four categories that Green identifies in his analysis of truth: legal, 
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ethical, intellectual, and theological.
75
  The largest of these semantic groups is the legal 
category, in which right signifies a rule of conduct or law (MED, def. 3).  Chaucer’s Tale 
of Melibee illustrates this sense when Prudence counsels Melibee to “venge you after the 
order of right; that is to seyn, by the lawe and noght by excesse ne by outrage” (VII 
1529). In the legal sense, right can also be a judgment or sentence (4), a duty or 
obligation (7), or a legal claim or entitlement (5 and 6); Chaucer’s monk, for example, 
relates how Darius occupied the throne of Belshazzar even though he “hadde neither right 
ne lawe” (VII 2238).  In the second semantic category – the ethical – right refers to that 
which is morally right (1).  It also signifies the abstract notions of justice and equity (2) 
and, thus, overlaps somewhat with its legal uses.  Chaucer’s judge Apius, presiding over 
a fraudulent case to determine the paternity of Virginius’s daughter, darkly exploits this 
ambiguity when he tells Virginius, “Thou shalt have al right, and no wrong heere” (VI 
174). The third category of meaning falls within what Green would call the intellectual 
semantic field (8).   In Cleanness, Balthazar promises Daniel great reward if he “redes ... 
by ry!t” – if he reads correctly – the words written by a monstrous hand.76 
The fourth category of meaning – the theological sense of the word – is the 
category that the MED develops least, a fact that becomes important when we consider 
the uses of the word in Saint Erkenwald.  In the theological category, the MED notes only 
that right is an orthographic variant of the modern word rite: “er ye have youre right of 
hooly chirche, / Ye may repente of wedded mannes lyf, / In which ye seyn ther is no wo 
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ne stryf” (IV1662-64).  But even where the overt meaning of the right falls into the legal, 
ethical, or intellectual semantic categories, the word often suggests a broader theological 
meaning.  In Pearl, for example, the ghostly maiden tells the Dreamer, “al is traw!e !at 
He [God] con dresse / And He may do no!ynk bot ry!t,” a pairing of terms that suggests 
both right and truth to be firmly within God’s purview.
77
  Similar theological overtones 
are at play in Cursor Mundi, in which God strives to “Brynge mon into state of ri!t.”78 
Here, a “state of ri!t” seems to refer to both a state of high human morality and a divinely 
imparted state of grace, a near synonym for what Saint Erkenwald signifies with “trew.”  
In these passages, right, to be sure, may not function as a denotative synonym for 
theological truth, but the theological connotations of the word, I argue, simmer beneath its 
overt legal, ethical, and intellectual meanings.  Both as a word and as a concept, right 
implies and even invokes, but is not equal to, theological truth.  In this respect, right has a 
markedly different relationship to the divine than does truth.  We might say that in Saint 
Erkenwald, God’s truth is necessarily and unimpeachably right, but right – legally, 
ethically, and intellectually – is not always God’s truth. 
In its attempt to query the relationship between Christianity and its pre-Christian 
forbears, Saint Erkenwald continues its thematic exploration of right and truth by 
engaging both concepts on a semantic level.  As I have demonstrated, the poem quickly 
establishes truth as a theological absolute, a concept aligned strongly with both 
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Augustine and Erkenwald and analogous to the Word of God itself.  Saint Erkenwald 
aligns right, however, with the reanimated heathen thereby rendering it a far more fraught 
concept within the poem.  The word first appears in the poem when the heathen provides 
an account of his judicial career: 
"e folke was felonse and fals and frowarde to reule, 
I hent harmes ful ofte to holde hom to ri!t. 
Bot for wothe ne wele ne wrathe ne drede 
Ne for maystrie ne for mede ne for no monnes aghe, 
I remewit neuer fro !e ri!t by reson myn awen 
For to dresse a wrange dome, no day of my lyue. 
Declynet neuer my consciens for couetise on erthe, 
In no gynful iugement no iapes to make 
Were a renke neuer so riche for reuerens sake. 
Ne for no monnes manas ne meschefe ne routhe 
Non gete me fro !e heghe gate to glent out of ri!t, 
Als ferforthe as my faithe confourmyd my hert.  (231-242)
79
 
All three of these uses of right adhere to what I have previously described as the legal 
sense of the word, a reasonable sense for the judge to invoke as he has built his reputation 
on his ability to adhere to the dictates of “reson” and to a specific legal code.  Thus, we 
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can understand ri!t in this passage to signify law, the law to which the judge attempts to 
hold his people and from which he never deviates.   
The judge’s speech also shows the Erkenwald-poet developing the ethical 
dimension of right.  Not only does the heathen adhere to and enforce the law, he also 
holds himself and his community to an ethical and morally correct standard.  I suggest, in 
fact, that the judge conflates the ethical and legal senses of right in these lines.  For him 
the law is a moral certainty, an ethically derived code for managing a “felonse and fals 
and frowarde” people.  Indeed, it is because of his unswerving adherence to that legal and 
moral certainty – because the judge was “ry!twis and reken and redy of !e laghe” (245) 
and “rewardid euer ri!t” (256)  – that the citizens of New Troy bury him as a king after 
his death.  
When the judge mentions that faith always “confourmyd [his] hert” (242) to 
adhere to right, he adds theological connotations to the legal and ethical semantic fields 
that dominate in his speech.  As his dialogue with bishop Erkenwald continues, the judge 
evokes such theological overtones more emphatically.  For example, when Erkenwald 
asks if he was embalmed, the judge replies, “enbawmyd wos I neuer / Ne no monnes 
counselle my clothe has kepyd vnwemmyd / Bot !e riche kynge of reson !at ri!t euer 
alowes / And loues al !e lawes lely !at longen to trouthe” (265-268).  This explanation, 
which implies that human laws are associated with [“longen to”] God’s truth, suggests a 
link between right and God, between human law and divine truth.  The judge reinforces 
that link by explaining that God granted his miraculous preservation for his adherence to 
right: “if renkes for ri!t !us me arayed has / He has lant me to last !at loues ry!t best” 
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(271-272).  In both passages the judge suggests that his legal righteousness equates not 
only to a moral or ethical right but also to a fulfillment of divine truth, that the laws he 
enforced in his lifetime were sanctioned by – even predicated upon – the very will of 
God.  Just as the poet’s use of right conflated the legal and ethical sense, the judge’s use 
of the word in these passages conflates legal right with theological truth.  In the judge’s 
own formulations, right is law is morality is truth.  Even Bishop Erkenwald himself 
seems momentarily to entertain this idea; when he finally commands the judge to speak 
of his soul – “sayes !ou of !i saule” (273) – he uses the word right for the first and only 
time, apparently mindful of its troubling ambiguity and its full semantic multiplicity: 
“Quere is ho [your soul] stablid and stadde if !ou so stre!t wroghtes? 
He !at rewardes vche a renke as he has ri!t seruyd 
My!t euel forgo the to gyfe of His grace summe brawnche, 
For as He says in His sothe psalmyde writtes: 
‘"e skilfulle and !e vnskathely skelton ay to me.’” (274-278)
80
 
As he interrogates the reanimated corpse, Erkenwald invokes at once the full range of 
meanings that the poem accords to right.  In this context, for a “renke” to serve right 
seems to indicate that he serves the law, that he follows the moral and ethical dictates of 
his own conscience, and (particularly given Erkenwald’s apparent assumption of the 
heathen’s salvation) that he serves truth itself.  Indeed, in asking the pagan judge about 
the state of his soul, Erkenwald simultaneously questions the very meanings of right that 
he has just posited.  Could right really mean all that it seems to mean?  Is the earthly 
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pursuit of law and morality tantamount to the pursuit of divine truth?  Can it – does it – 
merit the same rewards? 
The answer, resoundingly, is “no”: in the confines of the poem’s soteriological 
straitjacket – where salvation must be granted by the institutional church and even the 
most virtuous of heathens molder “dulfully [in] !e depe lake” – law is not truth.  But the 
semantic dilation of the word right itself – the implication that right is truth on both a 
linguistic and conceptual level – makes logical the incredulity of the judge at being left in 
limbo even though he “after right hungride” (304) throughout his life.  The very 
possibility that right could replace truth as a means of salvation underscores the threat 
that the righteous heathen poses to Erkenwald’s ecclesiastical authority, a threat that, in 
Chism’s words, “[afflicts] the bishop with an ambiguous torment” and causes him 
“misgivings about the necessity of his office.”
81
  However, the poem demonstrates – first 
by expanding the semantic possibilities of the word and then by circumscribing them – 
that right is a fluid and human construct, a watery reflection of divinely ordained truth.  
This is not to say that right is without its own palpable rewards: just as England’s pre-
Christian inhabitants grant their “ry!twis” judge a scepter and inter him as a king, so too 
does God – “He... !at loues ry!t best” (272) – preserve his physical body.  But right lacks 
the absolute authority that characterizes truth in the poem.  Unlike the “trouthe” planted 
by Augustine, right alone cannot confer salvation.  Right proves to be a kind of half-
measure, perhaps even a half-truth; it is capable of leading to the judge’s corporeal 
preservation but not to spiritual salvation, capable of providing a legal and even moral 
structure for a pre-Christian English society but not the transformative sacramental 
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community that we see in the poem’s closing lines.  Significantly, when the heathen 
judge finally ascends to heaven and sups with the “trew,” he never once uses the word 
right to describe his soul or his actions.
82
  In moving from damned to saved – from limbo 
to paradise – the newly minted Christian learns that the authority of the church and the 
sacraments themselves, those very things that have precipitated his belated salvation, are 
predicated not on right, not on law, not even on justice, but on a divine and explicitly 
Christian truth. 
 
I belabor the semantic implications of right and truth in Saint Erkenwald because the 
opposition that the poem presents between the two terms is indicative of the more overt 
collisions it dramatizes between judge and bishop and between England’s pre-Christian 
past and Christian present.  Indeed, one of the poem’s most notable stylistic features is 
the careful series of parallels that it develops between Erkenwald and the heathen judge, 
parallels that extend in turn to Erkenwald’s London and the judge’s New Troy.  When we 
first encounter Erkenwald in the poem, he is not only the bishop of Augustine’s “art” but 
the teacher of “the laghe” in “London toun” (34), a position adumbrated by the heathen’s 
career as judge of New Troy.  Similarly, both figures are expected to maintain civic order 
within their communities: the judge presides with perfect jurisprudence over a “felonse 
and fals and frowarde” populace while Erkenwald returns from a progress in Essex to 
quiet the “troubulle in !e pepul” precipitated by the heathen’s exhumation.  These 
thematic correspondences between the two men also find more concrete expression: the 
judge’s “rialle wedes” (77) hemmed with “glisnande gold” (78) and “mony a precious 
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perle” (79) are quietly doubled as Erkenwald walks to the tomb “riche reuestid” (139) in 
splendid clerical finery; the “semely septure” (84) that the judge holds in his coffin is 
repeated in Erkenwald’s procession of “ma!ti men and macers” (143).  This striking 
doubling extends even beyond the confines of the poem.  The fictional judge’s “ferly 
faire toumbe” (45), whose discovery in the foundations of the city’s “New Werke”  
precipitates the actions of the poem, will ultimately find its successor in St. Erkenwald’s 
own shrine, itself located in a place of architectural and spiritual focus in St. Paul’s 
Cathedral.
 83
  In fact, many critics believe that the increased veneration of that shrine in 
the late fourteenth century provided the occasion for the poem’s composition.
84
 
As Saint Erkenwald sets up these overt, even ham-handed, parallels, it also 
frustrates them at critical moments.  Given the questions of linguistic efficacy that the 
poem raises, many of those critical moments, not surprisingly, involve the speech acts of 
the two men.  We have already examined, in the context of the poem’s immediate 
response to the Lollard threat, the unquestionable efficacy of Erkenwald’s spoken 
utterances.  By intoning a command “in His [God’s] behalue” (181), Erkenwald reinvests 
the preserved heathen with life and compels him to reveal his history; by uttering the 
divinely sanctioned baptismal formula “and not one grue lenger” (319), the bishop effects 
not only the salvation of reanimated judge but also a miracle tantamount to that of 
transubstantiation.  Even the Holy Ghost’s speedy response to Erkenwald’s request for a 
vision allowing him to “kenne / "e mysterie of !is meruaile !at men opon wondres” 
(124-25) may be seen as evidence that the bishop’s speech is nothing if not productive, 
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despite being uttered outside of an explicitly sacramental context.  Such powerful 
performative speech acts reflect Erkenwald’s position as a representative of the orthodox 
church.  The authority of his words is predicated upon the authority of the Word of God 
and the Christian faith itself; the efficacy of his speech is a linguistic manifestation of his 
relationship to truth. 
By comparison, the speech acts of the pagan judge, a figure whose affinities lie 
with right rather than truth, are marked not by their inherent performativity but by their 
inability to effect the kinds of change brought about by Bishop Erkenwald.  For example, 
when we compare the heathen judge’s attempts to bring about civic order to the orderly 
Corpus Christi tableau that concludes the poem, we can see how impotent his utterances 
really were.  In spite of a long career in which he was never known to “dresse a wrange 
dome” (236), the righteous heathen was unable to control his “felonse and false and 
frowarde” (231) subjects.  According to his own testimony, the citizens of New Troy 
were largely unaffected by his unfailingly right “domes,” responding to them with 
“mede” (234), “meschefe” (240) and “manas [menace, threat]” (240).
85
  Unlike Bishop 
Erkenwald, who creates civic order in London with a single prayer, the Judge cannot 
bring about such an ideal society in his own time, even over the course of “more !en 
fourty wynter[s]” (230) of justly executed verdicts.  The judge’s final plea for salvation 
similarly illustrates such verbal inefficacy.  Despite his well-founded and emotionally 
persuasive complaint, the heathen cannot speak himself into heaven.  Bishop Erkenwald, 
however, delivers the judge from limbo with a baptismal speech act uttered in the 
conditional, a performative that is not even intended to be performative.  Such 
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comparisons reinforce the fact that within Saint Erkenwald, the efficacy of spoken 
language – the ability to utter a successful performative – is defined by the speaker’s 
relationship to the Church, by submission to Christian truth rather than adherence to right 
and law. 
It is, then, their relative relationships to right and truth that separate the judge’s 
unproductive speech acts from the bishop’s efficacious ones.  But those speech acts in 
themselves are also emblematic of a larger division within the poem, one that is similarly 
suggested by the poem’s discourse of right and truth – the division between Old Law and 
New Law, between Mosaic justice and Christian mercy.  This point has not gone 
unrecognized by the poem’s earlier readers.  Arnold Davidson posits that Saint 
Erkenwald presents competing visions of “God’s power and God’s justice” and of “God’s 
mercy, which is proved most by Christ’s crucifixion.”
86
  Other critics aligned the two 
central figures in the poem still more absolutely with Old and New Law, reading the 
heathen primarily “as a representative of the Old Law” and Bishop Erkenwald “as a 
stand-in for Christ, sharing in Christ’s unique priesthood and continuing Christ’s priestly 
ministry in linear time.”
87
  Although William Kamowski has recently claimed that “the 
attempt to identify one or another virtue of character with either the Old or New Law 
distracts from the more intricate relationship the poem illustrates between justice and 
mercy,” the tangible means by which the Erkenwald-poet connects right to the pagan 
judge and truth to Bishop Erkenwald, particularly through the relative efficacy of their 
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respective speech acts, suggests that such a claim is not altogether justified.
88
  Saint 
Erkenwald insists upon the heathen’s identity as a man of law, an archetypal figure 
whose strict adherence to justice consistently overrules his sense of mercy, even “to [his] 
fader, !aghe felle hym be hongyt”(244) – even if justice meant that his own father would 
be hanged.  The poem goes to equal lengths to show Erkenwald, weeping with pity for 
the judge’s tortured soul, as a figure of mercy whose inadvertent baptism both fulfills and 
supersedes the baptismal precepts to which the judge is subject.   
The intricacy that Kamowski locates in the poem’s treatment of right and truth 
resides not in the respective identification of the characters with Old and New Law but in 
the vexed fate of the judge, in his thousand years of suffering and his belated salvation.  
On the one hand, the heathen is subject to the same strict adherence to rote legal dogma 
that he himself displayed in New Troy as a judge of the Old Mosaic Law; his fate, even 
in the time of Christ, is clearly predicated on a heightened idea of justice rather than 
mercy.  Erkenwald, too, must submit to the legalistic exigencies of the judge’s 
damnation, and the unflagging necessity of his Christian baptism is predicated on a hard-
line orthodoxy that, in its lack of Christian mercy, is as suggestive of an Old Testament 
ethos as it is of a New Testament one.  On the other hand, the fate of the judge is not just; 
rather, it seems to transcend any reasonable ideal of human justice.  In this respect, the 
judge’s fate is exemplary of the New Law.  Indeed, the mercy of the Christian God – 
which, as the poem reminds us, is most fully evidenced in the suffering of Christ on the 
cross – must be understood apart from both justice and right.  As unjust as it might seem 
to those assembled in wonder before the sarcophagus – as unjust as it seems to the tearful 
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Bishop Erkenwald himself – the mercy of the Christian God is not subject to justice.  It 
functions beyond the justice and morality that informs human law. 
 I have used the term Mosaic to describe the heathen’s Old Law, thus suggesting 
that the heathen judge is, in some sense, a Jew.  Saint Erkenwald is emphatically vague 
about England’s pre-Christian faith, alluding to “"e synagoge of !e Sonne” (21) in the 
same polytheistic breath with which it refers to “appolyn” (19), “Mahon” (20), “Jubiter 
and Jono” (22), and even “Sathanas” (24); the poem is so self-evidently invested in the 
opposition of right and truth as Old and New Law respectively, however, that it all but 
forces us to consider the relationship between Christianity and its most immediate 
antecedent.  Indeed those references to “appolyn” and “Sathanas” that would seem to 
discourage us from identifying the judge as a Jew could also serve to suggest it.  R. I. 
Moore discusses the belief, common in medieval Christian thought, that “a special 
association [existed] between the Devil and the Jews” and have detailed the widespread 
belief that Jews were skilled in sorcery and other pagan rites.
89
  Similarly, both Christine 
Chism and Jeremy Cohen note that many medieval Christians believed there to be an 
affinity between Jews and Muslims “in matters of law and ideology,” a  belief that might 
explain the reference to “Mahoun” in Saint Erkenwald’s account of Augustine’s 
conversions.
90
  Finally, simply by rededicating “"e synagoge of !e Sonne ... to oure 
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Lady” (21) and enacting a eucharistic transformation of heathen judge into saved 
Christian, the poem necessarily invokes the theory of supersession that defined for 
medieval Christians the position of Judaism vis-à-vis Christianity.  Thus, in addition to its 
baptismal and eucharistic concerns, Saint Erkenwald also displays a distinctively 
typological strain of thought, a conviction that “persons, events or institutions of the past 
prefigure and connect with persons, events or institutions of a later period, the second 
encompassing or fulfilling the first.”
91
  In fact, the poem presents us with countless (and 
sometimes anachronistic) layers of typology: Apollo to Adam to “Mahon” to Christ; 
Temple to Synagogue to Church; Pagan to Jew to Lollard to Christian; Brutus to Hengist 
to Gregory to Augustine; Bretons to Saxons to New Trojans to Londoners; pagan judge to 
Christian bishop.  In these typological crenellations of half-imagined history, Saint 
Erkenwald finds some of its most thematically fertile ground.   
 Recent scholarship on the relationship between Judaism and Christianity in the 
Middle Ages has much to tell us about the pagan judge in Saint Erkenwald and his 
relationship to the Christian tradition that he confronts.  This is particularly true of critical 
considerations of Augustine of Hippo’s doctrine of Jewish witness, a doctrine that was 
still current in the fourteenth century and that remained important to Christian identity 
well beyond the Middle Ages.  Augustine’s doctrine was a key feature in the 
development of medieval and early modern anti-Judaism: 
Augustine argued that God preserved them [the Jews] for the sake of the 
Church, so that in adhering to the Old Testament they might witness the 
truth of and historical basis for christological prophesy, and so that they 
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might ultimately accept the implications of this prophesy by converting to 
Christianity at the end of days ....  The dispersion and derision of the Jews, 
if insured by the regnant Church, would both alleviate the problem of the 
Jewish encroachments upon Christianity and enhance the value of their 
survival – by emphasizing the deplorable wretchedness of their error.
92
 
In many respects, the purpose that Augustine prescribes for the Jews is analogous to the 
purpose that Saint Erkenwald prescribes for the reanimated judge.  Consigned by God to 
limbo and, as Peter the Venerable suggests, “preserved in a life worse than death,” the 
pagan judge has seen the Harrowing of Hell and the promise of humankind’s redemption.
 
93
  He recalls with vivid detail “!e blode of [Christ’s] body vpon !e blo rode” (290), and 
he relates to those still living the unending hunger of damnation.  Brought forth from the 
past and set among the living, the ancient judge stands witness to the miracles of Christ’s 
sacrifice and the truth of Christian doctrine.  To the Christians gathered nervously at the 
mouth of the tomb, he also reifies the urgency and necessity of their own faith: his life-in-
death suffering becomes a testament to his adherence to the Old Law; his eventual 
salvation speaks of his acceptance of the New.  Cohen might argue that the judge 
embodies “Christianity’s claim to validity,” a validity that “hinged on the cessation of the 
ceremonial laws of Moses and their replacement by – or more precisely, their symbolic 
fulfillment in – the provisions of the New Testament.”
94
  Whatever the presumed identity 
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of his shadowy “paynym” faith, the reanimated judge is, by the standards of Augustinian 
witness, a virtual Jew.
95
 
 Saint Erkenwald is not alone among Middle English alliterative verse in 
interrogating the doctrine of Jewish witness.  Prophetic Jews feature as guardians of 
Jerusalem in The Wars of Alexander, and Langland’s Piers Plowman shows Jews 
functioning as both precursors of Christianity and living testaments to its truth.
96
  Within 
the poems of the so-called Alliterative Revival, however, questions of Jewish witness are 
most forcefully considered in the Siege of Jerusalem, a work that considers the fraught 
relationship between Christianity and Judaism through the manifestly brutal lens of Titus 
and Vespasian’s first-century assault on the city.  Just as the pagan judge stands witness 
to the truth of Christian doctrine in Saint Erkenwald, so too do the citizens of Jerusalem 
in Siege stand witness to the destruction that Christ foretold in the Gospel of Luke:  
Quia venient dies in te: et circumdabunt te inimici tui vallo, et 
circumdabunt te: et coangustabunt te undique ad terram prosternent te: et 
filios tuos, qui in te sunt, et non relinquent in te lapidem super lapidem: eo 
quod non cognoveris tempus visitationis tuae [For the days shall come 
upon thee, and thy enemies shall cast a trench about thee, and compass 
thee round, and straiten thee on every side, and beat thee flat to the 
ground, and thy children who are in thee: and they shall not leave in thee a 
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stone upon a stone: because thou hast not known the time of thy 
visitation].
97
   
It is this very Christological prophesy that the poem so energetically and so horrifically 
enacts, revealing its terrible ramifications, both for the city (“no ston in the stede 
stondande alofte, / Morter ne mude-walle bot alle to mulle fallen”) and all the more so for 
its inhabitants (“Myght no man stande on the stret for stynke of ded corses. / The peple in 
the pavymeny was pité to byholde / That were enfamyned and defeted whan hem fode 
wanted”).
98
  As Elisa Narin van Court aptly notes, The Siege of Jerusalem, among other 
late medieval texts, draws upon an Augustinian “theological formula in which the Jews 
are accorded a role in Christendom: alive, but in servitude; alive, but socially and 
economically degraded; alive, but as symbols of Christ’s Passion.”
99
 
 If the doctrine of Jewish witness suggests parallels between Saint Erkenwald’s 
pagan judge and the typologically imagined Jew of the Christian Middle Ages, the 
emphasis that the poem itself places on Erkenwald’s successful performative speech acts 
and the Judge’s unsuccessful ones both confirms and extends these parallels.
100
  We have 
seen how Erkenwald’s highly efficacious speech links the bishop to an explicitly 
Christian ideal of truth and to the institutional Church itself.  As a pre-Christian “lede of 
!e laghe” (200), the judge is similarly linked to a cultural tradition that understood Jews 
to be “the living letters of biblical law,” repositories of the foundational Mosaic precepts 
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that Christ’s New Law both fulfilled and superseded.
101
  Like the pagan judge, “the Jews 
preserve the literal sense, they represent it, and they actually embody it – as book bearers, 
librarians, living signposts, and desks, who validate a Christological interpretation of the 
Old Testament.”
102
   Unwavering in his adherence to “!e ri!t” and “Enioynyd in gentil 
lawe” (216), the reanimated heathen is himself the Old Law reanimated, both a 
manifestation of it and a slave to its “literal sense.”  And though the invocations of 
Bishop Erkenwald allow him to speak, the judge is finally identified with the inscribed 
letter rather than the spoken word, an identity that is underscored by the inefficacious 
nature of his spoken utterances. 
 The connection between the pagan judge and the written word returns us once 
again to the image of the sarcophagus, specifically to the “bryht golde lettres” (51) that 
embellish its border.  Wolfgang Seiferth notes that Jews in the Middle Ages were 
recognized for “their knowledge of languages,” and in the minds of many medieval 
Christians, the continued adherence to the precepts of Mosaic law that Jews exhibited 
increasingly bound them to the written word.
103
  Typical of such thought was Abrogard 
of Lyon, a ninth-century bishop who excoriated the Jews for their supposed belief “that 
the letters of their alphabet exist eternally and that ... the law of Moses was written many 
eons before the world came into being.”
104
 The close association of Jews and the written 
word is also suggested in alliterative poems contemporary with Saint Erkenwald. In the 
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Wars of Alexander, for example, the prophesies of the Jews are tied directly to their 
written texts. 
And Iaudus of Ierusalem, !e Iewis [fadir], 
Bringis out a brade buke & to !e berne reches,  
Was plant full of prophasys playnely all ouire, 
Of !e doctrine of Daniell & of his dere sawis. 
"e lord lokis on [a lefe] & [i]n a l[yne] fyndis 
How !e gomes out of Grece suld with !aire grete mi!tis 
"e pupill out of Persye purely distroy; 
And !at he hopis sall be he, & hertly he ioyes.
105
 
In the context of the poem, the prophesy itself – both in its content and its accuracy – is 
unsurprising; such prophesies are ubiquitous in Wars and help to propel Alexander’s 
relentless march East.  But the prophesy of the Jews is unique in that it is written in a 
“broad book,” not simply spoken by a prophetic figure.  Even in the vast and 
heterogeneously populated world of the Wars of Alexander, Jews are marked by their 
adherence to the written word. 
 A far more threatening contemporary perspective on Jewish language can be seen 
in Mandeville’s Travels, a text in wide circulation throughout the late Middle Ages.  In a 
rather startling exception to his generally tolerant approach to non-Christian peoples, 
Mandeville describes the Jews who inhabit Gog and Magog as murderous comrades of 
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the Antichrist, noting with anxious repetition that the Jews “conen no langage but only 
hire owne !at noman knoweth but !ei” and that “!ei conen no maner of langage but 
Ebrew.”
106
  Mandeville hypothesizes that Jews learn their enigmatic language “in hope 
!at whan the o!er Iewes achull gon out, !at !ei may vnderstonden hire speche & to leden 
hem in to cristendom for to destroye the cristene peple,” a supposition that renders the 
Jews’ mysterious alphabet “a tool of threat and conspiracy against Christians.”
107
   
 The Jews of Gog and Magog – figures of abject menace – are not themselves 
recreated in Saint Erkenwald’s fair-minded heathen judge, but “Mandeville’s “Ebrew” is 
closely analogous to the writing on that judge’s sarcophagus:  
Bot roynyshe were !e resones !at !er on row stoden. 
Fulle verray were !e vigures !er auisyde hom mony, 
But alle muset hit to mouthe and quat hit mene shulde:  
Mony clerkes in !at clos wyt crownes ful brode 
"er besiet hom a-boute no!t to brynge hom in wordes. (52-56)108 
Inscrutable, unpronounceable and incomprehensible, the figures on the casket echo 
Mandeville’s “Ebrew” as well as the mystery presented by the corpse himself.  But unlike 
that corpse, whose story is ultimately revealed by Erkenwald himself, the words on the 
casket remain untranslated.  They are literally unspeakable, words that can not be brought 
“to mouthe.”  The unrest that those radically unknowable and unspeakable words foment 
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within Erkenwald’s London hints at the more pernicious forms of destruction threatened 
in Mandeville’s account. 
 In his Summa Theologica, Aquinas posits that “all the differences assigned 
between the Old and New Laws” – between the laws of the Jews and the laws of the 
Christians – “are gathered from their relative perfection and imperfection.”: 
Now the end of every law is to make men righteous and virtuous ... and 
consequently the end of the Old Law was the justification of men.  The 
Law, however, could not accomplish this; but it foreshadowed it by certain 
ceremonial actions and promised it in words.  And in this respect, the New 
Law fulfils the Old by justifying men through the power of Christ’s 




In the context of Saint Erkenwald’s typological sensibility, the reanimated heathen judge 
exemplifies this Thomistic vision of the Old Law, of the written commandments 
ultimately fulfilled and superseded by the New Law of Christ.  The relative impotence of 
the Old Law – its inability to accomplish “the justification of men” that Aquinas 
describes – finds an analogue in the judge’s own verbal inefficacy, in his failure to exact 
his salvation or to bring about the harmonious social order in New Troy through 
performative utterance.
110
  It is left for Erkenwald himself, a figure aligned with the New 
Law of Christian truth, to do both of these things.  Invested with the authority of Christ’s 
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word the sacramental power his own voice, Erkenwald promises to complete and surpass 
the unfulfilled promise of the heathen.    
 
As both a symbol of Old Law and a half-living revenant from England’s pre-Christian 
past, the exhumed judge fills the Augustinian function of the Jew in the medieval 
Christian imagination, a figure who has both suffered and witnessed, who can attest to the 
truth of the Christian prophesy, and who offers a dire warning against ignoring the true 
Church.  That implicit warning is one way in which the typological dimensions of Saint 
Erkenwald circle back around to the more specifically anti-Lollard tropes that I discussed 
in the first part of this chapter.  Indeed, the very premise of Augustine’s doctrine of 
Jewish witness – that the Jews’ “biblical tradition offers cogent proof of Christian 
doctrine, enabling the Church to respond effectively to its enemies” – is no less 
applicable to Saint Erkenwald’s pagan judge than to Jews themselves.
111
  The suffering of 
the pagan judge suggests not only the fate of those, like him, who sadly could not be 
Christians but also (and a fortiori) the fate of those born after Christ who would choose 
not to be Christians.  In this way, the poem’s virtuous heathen cum virtual Jew is aligned 
with the fourteenth-century Lollard; the typological discourse of the poem allows us to 
see both Jews and Lollards as taking the same counterproductive position in regard to the 
true Christian faith, as regressing from the spiritual fulfillment promised by the Church.   
 On a fundamental level, however, the connections drawn between Lollards and 
Jews in the later Middle Ages are also grounded in the distinctions I’ve examined above 
between the literal (read “written”) word of the Old Testament – understood to be dead 
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and inert – and the word of the New Testament – alive, efficacious and transformative, 
spoken and present.  Despite their propensity for preaching and for glossing the 
scriptures, Lollards were frequently excoriated for their strict adherence to the literal text 
of the Bible and for their efforts to make it widely available through a program of 
translation.  Ruth Nissé discusses how the early fifteenth-century Dominican Thomas 
Palmer “associated the Lollard translators, in their insufficient understanding of 
Scripture, with the ‘carnal’ and stubbornly literal understanding of the Jews and the 
disciples who ‘went back’ from spirit to flesh.”
112
  Similarly, the virulently anti-Lollard 
bishop Reginald Pecock derided Lollards as “Bible men” and argued that the very root of 
their heresy was in “over myche leenyng to scripture, and in such maner wise as it longith 
not to holi scripture for to receyve.”
 113
  More generally, the emphasis that Lollards 
placed on the primacy of written scripture suggests the damning adherence to the literal 
sense that also characterized popular medieval conceptions of Jews.  The heathen judge’s 
acceptance of the living word of God – his salvation through the efficacious speech of 
baptism and his recognition of the truth of the Orthodox church – provides more than just 
proof of his righteousness; it also provides a pointed rebuke to Lollards and other heretics 
who, unlike the pre-Christian judge, have the ability to accept this truth before their death 
but actively choose to oppose it. 
 Saint Erkenwald’s typological and anti-Lollard discourses, suggested by the 
distinctions between the bishop’s efficacious spoken words and the dead letters on the 
pagan judge’s sarcophagus, finally coalesce around the central miracle of the poem, the 
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sacrament of the Eucharist itself.  The Eucharist frequently found its way into the 
discourse surrounding Jews in the fourteenth and fifteenth centuries, a discourse which, 
as Miri Rubin demonstrates in her exhaustive study of the matter, often assumed a 
decidedly dark cast: Jews on the continent were regularly accused of abusing the 
consecrated host in both mockery and reenactment of the Passion; many more Jews were 
murdered in the wake of such accusations by over-zealous Christians.  Even in England, 
where Jews had been officially expelled since 1290, stories of Host desecration were 
commonplace, their increasing prevalence highlighting “a central strand within the 
culture, that which placed the Eucharist at the heart of a system which made the 
supernatural efficacious.”
114
  As Lester Little states, the “frontal attacks” launched 
against the Eucharist by Wyclif actually made such host desecration narratives more 
important to the institutional Church because they both “permitted [Christians] to project 
on to Jews their doubts about transubstantiation” and “served to bolster popular belief in 
the miracle of transubstantiation.”
115
  Thus, the resurgence of host desecration stories that 
we see in the fourteenth and fifteenth centuries can be at least partially attributed to a 
cultural perception connecting Lollards and Jews, a perception that was itself reinforced 
by Lollard denials of the eucharistic miracle. 
 Such connections are fully manifest in the Croxton Play of the Sacrament, an 
idiosyncratic host desecration drama from the mid-fifteenth century which ends not with 
the death of the Jewish desecrators – the typical outcome in such narratives – but with 
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their conversion.  Its “humane” ending notwithstanding, the play is still an exceptionally 
bloody spectacle.  Upon purchasing a consecrated wafer from a corrupt Christian, a group 
of Jews led by the wealthy merchant Jonathas reenact the passion upon the host – first by 
stabbing it, then by nailing it to a pillar, then by plunging it into a cauldron of  boiling oil, 
then by baking it in an oven – in order to determine if it really is “God, !at ys full 
mytheti, in a cake.”
116
  At every turn, the host reveals itself to be divine, bleeding 
copiously in response to the Jews’ abuse and causing Jonathas to “renneth wood, with !e 
Ost in hys hond.”
117
  In the play’s climactic moments, the oven in which the Jews are 
baking the host begins to “ryve asunder and blede owt at !e cranys,” and the image of the 
risen Christ appears and speaks to the Jews, finally engendering their conversion.
118
   
 Because of the Jews’ fervent denial of the eucharistic miracle in the Play of the 
Sacrament, a number of critics have suggested that Jonathas and his co-conspirators 
function as stand-ins for Lollards.  Cecilia Cutts argues that “the particular doctrines with 
which the play is so concerned are those to which Wyclif and his followers objected,” 
namely the sacrament of the altar, and that the play itself might have been written to 
“[confirm] the people in the Catholic faith” and resist the threatening encroachment of 
Lollardy.
119
  More recently, Ann Eljenholm Nichols has shown the prevalence of 
“Lollard vocabulary to characterize the non-believing Jews” within the play, particularly 
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in the words used to refer to the Eucharist such as “cake” and “bread.”
120
  Eamon Duffy 
draws a direct comparison between the bloody spectacle of the Play of the Sacrament and 
the Legend of the Blood of Hailes, in which a chalice boils over with the blood of Christ 
when a Lollard priest enacts a heretical mass over it.  Both works, Duffy argues, present 
“an aspect of the Eucharistic reality which was only presented to sin and unbelief, to 
those outside the household of faith” – to Jews as well as to Lollards.
121
   
 The point here is not that the Jews in the Play of the Sacrament should be read 
primarily as Lollards; the Jews are clearly meant to represent Jews and are repeatedly 
reinscribed as Jews by the play.  However, we should also recognize that the particular 
type of disbelief that the Play of the Sacrament ascribes to its Jews, the denial of the 
Eucharist and of the priest’s ability to engender the miraculous presence of “God, !at ys 
full mytheti” within the accidents of a wafer, is essentially identical to the pattern of 
disbelief ascribed to Lollards.  And if the spectacularly bloody Play of the Sacrament 
seems a strange bedfellow for the ostensibly kinder and gentler Saint Erkenwald, the Play 
of the Sacrament’s strident defense of orthodox eucharistic sacramentalism, its effort to 
absorb non-Christian others into the political and social fabric of a Christian society, and, 
most tellingly, its implicit anti-Lollard positions can also be understood as holding a dark 
mirror to the alliterative poem.  Indeed, a recognition of the similarities between Saint 
Erkenwald and the Play of the Sacrament reveals how those anti-Lollard concerns are 
embedded within medieval understandings of the development of Christianity itself: 
within the model of supersession that defined Christian identity and history; within 
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archetypal divisions between Old and New Law; and within an Augustinian doctrine of 
witness.  Most crucially, however, Saint Erkenwald ensures that its anti-Lollard concerns 
are always embedded within the sacrament of the Eucharist itself, within the orthodox 
core of the medieval Church and the living, spoken word that enabled the miracle of 






“Seye it eek with good deuocioun”: 
Economies of Speech and Redemption in the Works of Thomas Hoccleve 
 
Thomas Hoccleve’s “The Story of the Monk Who Clad the Virgin by Singing Ave 
Maria” is a deceptively straightforward miracle of the Virgin.  Purportedly written to 
teach the correct method for reciting Our Lady’s Psalter, the poem focuses on a French 
monk – the son of “a ryche man and a worthy” (23) – who each day says fifty Ave Marias 
in honor of the Virgin Mary.
1
  One day, at the conclusion of his devotions, the Virgin 
appears to the monk wearing a robe without sleeves.  When the Monk asks the meaning 
of this odd garment, Mary replies that he himself has made the robe for her: his 
incomplete prayers, it turns out, have generated her incomplete clothes.  To finish the 
robe, the monk must henceforth recite 150 Ave Marias punctuated after every tenth by a 
Pater Noster.  This, the Virgin explains, is the proper way to recite Our Lady’s Psalter.  
The monk dutifully follows the extended regimen, and one week later the Virgin 
reappears, “fresshly arraied and wel” (90), in a garment with full sleeves.  She thanks the 
monk for his improved devotion and promises to reward him “in this lyf present, / And in 
!at othir” (97-98): first, he is to be chosen abbot of his monastery where he will save 
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many souls by teaching Our Lady’s Psalter; then, at his death, he is to join the Virgin in 
heaven.  Hoccleve himself provides a pat moral to the tale, suggesting that devout readers 
should “serueth our lady ... [who] souffissantly qwytith euery deede” (122-23) by 
scrupulously reciting Our Lady’s Psalter in the manner prescribed by the monk. 
 The sparse critical discourse concerning Hoccleve’s miracle of the Virgin has 
tended to affirm the work as a paean to traditional forms of Christian devotion.  Both 
Beverly Boyd and Jerome Mitchell make independent but complementary claims for the 
orthodoxy of Hoccleve’s poem, presenting it as an uncritical redaction of a Marian lyric 
from the Auchinleck manuscript; Mitchell specifically finds Hoccleve’s religious verse 
“conventional” and locates within it “the characteristic expression of piety of the times.”
2
   
More recently, John Bowers has argued that “the exemplum of a young monk rewarded 
for praying his Latin Pater Noster was implicitly anti-Lollard, since Wycliffites had 
insisted that it was better to say the prayer ‘Our Father’ in English without Mary’s 
mediation.”
3
  Such readings may overstate the orthodoxy of the poem and the devotional 
practice it describes.  A forerunner of the modern rosary, Our Lady’s Psalter was a 
radical simplification, or more accurately an abbreviation, of the Book of Psalms.  Anne 
Winston explains how it may have developed: 
In “Marian psalters” ... the antiphons that preceded each Psalm and 
announced its theme were replaced by verses that interpreted each of the 
150 Psalms as a reference to Christ or Mary.  Gradually the devotion was 
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shortened to recitation of the antiphons and, in place of the Psalms, either 
Pater Nosters or Ave Marias.  Without the Psalms, the connection that the 
antiphons had to a specific theme was lost.  As a result, the antiphons 
themselves came to be replaced by rhymed free paraphrases or simply by 
150 verses in praise of the Virgin.
4
 
Among the most pared down of such devotionals, the prayer regimen advocated by 
Hoccleve’s monk would have adhered to the religious orthodoxy cited by Bowers; it 
would have preempted lay engagement with the scriptures and reinforced through 
repetition the central role of Mary as mediator.  Indeed, the rosary itself, of which Our 
Lady’s Psalter was an important precursor, was eventually approved by Rome as a way 
“to reinforce orthodoxy and to combat heresy.”
5
  But the development of Our Lady’s 
Psalter had connections beyond reinforcing orthodoxy; it “shaped, and was shaped by, the 
demands of the laity for new, more individual and private forms of religious 
observance.”
6
  These same demands were themselves instrumental to the spread of 
Lollardy in fourteenth-century England, and they helped precipitate other forms of 
heterodox devotion across the European continent. 
Thus, even if Our Lady’s Psalter does hew to the orthodox church in many 
respects, Hoccleve’s allusion to the devotional practice is more complex in its 
signification than most earlier critical opinions allowed.  In this respect, Ethan Knapp’s 
somewhat more nuanced reading maintains that “The Monk Who Clad the Virgin” is 
essentially orthodox in substance but also presents a “self-reflexive arrangement” 
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between monk and Virgin that pushes the poem “beyond most orthodox meditative 
exercises in its suggestion that the deeds of a man like the monk might have a concrete 
significance in the reality of the Virgin’s life.”  He also observes that Hoccleve’s 
depiction of the Virgin as mediatrix resonates with the poet’s secular and topical verse, in 
which “the issue of intercession, financial rather than spiritual, is a constant motif.”
7
 
Like the rest of Hoccleve’s devotional work, “The Monk Who Clad the Virgin” 
has been consistently overlooked by critical investigations in favor of La Male Regle, The 
Regement  of Princes, and the five linked poems known as The Series – Hoccleve’s 
putatively “autobiographical” works.
8
  As a result, our understanding of Hoccleve’s 
corpus has been dominated by readings of only a few poems; critics have either bracketed 
the religious lyrics from the autobiographical ones or, more often, ignored them 
altogether.  In this chapter, I will seek to rectify that critical imbalance by looking closely 
at a number of the devotional lyrics, starting with “The Monk Who Clad the Virgin.”  
More specifically, I will demonstrate that the relationship between supplicant and 
intercessor suggested in that work finds expression in several of Hoccleve’s Marian 
poems, and that those poems in turn help define similar patterns of reciprocity in the 
poet’s autobiographical works and in his dealings with the Lancastrian dynasty.  The first 
part of this chapter redefines what Knapp calls a “self-reflexive arrangement” in 
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Hoccleve’s religious verse as a specific economy of speech, a dynamic of exchange in 
which supplicant and intercessor are locked in a mutually dependent relationship 
predicated on the causative potential of the spoken prayer.
9
  Turning my attention to 
Hoccleve’s Series, I will then argue that the economic paradigms of speech Hoccleve 
develops in his devotional lyrics are critical to defining both the “wilde infirmite” (Series 
1.40) that he describes in the “Complaint” and the path to recovery, both social and 
psychological, that he suggests throughout the linked poems.  In these ways I will 
demonstrate that Hoccleve’s entire oeuvre – both the devotional and autobiographical 
works – maintains a discursive integrity that has not yet been recognized, a common 
vision of verbal exchange that transcends the claustrophobic idiosyncrasies of Hoccleve’s 
private turmoil and gestures toward the often public work ascribed to the spoken word 
within the mingled economic and political systems of the early fifteenth century. 
  
Spoken Prayer, Philanthropic Giving, and Our Lady of Economic Increase 
Ethan Knapp sees Hoccleve’s devotional lyrics as betraying “a fundamental 
anxiety about the reliability of Mary as an intercessor ... most often represented through 
invocations of memory.”  He further asserts that Hoccleve’s “Monk Who Clad the 
Virgin” is “founded on an act of memory, as the monk (like Chaucer’s clergeon) must 
learn the proper way to sing the Ave Maria.”  That this learning takes place through 
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repetition is significant in light of medieval models of memory, which would have 
understood the recitation of 150 Ave Marias as part of a process by which the monk 
inscribed a set of mental images into his mind.
10
  In addition to this obsession with the 
function of memory, Knapp perceives in the work “the presence of a peculiarly self-
reflexive spirituality ... in which the agency of the intercessor and supplicant are 
curiously mixed,” a dynamic in which the Virgin will show her favor to the monk as long 
as the monk remembers the Virgin and vice versa.
11
  Both of these thematic impulses – 
memory and self-reflexivity – coalesce in the poem around the Ave Maria.  Clearly, the 
monk’s recitation of the Ave Maria is itself an act of Marian remembrance; the prayer not 
only does “worsship and honour” (34) to the Virgin, it allows him to impress upon his 
own mind the “mental imaging... [that] is a feature of trained recollection.”
12
  In this 
respect, we might even understand the Virgin’s appearance to be the manifestation of the 
monk’s own memory – the incarnation of his own mental picture, itself created through 
the discipline of repetitive prayer.  But beyond its mnemonic function, the spoken 
devotional is also at the center of the circular relationship between the monk and Mary, 
one in which the monk’s devotional performance demonstrably affects the Virgin’s 
physical condition just as the Virgin’s mediation demonstrably affects the monk’s 
heavenly and earthly circumstances.  By insisting upon such an interdependent 
relationship, the poem asks us to consider not only the monk’s status absent the 
intercession of the Virgin but also the Virgin’s status absent the intercession of the monk: 
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would Mary be dressed in rags without the initial fifty Ave Marias uttered by the monk, 
or would she be humiliatingly naked; would she even exist as spiritual intercessor 
without his spoken homage?  Knapp posits that “The Monk who Clad the Virgin” finally 
questions the very nature of Marian intercession itself by showing the Virgin’s identity to 
be predicated upon the “supplemental action of worshippers.”
13
   
The “supplemental action” performed by those worshippers is more than simply a 
mnemonic; it is, I contend, expressly and fundamentally the action of speaking.  On this 
point the poem is emphatic: the Virgin demands not only that specific prayers be recited 
but that they be recited in a specific pattern and in specific numbers.  Moreover, the poem 
ties the physical recitation of the prayers inextricably to the creation of the Virgin’s 
garment; as Mary tells the monk, “This clothynge / Thow has me youen, for thow euery 
day / L [50] sythe Aue Maria seyying, / Honoured hast me” (57-60).  The dependency of 
garment upon word here strongly suggests that the spoken prayers of the monk – not 
solely his memory – are responsible for the clothes of the Virgin.  And even if the monk’s 
performance of Our Lady’s Psalter does not create the Virgin’s clothing out of whole 
cloth, it at least acts as a catalyst for such a creation.  In this respect, the uttered Ave 
Marias of Hoccleve’s “Monk Who Clad the Virgin” assume the properties of overtly 
performative speech acts.  Like the sacramental utterances that permeate Saint Erkenwald 
and like Phoebus’s punitive outbursts in the Manciple’s Tale, the monk’s spoken prayers 
perform demonstrable work on the world around them. 
We might argue that the monk’s performative prayers serve the same purpose as 
Bishop Erkenwald’s baptismal and eucharistic utterances, namely that they provide 
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implicit support to the orthodox church by simultaneously demonstrating the authority of 
an ordained ecclesiast and evoking a nexus of anti-Lollard associations.  Such a reading 
would shore up the critical consensus that “The Monk Who Clad the Virgin” exemplifies 
orthodox devotion and add to claims, often based upon Hoccleve’s public rebuke of 
Lollardy in the “Address to Sir John Oldcastle,” that Hoccleve was himself a strident 
anti-Wycliffite crusader.
14
  Rather than focusing on the poem’s orthodoxy, however, I 
would like to examine the place of the Ave Maria in the economy of exchange that 
Hoccleve develops between the Virgin and the monk, an economy that strongly recalls 
the philanthropic practices of well-heeled English families in the later Middle Ages.  Joel 
Rosenthal describes such philanthropy as being particularly pervasive among (but not 
limited to) the nobility during the fourteenth and fifteenth centuries: individuals and 
families of means “were expected to give to the church and to the poor ... both to justify 
their inequitable status in the social hierarchy and to buy prayers for their own souls.”
15
  
In “The Monk Who Clad the Virgin, Hoccleve specifically identifies the monk as the son 
of “a ryche man and a worthy” (23), marking him as – if not necessarily a member of the 
nobility – an individual with the means to participate in charitable practices.  
Furthermore, the poem stipulates that the central exchange between Mary and the monk 
takes place not within the abbey but in a devotional chapel on the monk’s family estate, a 
locus appropriate to the self-interested philanthropy of the upper-classes.  While such 
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details alone may not go so far as to render Mary the object of the monk’s noblesse 
oblige, they nonetheless lay the groundwork for a model of Marian devotion predicated 
upon structures of charitable giving by the landed and the affluent, structures that 
themselves suggest a feudally inflected, vertically aligned hierarchy of exchange. 
It follows that the language of the philanthropic gift is precisely the language 
Mary uses to describe her two exchanges with the monk.  When she first appears in her 
sleeveless garment the Virgin tells him, “This clothynge / Thow has me youen” (57-58); 
later, when the monk has completed his longer set of prayers, she says “Beholde now / 
How good clothing and how fressh apparaille / That this wyke to me youen hast thow” 
(92-94).  But the “fressh apparaille” is not given for nothing.  In short order the Virgin 
reveals how she will “qwit” (97) the monk’s generosity: “And soone aftir, abbot of !at 
abbeye / He maad was, as !at tolde him our lady. // ... his soule was betaght / To God.  
He heuene had vnto his meede” (115-16, 120-21).  Like the monk’s affluence and the 
poem’s seigneurial setting, this quid-pro-quo arrangement conforms to expectations of 
late medieval philanthropic giving, a practice that “was primarily aimed at the spiritual 
welfare of the donor rather than at improving the worldly condition of the recipient.”
16
  
Indeed, such an economic model – in which personal, spiritual reward is implicit in the 
act of giving – helps to explain the unusual, even paradoxical, degree of reciprocity that 
marks Mary’s relationship with the monk.  Conforming to the hierarchic structure of 
philanthropy, in which the donor was always of a higher social station than the recipient, 
as well as to traditional structures of Marian devotion, in which the devotee was but a 
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beggar before the “queene of heuene” (78), Hoccleve ‘s monk both gives to and humbles 
himself before a Virgin marked at once by need and by noblesse. 
The institution of philanthropy among England’s upper classes was deeply rooted 
in the strict hierarchy and gross economic inequities of the feudal system, and in many 
respects it was dependent upon those very inequities for its preservation.  Arguably, the 
philanthropic gift functioned less to improve the lot of its recipient than it did “to 
contribute to the affirmation of the lord [of a household] and his establishment” and to 
reify the seigneurial relationships that necessitated it in the first place.
17
  As a result, we 
might be tempted to see the philanthropy of the upper classes as an essentially 
conservative economic practice, one that not only provided spiritual succor for donors in 
the form of prayers, chantries, and other such soteriological considerations but also 
enhanced “the social status of the givers” while “apply[ing] social control by the 
benefactor upon the beneficiaries.”
18
  But the precepts of philanthropic giving also 
simmered just beneath the surface of England’s burgeoning money economy in the later 
Middle Ages; therefore, they must be understood not merely as a vestige of the fast-
decaying feudal system but also as “part of a larger exchange, that of services and 
obligations in return for money and goods, which we recognize as the specialization of 
labor.”
19
  In point of fact, the institutionalized giving of gifts (or at least the pretense of 
such giving) often stood in for the regular payment of wages, and it facilitated the 
beginnings of modern practices of lending and borrowing.  The gift even provided cover 
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for the de facto charging of exorbitant interest, a practice that would otherwise have been 
considered usury.
20
  Thus, even as philanthropic giving outwardly reinforced the vertical 
hierarchies of exchange that had prevailed in England for centuries, it simultaneously 
enabled horizontally aligned (and sometimes suspect) market transactions that, by the 
later Middle Ages, were radically dismantling such hierarchies.  
The necessary but awkward overlap of philanthropy and wage capitalism was by 
no means irrelevant to Hoccleve’s experience as clerk of the Privy Seal.  A. L. Brown 
documents a seemingly regressive shift in the remuneration of the Privy Seal clerks 
during Hoccleve’s tenure, a shift that saw the payment of daily wages replaced by the 
awarding of gift-like annuities.
 21
  Such a change meant that by 1399, the entire 
remunerative system for the Privy Seal clerks “was theoretically grounded on the 
independent largesse of the king” and was supplemented only occasionally by 
miscellaneous grants, bequests, and tips from other patrons.
22
  Because of his long years 
of employment at the Privy Seal (c. 1387 - c. 1424), Hoccleve would no doubt have been 
intimately familiar with this change in remuneration as well as with the Janus-like 
countenance that the philanthropic gift more generally assumed.
23
 
In “The Monk Who Clad the Virgin,” Hoccleve develops the tension between the 
seigneurial (read vertically aligned) and mercantile (read horizontally aligned) structures 
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of exchange through the persistent use of economic language.  At moments, this language 
resonates with the social and economic formations that we associate with feudalism, for 
example, when Hoccleve describes the monk’s dutiful “worsship and honour / Of Goddes 
modir” (34-35), when he notes that the monk’s prayers were uttered in a devotional 
chapel “maad and edified ... at our ladyes reurerence” (43-44), or when he proposes that 
in order to stay in the Virgin’s good graces we must perform “seruice, honour and 
plesance” (20).  At other times, the language displays a shift toward a more mercantile 
sensibility, as when Hoccleve writes “Betwixt God and man is [Mary] mediatrice / For 
our offenses mercy to purchace” (8-9).  Most frequently, however, the economic 
terminology that Hoccleve employs evokes both the feudal and the mercantile at once, an 
indication that by the fifteenth century the linguistic registers defining these two systems 
– and, indeed, the two systems themselves – were so thoroughly intermingled as to be 
mutually inextricable.  As an example, we might consider Hoccleve’s use of the word 
“meede” (121) to describe the reward Mary will provide for the monk’s spoken 
devotionals.  Certainly “meed” can suggest the vertical systems of exchange that define 
the feudal economic hierarchy: in the popular fifteenth-century Romance of Guy of 
Warwick, a text roughly contemporary with Hoccleve’s “Monk who Clad the Virgin,” Sir 
Roholde is described as an Earl “who helde Warwick in hys honde” and who “gave 
gyftys and grete medys” to his grateful villeins.
24
  In Piers Plowman, however, Langland 
personifies “meed” as a figure of abject duplicity, capable of co-opting the appurtenances 
of a feudal economic hierarchy (“Seruaunt! for hire servyce, we see! wel !e so!e, / 
Taken Mede of hire maistres as !ei mowe acorde”) even as she enables the most 
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fundamental aspects of mercantile exchange (“Mede and Marchaundi!e mote nede go 
togideres; / No wi!t, as I wene, wi!outen Mede may libbe”).25   
In “The Monk Who Clad the Virgin,” the word “quit,” like the word “mede,” 
occupies an ambiguous position between the poem’s vertical and horizontal structures of 
exchange.  In the poem’s authorial moralitas, Hoccleve invokes the sworn bonds of fealty 
implicit in the practice of Christian worship when he writes, “Who serueth our lady, 
leesith right naght. / Shee souffissantly qwytith euery deede” (122-23). Despite this 
seigneurial context, however, the term “quit” itself, which also appears when the Virgin 
promises to “qwit” (97) the monk for his labor, necessarily recalls the free-wheeling, 
hierarchy-violating economic structure that organizes Chaucer’s Canterbury Tales.
26
  
While Hoccleve’s moralitas may imply that the spiritual quittings of “The Monk Who 
Clad the Virgin” are more staid than those of Chaucer’s capitalist hurly-burly, we can 
also see in those quittings echoes of the Summoner promising to “quiten [the Friar] every 
grot” (III 1292), the “false chanon” asking a priest “Leene me a marc ... / And at my day I 
wol it quiten thee” (VIII 1026-27), or even Palamon and Arcite, locked in a tower where 
“ther may no gold hem quite” (I 1032).  The Virgin’s sufficient “quitting,” embodies both 
of these exchange models. 
The mechanics of the final transaction between the monk and the Virgin 
underscore and extend these complexities.  Indeed, despite Hoccleve’s clear insistence on 
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maintaining the language and ethos of seigneurial hierarchy in this passage, a number of 
fundamentally capitalist elements still lurk behind the exchange itself: 
And euery day Aue Maria he [the monk] 
Seide aftir hir doctryne and enformynge. 
And, the nexte haliday aftir suynge, 
Our lady fresshly arraied and wel 
To the monk cam, beynge in !at chapel, 
 
And vnto him seide, “Beholde now 
How good clothyng and how fressh apparaille 
That this wyke to me youen hast thow. 
Sleeues to me clothynge now nat faille, 
Thee thanke I, and ful wel for thy trauaille 
Shalt thow be qwit heer, in this lyf present, 
And in !at othir whan thow hens art went. (87-98) 
The gift the monk gives and the gift the Virgin receives are not the same: specifically, the 
monk offers a regimen of spoken prayers while Mary gets from him “good clothyng and 
fressh apparaille” (93).  This disjuncture speaks to the performative efficacy of the 
monk’s speech by positing a direct and causal relationship between word and garment.  
In the same breath, it also suggests the potential economic function of such performative 
speech and its value in a system of mercantile exchange.  In this respect, the monk’s 
spoken prayers become a kind of linguistic currency: they are the means by which Mary 
gets her garment but not the garment itself, valuable for what they do rather than what 
171 
they are.  We see a similar disjuncture when Mary promises to “qwit” the monk for his 
“trauaille” (96) rather than for the garment she claims to have been given.  Indeed, the 
very notion of the Virgin repaying the monk for his ad hoc work is far more reminiscent 
of a market economy based on contracts and specialized labor than it is of a seigneurial 
economy based on fealty and institutionalized noblesse oblige, particularly when we 
consider that Mary herself requested (would it be too tendentious to say “contracted”?) 
the additional prayers. 
Finally, and perhaps most startlingly, we see in this passage a constant emphasis 
on increase throughout the exchange: the monk’s recitation of Our Lady’s Psalter 
provides good clothing for the virgin, and in return the Virgin installs the monk as abbot 
of his order and assures him of “eternel blisse” (111).  Later, as the Virgin stipulates, the 
monk teaches his “couent ... to seye / My psalter as byforn taght haue I thee” (101-02), 
and together they in turn teach it to “the peple ... in generaltee” (103).  Because of all of 
this work, the Virgin announces finally, “shal ther be many oon / Saued” (110-11).  The 
exponential degree of increase that the poem imagines – in both souls saved and prayers 
spoken – is not unusual in narratives of spiritual redemption (itself a term with strong 
economic valences); we might even argue that chain-reaction of salvations triggered by 
Hoccleve’s monk follows the same pattern as St. Cecilia’s conversions in the Second 
Nun’s Tale or, just as appropriately, the secular and economically grounded flood of 
forgiveness that concludes the Franklin’s Tale.  But in a poem where spoken prayers 
become currency and where contracted “trauaille” is “qwit” with not just spiritual but 
temporal reward, such eschatological increase begins to smack uncomfortably of 
economic increase, even of compounding interest.  Indeed, we might understand the 
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terms of the Virgin’s arrangement with the monk – the monk teaches Our Lady’s Psalter 
to his fellow monks, who in turn teach it to the members of local community, who in turn 
teach it to others, and so on – as amounting to a salvific pyramid-scheme, one that recalls 
the dubious financial exchanges of the Shipman’s Tale or the devious “multiplicacioun” 




Foucault’s observation, “When goods can circulate (and this thanks to money), 
they multiply, and wealth increases,” is instructive here; so, too, is its corollary, “when 
coinage becomes more plentiful, as a result of good circulation and favorable balance, 
one can attract fresh merchandise.”
28
  Both of these statements speak to the exponential 
increase that the Virgin’s instructions to the monk engender.  As it pertains to Christian 
redemption, such increase clearly would have been understood as a net positive by 
Hoccleve’s readers.  The economic model that Hoccleve proposes for such eschatological 
increase, however, is more ambiguous in its moral implications because it echoes a 
number of the abuses that prevailed in the developing marketplace of the fifteenth 
century.  Chief among these abuses was, of course, the sin of usury, which William of 
Auxerre defines as “the will to acquire something above the principal of a loan” and 
which John Gower, more colloquially, recognizes as the action of a man who “wol 
ageinward take a bene, / Ther he hath lent the smale pese.”
29
  The discourse surrounding 
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usury is complex and often self contradictory, and I don’t want state outright that 
Hoccleve’s monk and Virgin are engaged in usurious practices.  But the economic model 
of increase upon which their salvific program is based seems dangerously close to the 
more unethical exigencies of a mercantile system of exchange.  Even if the Virgin is not 
an outright usurer, we can see that the seigneurial language deployed by Hoccleve’s 
poem is the same language by which annuities were able to stand in for the salaries of the 
Privy Seal clerks, the same language by which the giving of “gifts” facilitated usurious 
lending without the appearance of excessive interest.  The economic language of 
Hoccleve’s poem is the self-same language that served both to elide and to allow for the 
more dubious practices of market capitalism in the later Middle Ages. 
 
Because economic language has a long history in the Marian lyric and in Christian 
devotional writing more generally, Hoccleve is not alone in describing salvation in terms 
of compounded interest.  His inimitable contemporary, Margery Kempe, relates a vision 
in which Christ describes salvation in similar terms of economic increase: “Dowtyr, I 
schal be a trew executor to the and fulfyllyn all thi wylle, and for thi gret charyté that 
thow hast to comfortyn thin even cristen thu schalt have dubbyl reward in hevyn.”
30
  But 
even if, as one scholar notes, “the intersection of religious and economic themes and 
tropes ... was a recognized commonplace in medieval discourses of redemption,” the 
uneasy tension that “The Monk Who Clad the Virgin” develops between feudal and 
mercantile structures of exchange is uniquely Hoccleve’s own, that of a lifetime 
bureaucrat caught up in “the long and uneven transition from household government to 
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  At the center of this economic tension stands the Ave Maria 
itself, a prayer that becomes important as a charitable donation to the virgin and as an 
investment in the monk’s soul, as the exercise of sacral fealty and as the completion of a 
contracted remembrance, as meed in return for devotion and as interest paid on a 
soteriological debt.  But we must not forget that the prayer is first a distinct and specific 
spoken utterance, one that attains these layers of importance only by virtue of its unique 
ability to function meaningfully in both the spiritual manor house and the spiritual 
marketplace.  Moving within the mingled economies of Hoccleve’s devotional lyric – 
across strict vertical hierarchies reminiscent of the feudal system and increasingly lateral 
social arrangements like those that proliferated in the late-fourteenth and fifteenth 
centuries – the Ave Maria becomes a speech act whose importance is predicated on its 
ability to circulate and to perform work: to serve as a charitable gift, to engender a 
garment, to provide remembrance, to secure a position in a religious order, to purchase 
mercy, to redeem a single soul, to save a whole community.  Be it as commodity or as 
currency, the Ave Maria is central to the spiritual economy of Hoccleve’s poem because 
it is bought and traded, because it engenders increase.  Such efficaciousness – such 
performativity – is what makes the Ave Maria so valuable a coin. 
My argument about spoken prayer and economic exchange, namely that prayer 
functions as a kind of currency in the spiritual economy of Hoccleve’s poem, has been 
anticipated by both structuralist and post-structuralist critics, specifically by Saussure and 
later by Derrida and Foucault.  Saussure draws a direct parallel between the coin and the 
spoken word, one predicated on the idea that each has value because each “can be 
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exchanged for a certain quantity of something different” (he cites “bread” for money and 
“an idea” for words) and also “can be compared to something of like nature” (e.g. another 
coin or another word).  Like money, “[t]he content of a word is determined ... not by what 
it contains but by what exists outside of it.  As an element in a system, the word has not 
only a meaning but also – above all – a value.”
32
  Derrida builds on Saussure’s 
observation by insisting that both language and money are always and inevitably 
metaphorical in nature; he notes that any object which “plays a role in the process of 
axiological and semantic exchange ... does not completely escape the general law of 
metaphorical value.”
33
  Foucault, whose observation that circulation engenders economic 
increase we’ve already examined, puts a still finer point on the connection between 
language and money.  He states that because they are grounded in homologous systems 
of representation and signification, “theories of money or trade have the same conditions 
of possibility as language itself.”  As the de facto signifier in a system of commercial 




These post-structuralist views on money and speech are surprisingly evocative of 
similar medieval perspectives.  Nicholas Perkins describes a “verbal economy” of late-
medieval England in which “the coinage ... was the vocabulary of loyal advice, of 
instruction and of complaint.”  In this verbal economy, “words could themselves be 
exchanged for money and influence,” an observation that calls to mind Foucault’s link 
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between circulation and value as well as the idiosyncratic exchange economy of 
Hoccleve’s own work.
35
  R. A. Shoaf also describes the metaphorical interdependence of 
speech and currency, stating broadly that “the analogy between language and money is ... 
seriously medieval,” an analogy that would have been available to Chaucer and to his 
disciples “not only through ‘experience’ but also through impeccable ‘authority.’”
36
  
Shoaf quotes Boethius to show how such an analogy might have been understood in the 
late Middle Ages: 
For sound is a kind of universal; names and words, on the other hand, are 
parts.  Every part, however, is in the whole ....  Thus just as a coin is 
copper impressed with a certain figure not only in order that it might be 
called a coin but also in order that it might be the price of some specific 
thing, so, in the same way, words and names, are not only sounds, but are 
imposed to a certain signification of thoughts ....  And thus, in this way, a 
sound – that is, a significant sound – is not sound only, but is called a verb 
or name, just as a coin is not called copper, but is called, by its proper 
name, a coin, by means of what distinguishes it from other copper.
37
 
Like the modern theorists cited above, Boethius understands that both spoken words and 
money are to some degree defined by their inclusion within a group (call that group 
“sounds” or “metals”) but that they attain value through their specificity and distinctness 
within that group.  It is their individuality, their circulation, and finally their metaphorical 
nature – the ability of the specific word to stand in for an idea within verbal discourse or 
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the ability of the specific coin to stand in for a commodity of equal value within 
economic discourse – that unites the two things.  As Shoaf concludes, “Boethius 
recognizes that value, linguistic and economic, depends on relativity and differentiation 
which are elements of exchange.”
38
   
From his position at the Privy Seal, where an appropriately worded petition could 
produce significant financial returns for both clerk and petitioner, Hoccleve would have 
understood these Boethian precepts.  He would have been acutely aware of the 
fluctuating, metaphorical exchange relationship that existed between coin and 
commodity, and he would have seen, each time a petition produced a monetary return, 
the effective literalization of the value of the word.  Similarly, the economy of “The 
Monk Who Clad the Virgin” can itself be understood as literalizing the metaphorical 
value of the spoken word – as aggressively commodifying the monk’s uttered Ave Marias 
by forcing a fixed exchange value onto them (50 Ave Marias + 5 Pater Nosters = 1 
sleeve).  Thus, I submit, it is not a stretch to see Hoccleve’s monk trading in Ave Marias 
and spending them like so many groats, nor is it a stretch to think that Hoccleve himself 
understood some spoken utterances, such as prayers, to operate as a medium of exchange 
in a manifestly economic system. 
 
By positing a multivalent eschatological economy in which prayer is effectively bartered 
for salvation, “The Monk who Clad the Virgin” offers us the clearest vision among 
Hoccleve’s devotional lyrics of how speech might function amidst the hierarchical and 
economic tensions created where feudally inflected exchange intersects with the 
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exigencies of the capitalist marketplace.  Nonetheless, many of the poet’s Marian poems 
invoke similar economic language, and some suggest the same kinds of reciprocity that 
we see in “The Monk Who Clad the Virgin.”  Indeed, the sheer number of Hoccleve’s 
poems to the Virgin suggest that Hoccleve saw in the figure of Mary – and particularly in 
her traditional role as intercessor between man and God – a useful figure with which to 
explore these varieties of exchange and to navigate their often conflicting currents.    
Perhaps the most straightforward of these Marian lyrics is a long prayer to the Virgin 
now known simply as “Ad Beatam Virginem” (Furnivall X).  In this plea for salvation, 
Hoccleve allows a relatively straightforward arrangement of lordship and vassalage to 
predominate as he offers himself wholly to Mary and John the Apostle in return for his 
spiritual preservation: “Vn-to yow I my soule commende, / Marie and Iohn, for my 
sauuacioun! / Helpith me !at I may my lyf amende ... Be in myn herte now and 
everemore!” (134-139).
 39
  The traditional precepts of homage and dependency that such 
a sacral relationship suggests are borne out when Hoccleve promises to “worship & 
honure” (64) the virgin “Syn [since] vp on thee / was leid the charge and cure ... to hele 
our shoules of hir seek estat” (66-70).  Within this traditional arrangement, spoken 
prayers – both the poet’s and the Blessed Virgin’s – are an understood medium of 
exchange.  Not only does Hoccleve imply that he will perform prayers in the course of 
his “worship and honure,” he asks the Virgin outright to “presente ... my prayer vn-to thy 
sone” (13) and makes reference to her own efficacious prayers when he notes, “To 
wasshe away our cloudeful offense ... your preyre may so moche auaille” (109-12).   
                                                
39
 Citations from Furinvall and Gollancz’s edition of Hoccleve’s Works: The Minor Poems are cited 
parenthetically by editor and poem number, and by line. 
179 
Speech proves similarly efficacious in Hoccleve’s “Ballade for Robert Chichele,” 
but the poem itself registers a more multivalent economic sensibility than does “Ad Beata 
Virginem.”  Specifically, the poem finds Hoccleve attempting to attain from God “a 
purueance” (“Ballade,” 24) in exchange for “[his] speeche and by [his] sawe” (21).  The 
word “purueance” itself – which may refer either to spiritual or to material provisions – 
occupies an ambiguous position within Hoccleve’s interpenetrating economic systems, 
one that evokes many of the tensions evident in “The Monk Who Clad the Virgin.”  
Hoccleve hints at this same ambiguity in another of his Marian addresses (Furnivall VII), 
a poem in which he frets that Mary, “Modir of lyf” and “cause of al our welthe” (1), will 
not “accepte [his] preyeere” (21) or “purchase ... pardoun” (80) for his sins.   
The mingled economies that Hoccleve presents in “Ballade for Robert Chichele” 
are still more strongly evoked in his “Item de Beata Virgine” (Gollancz V): 
Syn Thow, modir of grace, haast euere in mynde 
Alle tho / !at vp-on thee han memorie, 
Thy remembrance ay oghte oure hertes bynde 
Thee for to honure / blisful qweene of glorie, 
To alle cristen folk / it is notorie 
"at thow art shee / in whom !at al man-kynde 
May truste fully / grace and help to fynde. (1-7) 
The dynamic that this passage describes, in which Mary’s “remembrance... oghte oure 
hertes bynde,” bespeaks the vertical alignments implicit in “The Monk Who Clad the 
Virgin.”  This point is further underscored later in the poem when Hoccleve describes 
Mary’s salvific intercession on behalf of her “seruant!” (84).  But, the lady/servant 
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relationship that the poem proposes is frequently undercut by language suggestive of 
market exchange, such as Hoccleve’s description of Mary’s “purchase of ... foryeunesse” 
as a “bysynesse ... "at vn-to man-kynde is so profitable” (118-121) or his concern that 
Christ “hath boght our soules at swich prys / !at derrere might no thyng han be boght” 
(106-107).   
As the co-mingling of economic systems begins to emerge in “Item de Beata 
Virgine,” so, too, do the economic overtones of the spoken word.  The speaker asks, for 
example, “What wight is !at that with angwissh and wo / Tormented is if he preye vn-to 
thee / Him to deliuere and to putte him there-fro” (8-10), a statement that shows prayer 
circulating in the economy of salvation.  He also marvels at how “acceptable” (79) 
Mary’s own prayers are to Christ and even ponders the plight of individuals who cannot 
speak, reasoning that “thogh !at preye may [their] tonge noght, / Yit holpe [are they] 
thurgh cry of hertes thoght” (13-14).  Such a formulation goes so far as to re-imagine the 
usually silent act of repentance as an act of bodily prayer, a de facto utterance.  Salvation, 
it seems, needs to be purchased with some kind of spoken devotional, even if it is the 
unheard speech of the heart. 
 While these Marian addresses all implicitly affirm the power of spoken prayer and 
engage with metaphors of exchange to describe their respective redemptive economies, 
none rivals the complexity that we see in “The Monk Who Clad the Virgin” except 
Hoccleve’s “Complaint of the Virgin,” a work written in the voice of Mary as she mourns 
Christ’s crucifixion.  A loose translation of a lyric from Guillaume deGuilleville’s 
Pèlerinage de l’âme, this planctus Mariae takes the form of a series of apostrophes 
spoken by the Virgin Mary.  Each of these apostrophes finds Mary lamenting her son’s 
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death not in the broad terms of Christian redemptive theology but in the excruciatingly 
intimate terms of a human mother witnessing the death of her human son.  Her first 
apostrophe, beginning “O fader God, how fers and how cruel” (“Conpleynte” 1), 
exemplifies the poem’s general approach: 
“I had ioye entuere and also gladnesse  
Whan !u betook him me to clothe and wrappe 
In mannes flesche.  I wend, in soothfastnesss, 
Have had for euere joye be the lappe. 
But hath sorwe caught me with his trappe. 
My ioye hath made a permutacioun 
With wepynge and eek lamentacioun.” (8-14)
40
 
After making her complaint to God, Mary addresses in succession the Holy Ghost, the 
angel Gabriel, Saint Elizabeth, the woman who blessed Christ (Luke 11:27), Simeon, 
Saint Joachim, and finally Christ Himself, implicating each in explicitly personal aspects 
of her loss.  Eventually, she extends her lament beyond this coterie to address death, the 
sun, the earth, the angels, and, at last, the whole of humanity itself.  With this final 
apostrophe, however, Mary’s rhetorical stance shifts dramatically from the 
claustrophobically personal to the emphatically universal.  The Virgin now asks the 
“sones of Adam” (227) to lament with her, to “bymeneth [Christ] in herte and cheere and 
vois” (231) and to recognize that “for [our] gilt makith he correcioun / And amendes right 
by his owne deeth” (236-237).  No longer speaking only as the inward-looking and 
                                                
40
 The lyric is editorially titled “Conpleynte Paramont,” in Ellis, “My Compleinte” and Other Poems, 53-
63.  I refer to it as “The Complaint of the Virgin” in order to avoid confusing inconsistencies with other 
recent criticism dealing with the poem. 
182 
disconsolate mother of a human son, she now funnels her individual personal sorrows 
into the redemptive aspects of Christ’s sacrifice. 
 Within the entropic spiral of Mary’s personal loss, Jennifer Bryan recognizes a 
pattern wherein “the Virgin is made to represent the private relationships that must be 
sacrificed for the sake of public duty.”
41
  But the Virgin’s cycle of loss is also related to a 
fundamental collapse of the spoken word, colossal failure of traditional frameworks of 
devotional speech to prevent or even to assuage Mary’s suffering.  The first suggestion 
the poem gives of this collapse comes in the fourth stanza when the Virgin asks the Holy 
Ghost, “Why hast thu me not in thi remembraunce / Now at this tyme right as thu had 
tho?” (22-23).  The Holy Ghost’s failure to remember Mary as she demands – to meet 
Mary’s unfulfilled expectations – calls to mind the monk’s abbreviated prayer cycle and 
the half-finished garment it engenders, both of which speak to the efficacy of spoken 
prayer. 
In the following apostrophe Mary begins to make overt the breakdown of the 
economy of speech that her rebuke to the Holy Ghost only implied: 
“O Gaubriel, whan !at thou come aplace 
And madest vnto me thi salewyng 
And seidest thus, ‘Heil Mary, ful of grace’, 
Whi ne had thu gove me warnyng 
Of !at grace that veyn is and faylyng, 
As thu now seest, and sey it weel beforne? 
Sith my ioye is me rafte, my grace is lorne.” (29-35) 
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In this stanza, the Holy Ghost’s lapse in “remembraunce” is replaced by Gabriel’s failure 
to speak the truth; more precisely, it becomes Gabriel’s failure to speak enough of the 
truth, a distinction that again resonates with the monk’s initial inadequate prayer regimen 
in “The Monk Who Clad the Virgin.”  But whereas the central flaw marking the monk’s 
Ave Maria was the number of prayers spoken, the central flaw marking Gabriel’s Ave 
Maria turns out to be the content of the Marian address itself, a problem of kind rather 
than a problem of degree.  Indeed, Gabriel’s address to the Virgin at the Annunciation is 
revealed in this stanza to be fundamentally insufficient, a kind of half truth that neither 
warns Mary of the crucifixion nor gives her any indication of the “veyn and faylyng” 
nature of grace.  For this reason, the Ave Maria, which in Hoccleve’s miracle of the 
Virgin functions both as salvific currency and as exchange commodity, only serves in the 
“Complaint of the Virgin” to sharpen Mary’s grief. 
Similar failures of the poem’s economy of devotional speech follow in quick 
succession: Mary laments to Elizabeth that her words were not only insufficient but 
inaccurate (“The word[es] !at thu spak in the mowntain / Be ended al in another maner / 
Than thu had wened” [37-39]); she tells Simeon that his speech was too accurate, bearing 
bad news instead of omitting it (“O Simeon, thow seidest me ful sooth, / The strook that 
perce shal my sones herte / My soule thirle it shal, and so it dooth” [50-52]); and finally 
she upbraids her father Saint Joachim for his absence of utterance altogether (here 
imagined as minstrelsy), complaining that he has no harp “wherwith me make light / And 
me to conforte in my woful torment” (66-67).  With startling compression, The Virgin of 
Hoccleve’s planctus Mariae ascribes to the spoken utterance – starting with the Ave 
Maria itself – a litany of grievances and painful elisions, endemic failings that essentially 
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undo the spiritual economy Hoccleve represents in “The Monk Who Clad the Virgin” and 
that call into question the efficaciousness of devotional speech as a whole.  Within this 
unstable economic framework, prayer seems unlikely to buy a petitioner’s redemption; 
rather, the spoken word in the “Complaint of the Virgin” seems only to engender loss 
upon excruciating loss. 
 The nadir of the poem’s verbal economy comes when Mary speaks to Christ 
himself, still suffering upon the cross.  In Hoccleve’s poem, as in the Gospel of John, 
Christ calls His mother “womman” (176) rather than “Maria” or “Mother.”
42
  In 
response, the Virgin begins aggressively to rupture her own name, changing it first from 
“Maria” to “Mara” (a pun on amara or “bitterness”) and then from “Marie” to “marred” 
(183, 218)  in token that “‘I,’ which is Ihesus, is fro me fall” (186).
43
  For this same 
reason, Mary eventually renounces the name “modir” (225) altogether; its letter “i,” like 
the letters in “Maria” and “Marie,” is lost at the moment of the crucifixion.  Bryan reads 
such “distortions and dislocations” as Mary’s rejection of the self-referential “I,” an act 
dramatizing within the Virgin “a dissolution of identity, of subjectivity itself.”  But 
because Mary performs this dissolution of subjectivity exclusively within language, those 
dislocations speak equally strongly to the collapse of the speech that the poem enacts.
44
  
In this regard, it is especially significant that each time Mary perverts her name, she does 
so specifically with regard to its vocative functions: “Wel may men clepe and calle me 
Mara / ... How sholde I lenger clept be Maria” (183-85); “Marie? Nay, but ‘marred’ I thee 
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calle” (218); “of modir ... / No more maist thow clept be by thy name” (225-26).  Each of 
these linguistic disjunctures deals with the Virgin’s name as it is “calle[d]” and “clept.”  
Moreover, each implicitly but decidedly negates her connection to the invocatory words 
of the Ave Maria itself and dissociates her from the very forms of remembrance upon 
which Marian devotion and salvation so conspicuously depend. 
 A number of critics have discussed the gender and power dynamics implicit in 
late medieval accounts of the Virgin’s suffering.  Thomas Bestul describes the intensely 
tearful reaction of the Virgin in later medieval planctus Mariae as part of “a theological 
doctrine ... that stressed the idea of Mary’s unique compassion, or co-suffering, with 
Christ, a doctrine that gradually created an exalted position for Mary as the co-redemptrix 
of the human race.”
 45
  He locates within the Virgin’s emotional meltdown a space in 
which Mary’s agency, both as divine mediator and as woman, is simultaneously 
constrained and amplified. 
 
But I want to argue that within the particular economy of 
speech that Hoccleve proposes in his “Complaint of the Virgin,” the systemic failure of 
the spoken word that coincides with Mary’s breakdown is more monolithically 
threatening; indeed, it undermines the very means of salvation that Marian intercession, 
and particularly the Ave Maria, enable.   
It is inevitable, therefore, that the poem recuperate the efficaciousness of speech – 
both as prayer and a means to invoke the Virgin – and affirm its role in an economy of 
salvation.  Such an affirmation comes in the final three stanzas of the work when Mary 
“at last ... performs her ordained role, mediating between sinful humanity and crucified 
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  Turning to address the “sones of Adam,” the Virgin suddenly refocuses her 
personal lament outward, asking the reader to “see how my sone for your gilt and blame / 
Hangith heer all bybled vpon the crois” (299-300).  Mary also refers to herself as “a 
modir” (239), a term that she had repudiated only a few lines before but which now 
serves to reassure that she has resumed her traditional identity as “Goddes modir, of vertu 
the flour” (“Monk” 35).  Finally, the Virgin exhorts the reader to mourn Christ “in herte 
and cheere and vois” (231), thus emphasizing the role of spoken prayer in remembrance 
and inviting the poem’s addressees to assume a devotional stance similar to that 
displayed in “The Monk Who Clad the Virgin.”   
But “vois” is not the only thing rehabilitated in these final lines; along with the 
affirmation of spoken piety, the final stanzas also witness the return of the reciprocal 
structures that were so central to the salvific economy of Hoccleve’s miracle of the 
Virgin: 
If yee to him han any affeccioun 
Now for his wo your hertes oghten colde. 
Shewith your loue and your dileccioun. 
For your gilt makith he correccioun 
And amendes right by his owne deeth. 
That ye nat reewe on him, myn herte it sleeth. (233-38) 
The spiral of loss dramatized in the first part of the poem – the very failure of prayer 
itself to function in fulfillment of the Christian promise of redemption – is replaced here 
by an economy in which the interdependent relationship between Christ and mankind is 
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paramount, in which the faithful reciprocate the “correccioun” of His martyrdom when 
they “Shewith [their] loue and [their] dileccioun” (235), and in which their prayer – their 
“vois” – both ensures and requites “redempcioun” (245).  Indeed, the Virgin herself now 
claims that any failure to honor and mourn her son appropriately will “ [her] herte ... 
sleeth” (238), a statement that proposes types of exchange similar to those we see in “The 
Monk Who Clad the Virgin.”  Speaking now in her capacity as heavenly intercessor, 
Mary grieves not for the death of her son but for the prospect of humankind’s failure to 
recognize and reciprocate the blood “despent in greet foysoun... for... redempcioun” 
(244-45).  Within the positive eschatological framework of the poem’s final stanzas, the 
reciprocal relationship of redemption is once again fulfilled by the spoken words of 
prayer, words that purchase salvation rather than engender loss. 
 
Economies of Madness and Recovery in Hoccleve’s Series 
Hoccleve’s Marian poetry thus develops a devotional economy predicated 
simultaneously on the hierarchical precepts of noble gift giving and on the more 
horizontal arrangements that prevailed in England’s vibrant money economy, described 
by Lee Patterson as one “of the central elements that constitute[d] life in late medieval 
London.”
47
  I have argued that Hoccleve posits spoken prayer as a key medium of 
exchange within that devotional economy, a de facto currency whose value is predicated 
not only upon its circulation but also upon its ability to perform necessary salvific work.  
Within his Marian lyrics – and most evidently within “The Monk Who Clad the Virgin” 
and the “Complaint of the Virgin” – Hoccleve offers his readers a soteriology that 
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depends upon these economic and linguistic features.  The real threat to our salvation, his 
poems demonstrate, comes when one or another of them breaks down: when spoken 
prayers are flawed or incomplete; when the intercessor makes herself unavailable to the 
supplicant; when the supplicant does not provide an adequate number of prayers to the 
intercessor.  But if we put its overtly soteriological aspects aside, this idiosyncratic 
economy of speech cannot be relegated solely to Hoccleve’s devotional works.  Rather, 
the economic and linguistic dynamic that Hoccleve represents in his Marian lyrics 
assumes a central position in his secular poems, particularly in his final group of works, 
the five linked poems known as The Series.  This unity between Hoccleve’s sacred and 
secular writing – this link from the efficacious prayer to the efficacious petition by way 
of the often-empty purse – illuminates close affinities among religious, economic and 
even political redemption in Hoccleve’s corpus, and it underscores the increasing work 
that the spoken word was understood to perform in the early years of the Lancastrian 
dynasty. 
Responses to the autobiographical elements of The Series have varied widely.  
Most earlier critics understood the poem’s account of Hoccleve’s “wilde infirmite” 
(Series 1.40) and its aftermath to be uncritical self-description, so much so that D. C. 
Greetham could bemoan an overall critical response to the work that simply “took 
Thomas Hoccleve at his word” and ascribed neither a rhetorical nor narrative function to 
his autobiographical stance.
48
  Greetham’s lament, though, is something of an 
overstatement: five years earlier, John Burrow had called The Series a poem 
“preoccupied with the business of its own composition,” and ten years before that, 
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Penelope Doob had argued that Hoccleve’s presentation of his disease and recovery owed 
a great deal to conventional medieval understandings of madness as both punishment for 
and purgation of sin.
49
  What these two readings have in common, as Greetham might 
suggest, is a general assumption of the truth value of Hoccleve’s account, which is to say 
they both accept, either tacitly or explicitly, Hoccleve’s madness and recovery as actual 
historical events.  Nonetheless, the readings also show Hoccleve’s response to his 
madness, whether autobiographical or not, to be mediated through specific cultural and 
literary filters, a point that is ultimately more significant, I would assert, than whether 
Hoccleve experienced exactly what he describes.   
Recent critical responses to The Series have largely adhered to this pattern, 
though they have posited an increasingly diverse range of assessments: Hoccleve’s work 
has been perceived alternately as demonstrating proto-humanist anxiety about a medieval 
world still uncertain about the place of the individual, as detailing a psychosomatic 
response to the exigencies of life in fifteenth-century London, as revealing “the workings 
of a consciousness for which self-knowledge and social acceptance are at once goals to 
be achieved and conclusions to be avoided,” and finally as developing “a sophisticated 
meditation upon the irresolvable fragmentation of the self and the intricate connections 
between [Hoccleve’s] poetic project and the specific cultural milieu of the Privy Seal.”
50
  
Like these readings, my own discussion of the poem does not depend upon the 
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autobiographical verity of Hoccleve’s madness and recovery. Though Hoccleve does 
insist upon positioning himself at the very center of his work, both referring to his 
“felawis of the Priue Seel” (1.296) and inscribing his own name in the friend’s address in 
the “Dialogue” (2.3, 20), the poetic “I” that he develops within it is nonetheless a 
narrative persona, one whose autobiographical function should not eclipse its rhetorical 
one. I am interested in examining the linguistic economy that Hoccleve uses his 
autobiographical persona to develop, an economy that, in itself, proposes a path to 
salvation similar to that depicted in the Marian lyrics.   
In the secular Series that salvation is not the spiritual redemption of the penitent 
but the psychological and social redemption of a man struggling to come to grips with his 
“!ou!tful maladie” (1.21).  Hoccleve advances it most overtly in the “Complaint,” the 
“Dialogue with a Friend,” the brief continuance of the “Dialogue” at the beginning of the 
“Tale of Jonathas,” and the envoy to Lady Westmorland –  the segments of the Series 
framing the work’s central three narrative exempla and those most commonly labeled 
autobiographical by modern readers.  In the first segment, the “Complaint,” Hoccleve 
depicts himself ruminating upon his madness in solitude, engaged only in the private 
actions of reading and thought.  The opening lines of the poem emphasize this solitude by 
darkly inverting the opening lines of Chaucer’s Canterbury Tales, a work whose very 
organizing conceit – tales told on a springtime pilgrimage to Canterbury – emphasizes the 
importance of “felaweshipe” and “compaignye”: 
Aftir !at heruest inned had hise sheues, 
And that the broun sesoun of Mihelmesse 
Was come, and gan the trees robbe of her leues, 
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That grene had ben and in lusty freisshenesse, 
And hem into colour of !elownesse 
Had died and doun throwen vndirfoote,  
That chaunge sanke into myn herte roote. (1.1-7) 
Here, as Burrow writes, “November drives Hoccleve in upon himself in solitary 
meditation.”
51
  Whereas Chaucer “on a day... by aventure yfalle / In felawshipe” (CT I 
19, 25-26), Hoccleve “vppon a ni!t, / Si!ynge sore ... in [his] bed lay” (1.17-18), quietly 
pondering his “siknesse” (1.22) and its sad consequences.  In a continued inversion of 
Chaucer’s text, Hoccleve relates how his friends undertook pilgrimages for him during 
his infirmity; they leave him in his solitude until the “greef aboute [his] herte so sore 
swal” (1.29) that he “nolde kepe it cloos no more” (1.32).  
Phrases like these propose Hoccleve’s isolation to be a physical ailment, 
tantamount in some ways to the poet’s “bodily sikenesse” (1.38) itself.  But as the poem 
continues, the terms of that isolation shift.  Rather than continuing to develop the stifling, 
bodily solitude presented in the opening stanzas, the poem increasingly insists upon a 
decidedly linguistic isolation, one in which Hoccleve is alone even “among the prees” 
(1.73) by virtue of his exclusion from spoken discourse.  Initially, such linguistic 
isolation seems only to be an extension of the physical isolation of the prologue; 
Hoccleve complains, for example, that “hem !at weren wonte me for to calle ... Her heed 
they caste awry, / Whanne I hem mette, as they not me sy” (1.75-77), a description of his 
enforced solitude that highlights his physical dissociation from his former acquaintances 
and, as Knapp suggests, serves to “emphasize a sense of simultaneous isolation and 
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  Soon, however, Hoccleve’s isolation begins to manifest itself in the 
same terms of remembrance (or lack of remembrance) that we witnessed in the Marian 
lyrics: “For!eten I was al oute of mynde awey, / As he !at deed was from hertis cherte” 
(1.80-81).  Eventually Hoccleve’s solitude is predicated almost entirely upon an inability 
to engage meaningfully in conversation.  The poet’s friends speak around Hoccleve but 
not to him: “Thus spake manie oone and seide by me” (1.85);  Hoccleve overhears 
conversations about him but is in no position to respond: “Tho wordis, hem vnwwar, cam 
to myn eere” (1.91).  Bereft of speech, Hoccleve is regarded as an animal by his former 
intimates, one of whom “seiden [he] loked as a wilde steer” (1.120) while “anothir seide 
... ‘Full bukkissh is his brayn’” (1.122-23).  Hoccleve listens to the words of others, but 
these only propel him into his own thoughts rather than into speech (“I leide an eere ay to 
as I by wente, / And herde al, and !us in myn herte I caste: / ‘Of longe abidinge here I 
may me repente” [1.134-35]).  Exiled from the spoken commerce of his former friends, 
Hoccleve finally allows himself to descend entirely into silence: “Forwhy, as I had lost 
my tunges keie, / Kepte I me cloos, and trussid me my weie” (1.144-45).  Despite the 
slanderous “suffring wronge” (1.179) that has been done to him, Hoccleve has “not 
answerid a!en, but kepte scilence / Leste !at men of me deme wolde” (1.180-81).  At the 
very best, these passages propose a Thomas Hoccleve who is on the thin peripheries of 
spoken discourse; at the worst, they reveal a Hoccleve who is utterly silent, even in the 
face of proffered speech. 
David Mills argues that by “[approaching] him through a diagnostic vocabulary” 
the people who speak about Hoccleve “imprison him – and themselves – in their 
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  If that is indeed the case, however, those same speakers also seal Hoccleve 
off from their discourse, hermetically enclosing him in a third-person silence within and 
precluding him from participating in their verbal economy and their community.  
Significantly, Hoccleve sums up his linguistic isolation in explicitly economic terms: 
My wele [wealth], adieu, farwel, my good fortune. 
Oute of !oure tables me planed han !e. 
Sithen welny eny wi!t for to commvne 
With me loth is, farwel prosperite. 
I am no lenger of !oure liuere. 
"e haue me putte oute of !oure retenaunce 
Adieu, my good auenture and good chaunce. (1.267-73) 
In a sentiment that immediately recalls Foucault’s observation that “when goods can 
circulate ... they multiply, and wealth increases,” Hoccleve draws a direct equation 
between his failure to function within a money economy and his inability to “commvne” 
with his friends.  Speech and specie here are two sides of the same coin; a person who 
“may but smal seie” (1.264) will find himself unable to produce wealth, either linguistic 
or fiscal, within an economy of speech.  If in the Marian lyrics, particularly in the 
“Complaint of the Virgin,” we see how a breakdown in the economy of speech threatens 
spiritual redemption, here we see how a similar economic breakdown imperils 
Hoccleve’s ability to attain psychological redemption. 
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Appropriately, the first respite Hoccleve finds from his sorrows comes in the form 
of a dialogue – a borrowed volume of Isidore of Seville’s Synonyma, in which “a man 
lamenting his miseries ... is interrupted and admonished by reason, who advises him to 
consider the sufferings of others, and to realize that his sorrows are justly ordained by 
God.”
54
  Reading this Boethian consolation does not necessarily constitute a triumphant 
re-entry into the economies of speech from which Hoccleve has been excluded; however, 
he does describe the Synonyma as a book that feeds him well “with the speche of 
Resoun” (1.315), a formulation that suggests that he engages with the text as he would 
with actual spoken discourse.  As Roger Ellis notes, “For Hoccleve ... books are an item 
of mental as well as commercial currency, and their circulation joins readers and writers 
literally no less than metaphorically.”
55
  Moreover, the pseudo-speech that Hoccleve 
enacts by reading Isadore seems to allow him at least some degree of redemption; in any 
event, he castes his sorrow “to the cok” (1.386) and bids it farewell.  Isadore’s dialogue 
encourages Hoccleve to understand his madness as a malady “wich cam of Goddis 
visitacioun” (1.382) and over which Hoccleve has little control. 
Hoccleve’s reassertion of a relationship with the divine is of fundamental 
importance to the “Complaint”; indeed, I want to suggest that the outlines of such a 
relationship are strongly reminiscent of the relationship the monk develops with the 
Virgin Mary in “The Monk who Clad the Virgin.”  This resemblance becomes clear near 
                                                
54
 Both A.G. Rigg and J. A. Burrow have identified the book Hoccleve refers to as the Synonyma, a work 
widely known in the Middle Ages.  See A. G. Rigg, “Hoccleve’s Complaint and Isidore of Seville,” 
Speculum 45 (1970): 564-74 (quotation from 566); J. A. Burrow “Hoccleve’s Complaint and Isidore of 
Seville Again,” Speculum 73 (1998): 424-28. 
55
 Roger Ellis, “Introduction,” “My Compleinte” and Other Poems, 33. 
195 
the close of Hoccleve’s poem when the Privy Seal clerk relates how God first afflicted 
and then healed him of his madness: 
Thoru! Goddis iust doom and his iugement 
And for my best, nowe I take and deeme, 
"af !at good lord me my punischement. 
In welthe I took of him noon hede or !eme, 
Him for to plese and him honoure and queme, 
And he me !af a boon on for to gnawe, 
Me to correcte and of him to have awe. 
 
He !af me wit and he tooke it away 
Whanne that he sy that I it mis dispente, 
And !af a!ein whan it was to his pay. 
He grauntide me my giltis to repente, 
And hensforwarde to sette myn entente 
Vnto his deitee to do plesaunce, 
And to amende my sinful gouernaunce. (1.393-406) 
As in his Marian lyric, Hoccleve establishes in these stanzas a supplicant/intercessor 
relationship constructed along the lines of a vertical hierarchy.  And while that verticality 
is less dramatically undercut by the overt references to interdependence that we see in 
Hoccleve’s “Monk Who Clad the Virgin,” this feudally inflected relationship still offers a 
certain degree of reciprocity, for example, when Hoccleve excoriates himself for his 
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failure to “please and ... honor and queme” God, or when he promises “Vnto his deitee to 
do plesaunce.”  The language of charity and philanthropic giving, so prevalent in the 
Marian lyrics, are also important to the redemptive economy of the “Complaint.”  
Hoccleve offers God thanks for “thin infinit goodnesse / and thi !iftis and benefices alle” 
(1.411-12), an emphasis that recalls both the gifts “youen” by both monk and Mary in 
Hoccleve’s miracle of the Virgin and the benefices sporadically offered to Hoccleve 
himself at the Privy Seal.
56
   The same economy that allowed spiritual redemption in the 
devotional lyrics now enables psychological redemption in the secular “Complaint.” 
 
The next parts of the series – particularly the “Dialogue” – develop in a social setting the 
same redemptive linguistic economy that the “Complaint” develops in a solitary one, thus 
rendering The Series as a kind of poetic diptych and according the poem an overall 
typological structure in which the “Dialogue” fulfills the promise of redemptive discourse 
only suggested in the “Complaint.”  To this end, the “Dialogue” itself stands in for the 
Boethian exchange presented by Isadore’s Synonyma.  To be sure, such a parallel is not 
exact; both Knapp and Patterson point out the discrepancies between the highly stylized 
language of the formal Boethian consolation and the “entirely different discursive 
universe” that marks the more colloquial “Dialogue.”
57
  Despite these differences, 
however, both Isadore’s work and the “Dialogue with a Friend” offer a dynamic of 
spoken exchange geared toward enabling Hoccleve’s social rehabilitation, a dynamic that 
gives Hoccleve access to an economy of speech from which he has been exiled.  Indeed, 
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it is the spoken aspect of the “Dialogue” (as opposed to the textual aspect of the 
“Complaint”) that the Series most prominently emphasizes.  James Simpson shows how 
Hoccleve uses an array of stylistic and rhetorical devices in the work “to efface any sense 
of barrier between the reader and the scene he or she witnesses,” a strategy that both 
imparts to the “Dialogue” the appearance of reality and suggests that for Hoccleve, “the 
actual means to sanity ... lies in dialogue.”
58
  In its ostensible spoken-ness, then, the 
“Dialogue” seems to offer Hoccleve a degree of social redemption to go with the 
psychological and spiritual redemption he describes at the end of the “Complaint.” 
 The emphasis that the “Dialogue” places on spoken exchange as a means of 
redemption also reveals an important thematic connection between The Series and 
Marian lyrics such as “The Monk Who Clad the Virgin” and the “Complaint of the 
Virgin,” a connection further reinforced by the commercial and economic metaphors that 
Hoccleve employs throughout the “Dilogue” and, more broadly, throughout the Series.  
Nowhere are these metaphors more explicit than in Hoccleve’s lengthy and seemingly 
arbitrary screed against coin-clippers and counterfeiters, an invective that readers have 
attempted to integrate into the poem’s concerns about madness and social reintegration in 
a wide variety of ways.  Paul Strohm, for example, has argued that Hoccleve’s diatribe 
implicitly supports the dynastic aims of the early Lancastrian kings, while Karen Smyth 
has read the passage as a rhetorical move whereby Hoccleve emphasizes the temporal 
and political immediacy of the “Dialogue.”  Other readers have simply declared the 
passage an aesthetic and thematic mistake, citing it as the “the main blemish” on an 
                                                
58
 James Simpson, “Madness and Texts: Hoccleve’s Series,” Chaucer and Fifteenth-Century Poetry, ed. 
Julia Boffey and Janet Cowen (Exeter: Short Run Press, 1991), 20, 24.  Simpson is not alone in proposing a 
“talking cure” for Hoccleve: Burrow has raised the idea in “Autobiographical Poetry,” especially 402-05, 
and it has reappeared more recently in Sarah Tolmie, “The Prive Scilence of Thomas Hoccleve,” Studies in 
the Age of Chaucer 22 (2000): 281-309. 
198 
otherwise unified poetic whole.
59
  But the “cursid vice” (2.164) of coin-clipping that 
Hoccleve discusses brings issues of value and circulation to the fore.  Given the strong 
economic language that marks descriptions of spoken exchange in the “Complaint,” we 
belittle it at our own peril.   
Rather than dismissing Hoccleve’s account of coin-clipping as an aesthetic 
anomaly, we can more fruitfully examine it through the lens of spoken exchange.  As 
Hoccleve describes them to his friend, the economic implications of coin-clipping are 
closely analogous to the social implications stemming from Hoccleve’s “!ou!tful 
maladie”:  
“Howe shal !e pore do in his holde 
No more moneie he ne haue at al 
Par cas but a noble or halpenie of golde, 
And it so thynne is and so narowe and smal 
That men the eschaunge eschewen oueral? 
Not wil it goo but miche he theronne leese. 
He moot do so, he may noon other chese.” (2.120-26) 
 This account of how coin clipping affects the poor strongly foregrounds issues of 
exchange.  Indeed, the very heart of the problem that Hoccleve describes is not the 
physical act of clipping (the practice of shaving small amounts of gold off coins and thus 
making them “narowe”) but the potential for clipped coins to be refused by merchants 
and kept out of circulation – for their “eschaunge [to be] eschewen.”  What makes coins 
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worthless is not that they have been clipped per se but that they are unable to circulate, 
that they can no longer function effectively in an economy of exchange. 
Coin-clipping was perceived as a genuine threat in the early fifteenth century; 
Hoccleve refers in the “Dialogue” (lines 2.136-40) to a series of statutes introduced by 
Parliament in 1421 standardizing the weight of English coinage and increasing 
punishments for counterfeiters and coin-clippers.
60
  But Hoccleve’s deeply personal 
indignation at the practice of clipping coins – his insistence that coin-clipping “hath hurt 
me sore” (2.101) and that it is the equal of murder, theft, extortion and heresy – does not 
simply reflect a keen eye for current events or a desire to ingratiate himself to potential 
Lancastrian patrons.  Rather, it reflects the struggle that Hoccleve describes so poignantly 
in the “Complaint”: his struggle to reaffirm his social and psychological solvency among 
his colleagues and friends by circulating his own speech among them; his struggle to 
spend the coin rendered suspect by his “wilde infirmite” in the marketplace of socially 
redemptive verbal exchange.  Hoccleve reinforces this connection through a series of 
careful linguistic echoes: his concern that he “may but smal seie but if men deme I rave” 
(1.264) finds a numismatic counterpart in his “narowe and smal” (2.123) coins; his fear 
that the words of his fellow privy seal clerks are of so little value that “thei mi!ten as wel 
haue holden her pees” (1.301) is repeated in the “Dialogue” when he wonders how a coin 
“may ... holde his peis whanne it is wasshe [clipped]” (2.106); his “feble wit” (1.277) 
becomes the coin-clipper’s “feble moneie” (2.102). Hoccleve even associates coin 
clipping with his madness itself: the former he calls “[t]hat venym [which] ouere wide 
and brood spredith” (2.170); the latter he refers to as “the greuous venim / That has 
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enfected and wildid my brain” (1.234-35).  Significantly, the solution to both problems is 
shown to be identical: just as Hoccleve’s “means to sanity ... lies in dialogue,” so too 
does the remedy for the problem of clipped coins lie in economic circulation, a process of 
exchange through which, Hoccleve insists, “Vnwaisshen [uncorrupted] gold shal waisshe 
awey !at vice” (2.182).
61
   
Dismissed or marginalized by many critics, Hoccleve’s discussion of coin-
clipping should, therefore, more accurately be understood as the central conceit of the 
“Dialogue.”  It is the metaphorical framework for the poem’s socially redemptive 
economy, an economy whose respective failures and successes alternately prevent and 
propel the poet’s fraught recovery.  In this respect, the “Dialogue” fundamentally 
reproduces the networks of linguistic and economic exchange developed in Hoccleve’s 
Marian lyrics.  The coin itself – be it clipped or unclipped – becomes a literal 
embodiment of the linguistic currency idealized in “The Monk who Clad the Virgin”; the 
destabilization and proposed redemption of that coin echoes the analogous destabilization 
and redemption of speech in “The Complaint of the Virgin.”  Moreover, insofar as they 
ask us to recall the metaphorical links between the spoken word and the minted coin – the 
“relativity and differentiation” that Boethius sees connecting the two as well as the 
signifying function that each holds within analogous systems of exchange
62
 – Hoccleve’s 
coins, both clipped and whole, become a concrete manifestation of the metaphorical 
value the poet ascribes to the spoken word.  They are emblematic of the properties of 
circulation that make the spoken word so valuable a commodity, and they further remind 
                                                
61
 Simpson, “Madness and Texts,” 24 
62
 See Shoaf, Currency of the Word, 11; Foucault, The Order of Things, 203. 
201 
us of the corruption and subsequent devaluation to which speech, like coinage, is 
necessarily vulnerable. 
 If Hoccleve’s screed against coin clipping responds to his inability to circulate his 
own damaged coin within a linguistic economy, then the “Dialogue” fits into the patterns 
of redemption through verbal exchange developed by the Series as a whole.  First, the 
“Dialogue” extends the recuperative work hinted at in the “Complaint” by replacing the 
implicit and solitary discourse of Isadore’s Synonyma with the explicit, social discourse 
of Hoccleve’s conversation.  More important, however, the “Dialogue” works to position 
the economy of speech developed in the Series into the same idiosyncratic and reciprocal 
economy developed in “The Monk Who Clad the Virgin,” an economy that suggests, 
paradoxically, the simultaneous operation of a seigneurial, vertically aligned hierarchy 
and a mercantile, horizontally inflected arrangement.  Hoccleve alludes to the vertical 
structures of this economy when he invokes the Lancastrian “patronage nexus” into 
which he hopes to enter his work; indeed, we would be hard pressed to think of Hoccleve 
seeking patronage from “My lord of Gloucestre” (2.534), a man second only to “our lord 
lige, our king victorious” (2.554), without considering the strict vertical strategies of 
exchange implicit in such a relationship.
63
 
Hoccleve’s friend in the “Dialogue” suggests a similar hierarchy when he urges 
Hoccleve to atone for the misogyny of his translation of Christine de Pizan’s  L’epistre de 
Cupide.  By writing “sumwhat now ... in honour and preysynge of [women]” (2.673-74), 
the friend insists, Hoccleve will be able to redeem himself from the anger of his female 
readers and once again gain their favor. The friend offers Hoccleve the following advice: 
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“Be heuy of thy gilt, and the confesse, 
And satisfaccioun do thow for it. 
Thow woost wel, on wommen greet wyt and lak 
Ofte haast thow put.  Bewaar lest thow be qwyt. 
Thy wordes fille wolde a quarter sak  
Which thow in whyt depeynted haast with blak.” (2.665-70) 
* * * * * 
“By buxum herte and by submissioun 
To hir graces, yildinge thee coupable, 
Thow pardon maist haue and remissioun, 
And do vnto hem plesance greable.” (2.687-90) 
The posture that the friend advises is one of abject submission, a posture drawn at once 
from the devotional stance that the monk assumes in “The Monk Who Clad the Virgin” 
and from the exaggerated positions of fealty and devotion that informed the discourse (if 
not necessarily the practice) of gender relations within the court.  Indeed, Hoccleve’s 
friend advises the Privy Seal clerk to capitulate entirely to his female readers, to “humble 
[his] goost” (2.692) and “[ask] hir graces with greet repentance” (2.716), to “yilde” 
himself (2.698) to the will of women and “take on thee swich rule and gouernance / as 
thee rede wolde” (2.718-19).  Hoccleve, the friend suggests, will escape from a courtly 
hell of his own making by “prolle [prowling] aftir wommennes beneuolence” (2.744).  In 
the face of the supplicatory posture Hoccleve assumes in the poem, we also see evidence 
of the self-interested philanthropy of the upper classes.  This is particularly true when the 
friend instructs Hoccleve to “do vnto hem [women] plesance greable” (2.690) in order 
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that he might gain “pardon ... and remissioun” (2.689).  The quid pro quo nature of such 
an arrangement underscores the self-interest of Hoccleve’s outward humility.  More 
tellingly, after Hoccleve assumes the posture of subservience that his friend recommends,  
he writes “I lowly me submitte / To your bontees” (2.813-14), a phrase that both 
reinforces the seigneurial hierarchy that Hoccleve proposes and reminds us of the 
“bontee” that he hopes to receive for such submission.  The phrase also pointedly recalls 
Hoccleve’s description of Mary in “Item de Beata Virgine” as “Modir of pitee, / Of al 
bountee thow verray cofre and cheste” (Gollancz V 127-29).  It invites us to see Hoccleve 
in the Series as the same persona who repeatedly commends his soul to the Virgin in 
paroxysms of guilty, sinful abjection. 
But as with the Marian lyrics, the nature of the economy suggested by the poem is 
not entirely that of a feudally inflected hierarchy of exchange.  Indeed, within the 
strictures of the vertical hierarchy he advises, Hoccleve’s friend also suggests that the 
poet “purchase” (2.678) with his “greet craft and art” (2.682) the love of the women he 
has angered, and he warns Hoccleve that without such purchase he will be “qwyt” (2.668) 
for his perceived misogyny.  Both of these sentiments resonate strongly with the precepts 
and the vocabulary of market exchange.  Moreover, Hoccleve’s friend explicitly invokes 
Chaucer’s Wife of Bath as an “auctrice” (2.694), a rhetorical move that draws attention to 
one of the Canterbury Tales’s most hierarchy-violating (not to mention most 
mercantilistic) pilgrims, even as it reverses traditional assumptions of authority by 
declaring a figure so known for her reliance on “experience” to be an “auctrice.” Such 
passages thus undercut the strict hierarchy of intercessor and supplicant and suggest the 
simultaneous existence of a horizontally aligned system of exchange based on mercantile 
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rather than feudal exchange strategies.  Here again, as in the Marian lyrics, Hoccleve 
develops an economy of exchange in which a palpable tension exists between coexisting 
models of noble giving and of the marketplace. 
Despite their manifest similarities, the redemptive economies shared by the 
Marian Lyrics and the “Dialogue” differently construe the specific nature of the linguistic 
currency upon which each economy relies.  The primary medium of exchange in 
Hoccleve’s Marian lyrics is the spoken prayer.  In “The Monk Who Clad the Virgin,” 
Hoccleve’s monk gives the Virgin her garment by uttering a prescribed cycle of Ave 
Marias, the same prayers with which he later ensures himself a place at the head of his 
abbey, with which he is able engender the salvific multiplication of the final stanzas, and 
for which the Virgin “souffissantly qwythth” (123) him.  Prayers perform a similar 
function in the darker “Complaint of the Virgin,” where Mary’s verbal self-effacement 
threatens to deny access to the salvific economy of “herte and cheere and vois” 
(“Complaint” 231) and to the redemption offered by Christ’s sacrifice.  The “Dialogue,” 
however, posits a system of exchange which, while functionally the same as that of the 
Marian lyrics, seems driven more by the written word than by the spoken, a system 
whose currency is the poetic text itself.  This is not to say that speech is unimportant in 
the poem; the “Dialogue,” after all, purports to be the transcript of a conversation 
between friends, a poem that strives to create the illusion of dialogic immediacy.  This 
very dialogic aspect of the poem, after all, grants Hoccleve entree into the economies of 
exchange that catalyze his social and psychological recovery.  But when Hoccleve’s 
friend encourages Hoccleve to assume a devotional stance in order to “purchace” (2.668) 
back the love of  women, he explicitly encourages the poet to “wryte in honour and 
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preysynge,” rather than to speak.  And when Hoccleve finally does “submitte / to [the] 
bountees” (2.813-14) of his female readers, he offers not to verbalize their praises but to 
“translate ... a tale ... late sy [seen], in honour and plesance / of yow, my ladyes” (2.820-
22).  Within the socially and psychologically redemptive economy of the Series, the 
poem itself, like the spoken utterance, becomes a medium of economic exchange.  The 
poet’s written statement joins the spoken devotional utterance as a currency that moves 
up the seigneurial hierarchy of philanthropic giving and across the helter-skelter, 
horizontal plane of the marketplace. 
 What the “Complaint” performs for Hoccleve psychologically and the “Dialogue” 
performs socially, the Series’s envoy to Lady Westmoreland performs extra-textually.  
Signed “Humble seruant to your gracious noblesse / T. Hoccleve” (Series 5.741-2) and 
included immediately after the “Tale of Jonathas,” the envoy establishes a recuperative 
economy beyond the hermetic confines of the poem itself, one whose effect seems 
focused not on Hoccleve’s narrative persona but on Hoccleve himself:
64
 
Go, smal book, to the noble excellence 
Of my lady of Westmerland, and seye 
Hir humble seruant with all reuerence 
Him recommandith vnto hir nobleye 
And byseeche hir on my behalue and preye 
Thee to receyue for hir owne right, 
And looke thow in al manere weye 
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To plese hir wommanhede do thy might. (5.733-40) 
Except for its nod to Chaucer’s Troilus and Criseyde (“Go, litel bok, go litel myn 
tragedye” [TC  5.1786]), this conventional envoy would under most circumstances be of 
only passing interest.  In the specific context of The Series, however, the envoy seems to 
hold for Hoccleve the genuine prospect of redemption from his madness.  Indeed, if the 
autobiographical frame elements of the poem are, as many readers have suggested, 
reflective of Hoccleve’s own struggle for social redemption after a period of mental 
illness, the Envoy may be seen as a final step in the poet’s rehabilitation, a short verse 
that denotes the establishment of a redemptive relationship of exchange outside of the 
confines of the text.  And whereas written poetry replaces spoken prayer and spoken 
petition as a medium of exchange within The Series, The Series itself subsequently 
becomes the medium of exchange within its own envoy.  Like the prayers in the Marian 
lyrics, The Series functions to “byseeche [Lady Westmorland] on [Hoccleve’s] behalue” 
and “to plese hir wommanhede.”  It recapitulates the feudally inflected hierarchy of 
philanthropic giving by recommending the “humble” Hoccleve “vnto hir nobleye” and by 
showing Hoccleve’s “reuerence” in the face of Lady Westmoreland’s “noble excellence.”  
Within the system of patronage and reciprocity that Hoccleve invokes here, he himself 
assumes the position of the monk in his miracle of the Virgin, offering both his fealty and 
his labor, expecting in recompense the fruits of the lady’s “gracious noblesse” (5.741). 
 
Clothing the Virgin and Clothing the Emperor 
Hoccleve’s Marian lyrics and the Series develop an economy of speech that also 
figures in the poet’s remaining autobiographical works, La Male Regle and The Regement 
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of Princes.  Written as a penitential lyric and completed between 1405 and 1406, La Male 
Regle is a ostensibly a first-person account of Hoccleve’s misspent youth, a “confession 
in the form of a prayer to the god of health.”
65
  As such, the poem immediately puts itself 
into a devotional framework familiar from the Marian lyrics, a vertically oriented 
hierarchy that is necessarily predicated upon the offering of the spoken word – here the 
words of confession –  to effect redemption.  Into this devotional framework, Hoccleve 
quickly interjects the economic and linguistic metaphors that we have seen in his other 
poems, referring to the god of health as the “grounde and roote of prosperitee” (Male 2), 
lamenting that “the venym of faueles tonge / Hath mortified ... prosperitee” (211-12), and 
even drawing an implicit link between the words of confession and the coin of the realm: 
“By coyn, I gete may swich medecyne / As may myn hurtes all, !at me greeue, / Exyle 
cleene, and voide me of pyne” (446-48).
66
  In this way, Hoccleve effectively conflates 
coin and auricular confession; the spoken word itself becomes the currency that finally 
voids the poet of his pain. 
 La Male Regle’s development of a devotional linguistic economy akin to that of 
the Marian lyrics comes across most strikingly in the poem’s final few stanzas.  
Beginning conspicuously with the words “I preye” (417), Hoccleve sublimates his 
confession to “Helthe” into a pecuniary petition to “my noble lord !at now is a tresoreer” 
(418), Lord Furnivall.  Hoccleve asks Furnivall for his annuity (419-422), and then, under 
the auspices of apologizing for his bluntness, he writes, 
                                                
65
 Thornley, “The Middle English Penitential Lyric,” 297.  For the dating of the poem see Ellis’s notes to 
La Male Regle de T. Hocleve, in My Compleinte and Other Poems, 77; and Furnivall, introduction to 
Hoccleve’s Works: The Minor Poems, xii. 
66
 Knapp states that in these lines, Hoccleve reverses “the causal sequence between coin and confession, 
between poverty and penance.”  See “Bureaucratic Identity,” 372. 
208 
The prouerbe is, the doumb man no lond getith. 
Whoso nat spekith and with neede is bete, 
And thurgh arghnesse [cowardice] his owne self forgetith, 
No wondir, thogh anothir him forgete. (433-436) 
Hoccleve not only establishes the hierarchical relationship of the devotional lyrics and 
The Series, he also invokes the same system of reflexivity and exchange that he 
developed in “The Monk Who Clad the Virgin” and the “Item de Beata Virgine,” a 
system in which the intercessor (here an earthly rather than a spiritual one) and the 
supplicant are locked in a mutually dependent relationship predicated upon memory.  
More to the point, the intimate relationship between money and language, a relationship 
in which speech promises to alleviate need while silence promises to exacerbate it, is 
explicitly tethered to that reflexivity in La Male Regle.  Here, the “doumb man no lond 
getith” and the “shamelees crauour” (429) will be rewarded with “estaat real” (430). 
 Like La Male Regle, Hoccleve’s speculum principum, the Regement of Princes, 
develops an economy of speech similar to that of the Marian lyrics and The Series, an 
economy in which, as Nicholas Perkins writes, “Hoccleve must negotiate an exchange 
between his words and [a] hoped-for reward from Prince Henry.”
67
  Here, the terms of 
Hoccleve’s linguistic economy are primarily pecuniary rather than socially or spiritual 
redemptive, but both the exchange of word for coin and the concomitant hierarchical 
flexibility are closely analogous.  The terms of the Regement’s specific economy become 
clear when we consider a passage near the conclusion of the poem in which Hoccleve 
laments that he is rapidly running out of poetic ideas. 
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More othir !ing, wolde I fayne speke & touche 
Heere in !is booke; but such is my dulnesse – 
ffor !at al voyde and empty is my pouche, – 
"at al my lust is queynt with heuynesse, 
And heuy spirit comaundith stilnesse. 
And haue I spoke of pees, I schal be stille; 
God sende vs pees, if !at it be his wille. (5013-5019)
68
 
Antony Hassler notes that that Hoccleve here presents himself as a poet “whose words 
are coins, proffered in hope of some return”; the conflation of the monetary and the 
poetic is cemented by Hoccleve’s “voyde and empty ... pouche,” a conceit that evokes 
“the silence encroaching on a weary body and a flagging tongue, a poet who has nothing 
more to say, nothing more to invest.”
 69
  But this passage engages strikingly with the rest 
of Hoccleve’s work.  Within the work’s petitionary mode, the empty pouch is not only 
emblematic of poetic and pecuniary exhaustion; it also becomes an image for the self-
reflexivity and the dependence upon circulation that we have observed in so much of 
Hoccleve’s work, both secular and religious.  Just as the Monk is granted heavenly and 
earthly reward for his speech to the Virgin Mary and just as Hoccleve himself is granted 
relief from his “!ou!tful maladie” through dialogue and social intercourse, so the poet 
who offers linguistic currency from his pouch will be rewarded with fiscal currency to 
put back into that pouch.  It is the inter-circulation of coin and word here that gives both 
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things their value, the ability of poetic language to provide the money needed by the poet 
and the ability of money to provide the poetic language needed by the prince. 
Insofar as they are predicated upon the value that the word accrues as it circulates, 
the economies of speech in La Male Regle and The Regement of Princes are reflective of 
a wide cultural understanding that words can do work, that speech – whether vocalized or 
poetic – can act effectively upon the world around it.  In “The Monk Who Clad the 
Virgin,” spoken prayers clothe the Virgin and engender the young ecclesiast’s salvation; 
in the “Complaint of the Virgin,” the failure of speech brings sorrow to Mary while the 
recuperation of speech holds the promise of Christian redemption.  Among the secular 
poems, Hoccleve’s Series shows verbal and poetic speech to be the means by which the 
poet recovers not only his sanity but his social position; both La Male Regle and The 
Regement of Princes develop economies in which words bring health and wealth to the 
poet.  The efficacy of the spoken word in Hoccleve’s Marian lyrics is crucial to the 
poems’ devotional contexts; as my analysis of Saint Erkenwald demonstrates, the 
performative potential of speech has important ramifications in late medieval religious 
culture.  By developing similar models for the spoken word in his autobiographical and 
political works, Hoccleve indicates that ideals of performative speech are equally 
applicable to secular arenas, that words have the ability to perform work not only for the 
church but for the crown.  For no one is that fact more important than for the early kings 
of the Lancastrian dynasty. 
The struggle of the nascent Lancastrian dynasty to legitimate itself in the wake of 
Richard II’s deposition and subsequent murder is well known.  Strohm provides a 
particularly evocative account of how both Henry IV and Henry V manipulated 
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chronicle-writing, written prophesy, legal writing, public spectacle, and even gossip to 
strengthen their tenuous claim to the throne and to “dominate their subjects’ political 
imagination.”  The Lancastrians even stoked English fears of the encroachment of 
Lollardy in order to cement their reputation as paragons of orthodox Christianity and the 
rightful heirs of the throne “vacated” by Richard II.  As Strohm explains, the first 
Lancastrian kings frequently enlisted poetic texts in their efforts to stabilize rule and 
dramatize their late transformation from nobles into kings: “Fully implicated in the 
Lancastrian task of legitimating self-transformation was the Lancastrian poet.  Long 
recognized as practitioners and exemplars of poetry as ‘symbolic legitimation,’ 
Lancastrian poets like Lydgate and Hoccleve moved well beyond the frontiers of simple 
integration and into a zone of complex complicity.”
70
   
The question of Hoccleve’s “complicity” in the Lancastrian project is still a 
matter of debate; Strohm’s suggestion that Hoccleve was “a royalist stooge” has lately 
met with increasing resistance by those who see both trenchant criticism and genuine 
advice simmering beneath his apparent support of the Lancastrian cause.
71
  I contend, 
however, that the very question of Hoccleve’s complicity, with all of the moral and 
ethical implications that it drags behind it, is the wrong one to be asking.  Whether 
Hoccleve was actively complicit, merely self-interested, or even subtly critical of 
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Lancastrian dynastic ambitions, what was really important to the Lancastrians and their 
supporters was the work that words could do in helping to secure their throne, the ability 
of the spoken word, prayer, prophesy, or poem to make legitimate their royal claim.  
Whether Hoccleve’s poetry actually did perform this dubious service for the house of 
Lancaster is a question that remains to be debated, but there can be no doubt that it 
provided a model for how such work could be transacted and demonstrated.  In their 
idiosyncratically economic terms, Hoccleve’s poems demonstrate the performative 
potential of the word.  But despite the persistence of economic and financial metaphors in 
Hoccleve’s poetry, in the final analysis we can see it moving towards a poetics that seeks 
even to transcend economics, a poetics in which words themselves function to change the 
world around them, a poetics in which, as Lois Ebin writes, “the poet’s words become a 
form of service to the state, a potent source of political illusion making, rewarded and ... 
feared by monarchs.”  As such, we might even imagine Hoccleve pointing toward a 
poetics where “the poet’s language now acquires creative force” and “the poet’s words, 
like the creative Word of God have the power to form a ‘second nature.’”
72
 In this sense, 
Hoccleve’s verse occupies a space where poetic speech not only clothes the Virgin, it 
crowns the King. 
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“Wyth hym there was a Plowman, was his brother”: 
The Two Plowmen and the Power of Speech 
 
 “The Story of the Monk Who Clad the Virgin by Singing Ave Maria” has been all 
but ignored by contemporary critics anxious to dub Hoccleve England’s first 
autobiographical poet on the basis of the Series, the Regement of Princes and La Male 
Regle.  The poem, it seems, was noticed little more in its own time; it exists only in three 
manuscripts, a slim number when we consider the eleven surviving witnesses of 
Hoccleve’s “Complaint of the Virgin,” the ten copies of the poet’s translation of Christine 
de Pizan’s “L’Epistre de Cupide,” or the seven known manuscripts of the Series.
1
  
Nonetheless, “The Monk Who Clad the Virgin” found a dubious second life in one mid-
fifteenth-century manuscript of the Canterbury Tales when it was recited by Chaucer’s 
most famously silent pilgrim, the Plowman.
2
  Introduced by a spurious link in which 
Harry Bailly invites “Ploughman Tylyer” to “telle hys tale, as lot comyth aboute,” 
Hoccleve’s short paean to the Virgin rests uneasily between the tales of the Squire and 
the Second Nun, a straightforward exemplum of Marian devotion in the midst of 
Chaucer’s sometimes conflicting, often heterodox, always beguiling collection of tales.
3
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 The compilers of the Christ Church manuscript might have had several reasons 
for including Hoccleve’s poem in Chaucer’s book.  The simplest is that when they were 
faced with both a mute pilgrim and a few blank pages after the Squire’s Tale, they opted 
to fill both textual voids with a single poetic gesture.  John Bowers, however, suggests 
that the assignment of the Tale to the Plowman rather than another silent pilgrim (one of 
the five guildsmen or the yeoman, for example) is itself significant: 
The plowman-figure had become the focus of considerable controversy 
beginning in the fourteenth century, accused by some preachers of 
opportunism during the labor shortage in the wake of the Black Death, 
praised by Wycliffite writers as the image of the ideal Christian ....  By the 
mid-fifteenth century, the agents responsible for organizing the Christ 
Church manuscript of The Canterbury Tales apparently felt that even a 
mute Plowman was not altogether desirable ....  Provided with a makeshift 
prologue fitting the work into the pilgrimage narrative, [Hoccleve’s] 
rhyme-royal Miracle of the Virgin ... was placed in the mouth of the 
Plowman as a story of unimpeachable orthodoxy.
4
 
In light of the approximate dates of the manuscript in question (c. 1460-1470), the notion 
that Hoccleve’s “Monk Who Clad the Virgin” was added to Chaucer’s work as a 
preemptive defense against Wycliffism seems unlikely; while it lingered into the 1430s, 
the Lollard movement was effectively crushed by the suppression of the Oldcastle 
rebellion of 1414, surviving only as a fringe movement at best.
5
  Moreover, by the time 
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the Christ Church manuscript was compiled, the house of Lancaster was no longer an 
emergent dynasty using the fear of Wycliffism and the stringent enforcement of religious 
orthodoxy to solidify their position on the throne.  Rather it was a dynasty struggling to 
reclaim its position at the head of the English state – by 1461, Henry VI had himself been 
deposed by Edward IV, thus effectively ending Lancastrian rule and ushering in the even 
shorter-lived rule of the House of York.   
 What Bowers calls “the subversive potential of the plowman as a spokesman for 
radical change” nonetheless loomed large in the fraught political and civic environment 
of the 1460s, and the insertion of Hoccleve’s overly orthodox miracle of the Virgin into a 
manuscript of the Canterbury Tales can be understood as an attempt on the part of the 
compliers to eliminate any taint of heterodoxy that clung the Plowman in particular and 
to Chaucer’s text more generally.  Indeed, such a move would not have been 
unwarranted: a manuscript of the Canterbury Tales (as well as a manuscript of the Prick 
of Conscience) was produced as evidence in a 1464 heresy trial.  Possibly, the owners of 
the Christ Church manuscript had good reason to inure themselves against similar 
accusations, thus the addition of the Hoccleve’s overtly orthodox poem. 
 But the “Monk Who Clad the Virgin” was not the Plowman’s final word.  In the 
1535-36 Thomas Godfray edition of the Canterbury Tales and again in the 1542 edition 
of William Thynne, Harry Bailly once more invites the Plowman to join in the tale-telling 
contest, asking him to “Come nere, and tell us some holy thynge.”
6
  This time, rather than 
responding with Hoccleve’s poem, the Plowman offers the compaignye a debate between 
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a pelican and a griffin that advances a clear and unequivocal anti-Papist agenda.  
Suddenly, the sixteenth-century Plowman becomes the very ecclesiastical reformer that 
was so feared in the fifteenth century.  In ways analogous to the addition of Hoccleve’s 
Marian poem, the addition of a “Lollard” Plowman’s Tale to Reformation-era editions of 
the Canterbury Tales makes abundant sense: following Henry VIII’s official break with 
Rome in 1534, it became politically expedient for the “Father of English Poesy” to be 
seen as “an upright Wycliffian forbear” of Tudor Protestantism.
7
  This impulse toward a 
proto-Protestant Chaucer is particularly clear in Thynne’s edition of 1542.  Dedicated to 
Henry VIII himself, Thynne’s Canterbury Tales actually places the anti-Catholic 
Plowman’s Tale immediately after the Parson’s Tale, thus giving the Wycliffite 
Plowman the last word in the Canterbury pilgrimage.
8
  By appending the spurious 
Plowman’s Tale to Chaucer’s complex work, both Godfray and Thynne, in effect, turn 
Chaucer into a good Tudor Protestant. 
 In this dissertation, I have examined representations of speech in Middle English 
literature, focusing particularly on the work that the spoken word performs within that 
literature and how such work both reflects and acts upon its cultural environment.  What I 
have located on a literary level, the Plowman’s Tale enacts on a textual level.  Indeed, in 
the midst of the Wars of the Roses, when the houses of Lancaster and York were vying 
for control of the English throne, the addition of a tale of unimpeachable orthodoxy to a 
single manuscript effectively recontoured the outline of the Canterbury Tales as a whole, 
literally creating a new text that comported with the religious and political sensibilities of 
the mid-fifteenth century.  Less than a century later, during a period when, as Margaret 
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Aston notes “religious persecution was going on under the Act of Six Articles,” the 
addition of the Wycliffite Plowman’s Tale made appropriately Anglican the potentially 
too-Catholic collection of tales.
9
  Insofar as our understanding of the historical Chaucer is 
necessarily mediated through his texts, we can even see the early compilers of the 
Canterbury Tales – Catholic and Protestant alike – as altering the figure of Chaucer 
himself, as making a new author by giving voice to his mute pilgrim.  Thus, while we 
usually imagine Chaucer creating and managing the often clamorous voices of the 
Canterbury pilgrims, the Plowman’s two tales show us that, in important ways, the voices 
of Chaucer’s pilgrims – the ventriloquized speech of 30 imaginary travelers – ultimately 
do the work of creating their author.  Here, filtered through the gauzy haze of history, we 
can see the literary spoken word creating the world around it. 
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